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Challenging the Habeas Process Rather
Than the Result
Justin F. Marceau∗
Abstract
Habeas scholarship has repeatedly assessed whether the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s (AEDPA’s)
limitations on federal habeas relief were as severe in practice as
they appeared to be on paper. By analyzing recent doctrinal
shifts—particularly focusing on two Supreme Court decisions
from this Term—and substantial new empirical data, this Article
acknowledges that AEDPA’s bite has reached substantial
proportions, in many ways exceeding the initial concerns and hype
surrounding
the
legislation.
More
importantly,
after
acknowledging that federal habeas relief from state court
convictions has become “microscopically” rare, this Article
considers what the rarity of relief ought to mean as a prescriptive
matter for federal oversight of state convictions.
Contrary to the dramatic proposals of scholars who have
recently suggested that the general futility of habeas litigation
dictates that individual, case-by-case habeas review should be
abolished, this Article seeks to regain intellectual and practical
traction for the longstanding view that federal courts play an
important role in overseeing and enforcing the Constitution. To be
sure, the path to success for state prisoners on federal habeas
review has become infinitesimally narrow, but the recent scholarly
interest in abandoning federal review of state convictions in nearly
all circumstances other than capital cases misses the mark. This
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Harvard Law School. B.A., Boston College. I am grateful to the thoughtful
comments and suggestions offered by Rebecca Aviel, John Blume, Fredric
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Article suggests that the paucity of success by habeas petitioners
does not naturally or necessarily justify the abandonment of
federal oversight, as the scholarly trend suggests. Instead,
scholars and courts should recognize the critical role federal
courts play in ensuring that the state court process is
fundamentally fair. Indeed, if the primary responsibility for
substantive review now rests with the state courts, the need for
federal oversight of the procedures is heightened. To this end, this
Article makes the case for focusing more attention on the need for
challenges of process rather than result and discusses novel
methods, both under § 1983 and § 2254, for bringing such
litigation. By focusing federal review on the adequacy of the state
process, the deterrence model of federal oversight retains a
position of importance and distinction, and principles of comity,
federalism, and fair process are well protected.
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I. Introduction
Undeterred by a robust and persistent academic commentary
criticizing as constitutionally dubious the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 1 the Supreme
Court has consistently upheld, albeit only indirectly, 2 the
1. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections 18, 21, 28, and 42
U.S.C. (2006)). Scholars have leveled well-founded critiques of AEDPA’s
interference with the ability of federal courts to provide a constitutional
safeguard against unjust state convictions on various theories, ranging from the
Suspension Clause, to the separation of powers doctrine, to the Fourteenth
Amendment. See, e.g., Justin F. Marceau, Un-Incorporating the Bill of Rights:
The Tension Between the Fourteenth Amendment and the Federalism Concerns
that Underlie Modern Criminal Procedure Reforms, 98 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1231, 1239 (2008); see also Bryan A. Stevenson, Confronting Mass
Imprisonment and Restoring Fairness to Collateral Review of Criminal Cases, 41
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 339, 360 (2006) (arguing that the reliability of the
justice system is in question until the AEDPA is repealed).
2. Although the Supreme Court has not squarely addressed the issue, the
circuit courts that have considered the constitutionality of AEDPA’s central
provisions, such as 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), have upheld the enactment as
constitutional. Notably, the United States Attorney General’s Office continues to
intervene and vigorously defend the constitutionality of AEDPA when issues
arise in the lower federal courts. See, e.g., United States Response and
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constitutionality of AEDPA’s restrictions on federal habeas
review of state criminal convictions. 3 At least initially, however,
AEDPA’s limits on federal review seemed to result more in delay,
uncertainty, and confusion than substantially diminished access
to federal oversight. Leading habeas corpus scholar John Blume
characterized the first decade of AEDPA litigation as substantial
“hype” without any serious “bite.” 4 Both in terms of doctrinal
shifts and recent empirical data, much has changed. The
harshness of AEDPA’s restrictions has come into focus over the
past five years.
Recent decisions confirm that the tide has turned and the
once academic questions of AEDPA’s application are, one by one,
being resolved in favor of reduced federal review. Illustrative are
two of the Court’s most recent federal habeas decisions,
Harrington v. Richter 5 and Cullen v. Pinholster, 6 both of which
resolve longstanding and divisive questions of habeas procedure
in favor of substantially curtailing federal courts’ authority to
overturn a state conviction or sentence. Although it is arguable
that the “hype” around AEDPA’s enactment exceeded its “bite” in
the years immediately following its enactment, the most recent
wave of decisions as well as recent empirical data leave little
doubt that AEDPA’s practical bite is even more ferocious than the
initial legislative bark may have suggested. 7 Both in terms of the
Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Petitioner’s Motion to Declare 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(1) Unconstitutional at 7 n.1, Goforth v. Parker, No. 5:09-cv-00352
(E.D. Ky. Apr. 29, 2011) (“While the Supreme Court has never addressed the
constitutionality of Section 2254(d)(1), it has applied this provision more than
thirty times (including in cases decided this Term) without questioning its
constitutionality.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
3. Although the Court has found no occasion to strike down the
limitations on federal review of state convictions contained in AEDPA, in the
context of executive detentions, the Court has recently reaffirmed the notion
that the writ of habeas corpus is an essential bulwark against intrusions on our
fundamental rights. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 742 (2008);
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 588–89 (2006); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466,
485 (2004) (recognizing the right of foreign nationals to challenge their
detention by the U.S. government at Guantanamo Bay).
4. John H. Blume, AEDPA: The “Hype” and the “Bite,” 91 CORNELL L. REV.
259, 261 (2006).
5. Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770 (2011).
6. Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011).
7. There has never been any debate that many of AEDPA’s statutory
enactments simply codified the existing habeas common law. The question,
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factual development of a habeas claim and the standard of review
under which the claim is considered, the Court, particularly
through decisions this Term, has imposed an exceptional array of
barriers to relief. In the words of Professors Nancy King and
Joseph Hoffmann, federal habeas review of state convictions has
become futile, illusory, and so improbable as to be “microscopic.” 8
Indeed, these scholars regard the deterrence model of federal
oversight embraced in this Article as nothing more than a
misguided “fairytale.” 9
After analyzing whether these claims about the demise of
federal habeas review of state convictions have merit, this Article
considers the range of responses to such a reality. As federal
constitutional law becomes increasingly the exclusive domain of
state courts—as state courts become the last, best hope for
constitutional review of one’s conviction—certain fundamental
changes in our thinking about federal review are necessary. One
response—a response that has become fashionable among leading
reform advocates—is to effectively abolish individualized federal
habeas review. 10 This Article concludes that eliminating federal
oversight is not a natural or necessary consequence of diminished
success on the merits but urges, instead, a re-orientation of the
focus of judges and litigants. 11 Federal habeas review may exist
however, has been to what extent the statutory enactments present new
limitations on federal review that were unknown to the common law of this
area. Cf. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 178 (2001) (explaining that Congress
enacted AEDPA both to codify preexisting judge-made doctrines that restricted
the habeas corpus remedy for state prisoners and to impose some new
restrictions, all for the purpose of “further[ing] the principles of comity, finality,
and federalism”).
8. NANCY J. KING & JOSEPH L. HOFFMANN, HABEAS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY: USES, ABUSES, AND THE FUTURE OF THE GREAT WRIT 81–84 (2011).
9. Joseph F. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Rethinking the Federal Role in
State Criminal Justice, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 791, 848 (2009).
10. See KING & HOFFMANN, supra note 8, at 87–108 (proposing that
Congress amend § 2254 to limit the availability of case-by-case habeas review).
11. Instead of reorienting federal review toward a process-based focus, one
could also bolster the effectiveness of federal review by abandoning some of the
key limitations on federal habeas review. See, e.g., John H. Blume, Sheri Lynn
Johnson & Keir M. Weyble, In Defense of Noncapital Habeas: A Response to
Hoffmann and King, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 435, 473–74 (2011) (advocating for the
abandonment of limits on habeas relief such as the procedural default doctrine
and § 2254(d)). This Article, by contrast, starts from the premise that a
refurbished federal habeas system that is more friendly to habeas petitioners is
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in a realm of diminished opportunities to overturn the merits of
state court adjudications, but this dictates that federal oversight
of the relevant state procedures is of increased importance. As
scholars have emphasized, the nature of federal oversight must
remain flexible and responsive to the current legal crises of the
day, 12 and at present, challenges of process will often be at least
as important as challenges to the ultimate result.
As the role of deciding the substantive law, often with
binding and nearly unreviewable finality, falls to the states, it
becomes increasingly important to ensure that states’ postconviction systems are procedurally fair and reliable on an
individual and a systemic level. Consequently—now more than
ever—it is important for prisoners to find creative ways to litigate
challenges to the state process rather than litigating (or as a
means of facilitating) challenges to the result. The era of
exhaustive, de novo federal habeas review has passed, at least for
the time being, and so too must the focus of federal review be
redirected. Building on the conclusion from my prior work that
AEDPA’s deference is conditional—there is a quid pro quo such
that states earn the newfound deference enshrined in AEDPA by
developing state review systems that are sufficiently fair and
reliable 13—I now confront the question of what procedural
mechanisms are available for procedural challenges to state postconviction processes. That is to say, the scope of the writ
expanded in the 1960s in response to the absence of state review,
and it has recently retreated based on the assumption that
federalism and comity require more deference to the nowestablished state post-conviction review procedures. 14 But just as
the absence of state procedures necessitated robust federal
habeas review in the twentieth century, so too is federal oversight
needed in the twenty-first century to ensure the adequacy of the
unlikely and, accordingly, urges a reform that is viable within the existing legal
framework.
12. KING & HOFFMANN, supra note 8, at 87–108.
13. See Justin F. Marceau, Don’t Forget Due Process: The Path Not (Yet)
Taken in § 2254(d) Habeas Corpus Adjudications, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 64–65
(2010) (contending that the AEDPA’s constitutionality may be dependent upon
full and fair state procedures).
14. See Blume, Johnson & Weyble, supra note 11, at 440–41 (describing the
history of noncapital habeas corpus).
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state processes in individual cases. Federal review may no longer
be necessitated by the absence of state procedures, but its role in
ensuring the adequacy of such procedures is no less important.
This Article, then, accepts that under the current form of
post-conviction review, the state habeas systems are now the
critical forum for the litigation of constitutional challenges based
on facts outside the direct appeal record. More significantly, this
Article posits that with this great power, state post-conviction
systems have assumed a commensurate level of responsibility in
terms of providing a full and fair state process. 15 Consequently, if
state collateral review is the last, best chance for constitutional
review, then it is critical to set forth with clarity the nature and
proper litigation platform for challenging procedurally unfair
state processes. This Article is the first step toward envisioning a
shift in focus toward challenges of process as opposed to merely
the result. As set out below, there exist procedures under both
the federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, 16 and the statute
permitting civil litigation regarding constitutional violations, 42
U.S.C. § 1983, 17 as interpreted this Term in Skinner v. Switzer, 18
that provide viable methods for state prisoners to challenge the
process through which their constitutional rights were
adjudicated.
In Part II, I provide the critical background for
understanding that state habeas procedures stand as the last,
best hope, or only viable forum, for robust constitutional
challenges to one’s conviction. In particular, the impact of the
recent decisions in Richter and Pinholster are discussed insofar as
they serve to substantially alter the previous paradigm for merits
review on federal habeas review. This Part also includes a
modest, somewhat impressionistic original empirical study
15. Cf. Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Right Problem; Wrong
Solution, 1 CAL. L. REV. CIRCUIT 49, 52 (2010), available at
http://www.californialawreview.org/assets/pdfs/Circuit/King31.pdf
(explaining
that the federal writ is a great power that requires a commensurate level of
discretion on the part of federal judges, “lest the courts inadvertently drain the
deep reservoir of respect that has sustained it for centuries”).
16. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
18. Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1298–1300 (2011) (determining
that the petitioner’s request for DNA testing can properly be pursued in an
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
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analyzing AEDPA’s impacts on Supreme Court decision-making.
In Parts III and IV, alternative scholarly reactions to the
diminished federal writ are considered. In particular, the
approach suggested by Professors Nancy King and Joseph
Hoffmann, which calls for the general elimination of federal
habeas review, is considered and ultimately rejected. Finally,
Parts V and VI introduce alternative opportunities for processbased challenges to state procedures; Part V discusses and
analyzes process-based challenges through federal habeas, and
Part VI presents a novel procedure for challenging state postconviction procedures through § 1983. The advantages and
disadvantages of each approach to challenging the process rather
than the result are considered in light of the statutory and
common-law limitations on these forms of litigation. This Article,
then, recognizes that federal habeas law has reached a critical
crossroads insofar as recent doctrinal shifts and empirical data
suggest that challenges as to the result of state post-conviction
proceedings, standing alone, will rarely succeed. By urging a
model of federal review focused on challenges of process, this
Article posits that the deterrence model is not dead and ought not
be euthanized, as other scholars have urged; the focus of federal
oversight, however, should be substantially redirected in the
manner proposed by this Article. 19
19. This is the first comprehensive proposal for challenging state processes
since the state post-conviction systems emerged as commonplace during the
period between 1950 and 1970. See Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336, 337 (1965)
(per curiam) (granting certiorari “to decide whether the Fourteenth Amendment
requires that the States afford state prisoners some adequate corrective process
for the hearing and determination of claims of violation of federal constitutional
guarantees”). The Court, however, ultimately remanded to the state in light of
the fact that while the case was pending, the state legislature enacted a statute
providing for post-conviction review. Id. Professor Jordan Steiker has observed
that although the Warren Court “consistently applied an exhaustion
requirement . . . many states did not have robust post-conviction remedies for
non-record claims” during this period. Jordan Steiker, Restructuring PostConviction Review of Federal Constitutional Claims Raised by State Prisoners:
Confronting the New Face of Excessive Proceduralism, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
315, 340; see also Jordan M. Steiker, Improving Representation in Capital Cases:
Establishing the Right Baselines in Federal Habeas to Promote Structural
Reform Within States, 34 AM. J. CRIM. L. 293, 308 (2007) (“State post-conviction
forums grew in response to the emergence of federal habeas corpus as an
effective means for the enforcement of federal constitutional rights of state
inmates. States sought to limit the fact-finding role of the federal courts by
providing their own vehicles for the development of non-record evidence.”).
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II. The Federal Habeas Mirage: Recognizing Federal Review as
Insufficient and Unreliable
After decades of failed legislative attempts to substantially
limit federal habeas review, in the immediate wake of the 1995
Oklahoma City bombing, the Republican Congress passed, and
President Clinton signed into law, the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act. 20 Though the Act’s name suggests a
focus on antiterrorism and the death penalty, the functional
centerpiece of the Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, fundamentally altered
federal habeas corpus review for all state prisoners, whether or
not they were charged with terrorism or a capital crime. 21 Section
2254 applies to all prisoners challenging their state conviction 22
and serves to prohibit federal habeas relief for any claim
20. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104132, §§ 101–08, 110 Stat. 1214, 1217–26 (codified in part at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244–
2267 (2006)); Lee Kovarsky, AEDPA’s Wrecks: Comity, Finality, and Federalism,
82 TUL. L. REV. 443, 447 (2007).
21. The only death-penalty specific provisions of AEDPA were limitations
on the time within which federal habeas judges had to decide a case and an
accelerated statute of limitations. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b), 2261(b), 2263(a)–(b),
2264(a), 2266(b)–(c). These provisions, however, were conditioned on a state
“opting-in” by satisfying certain conditions, such as providing experienced
counsel to defendants during state post-conviction review. Id. To date, no state
has effectively opted in and gained the only AEDPA advantages unique to
capital cases. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b), 2261(b), 2263(a)–(b), 2264(a), 2266(b)–(c).
22. Habeas relief is entirely unavailable to persons who are not in custody.
This means that a person convicted of an offense but not sentenced to any
custodial term is not entitled to the habeas remedy. See, e.g., Carafas v.
LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 237–38 (1968) (holding that a habeas action that is filed
while the prisoner is in custody does not become moot because the prisoner is
released while the habeas petition is pending). To be sure, “the combined effect
of the exhaustion and custody requirements” has led to a decline in the number
of persons convicted in state court who are eligible to file for federal habeas
relief. KING & HOFFMANN, supra note 8, at 73 (describing the custody
requirement as having “choked off federal habeas review”). Contrary to King
and Hoffmann’s assumption, however, the existence of a short sentence, or even
a mere sentence of probation, does not necessarily dictate that the defendant
will not be able to exhaust state remedies and file a federal habeas petition.
Compare id. (noting that only “two of every five people convicted of felonies in
state court are actually sentenced to prison” and that “most will . . . never have
the chance to seek a writ of federal habeas corpus because they will be
sentenced to less than five years and . . . serve less than three”), with BRIAN R.
MEANS, FEDERAL HABEAS MANUAL § 1:9 (2010) (“A person who is on parole or
probation at the time he files his federal habeas petition satisfies the custody
requirement.”).
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“adjudicated on the merits” by the state court unless one of three
exceptions is satisfied: (1) the state court decision was “contrary”
to clearly established federal law; or (2) the state court decision
involved an unreasonable application of clearly established
federal law; or (3) the state court decision was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts. 23 For these purposes, a
state court decision is said to be contrary to federal law only if the
state court applies an interpretation of federal law that is
“diametrically different” or “mutually opposed” to the binding
Supreme Court interpretation of the provision, or if the state
court “confronts a set of facts that are materially
indistinguishable from a decision of [the] Court and nevertheless
arrives at a [different] result.” 24 Similarly restrictive, a state
court adjudication is “unreasonable” only if the state prisoner can
demonstrate
something
“substantially”
more
than
a
constitutional error—that is, if “fairminded jurists” could so much
as reasonably disagree about the decision of the state court, then
federal habeas relief is not available. 25 To be sure, “an
unreasonable application of federal law is different from an
incorrect application of federal law.” 26
AEDPA’s reforms were, almost immediately, greeted by the
legal academe with a vast expression of fear and loathing.
Professor James Liebman captured the sentiment of many
academics on the topic: “Dwarfed among the many unspeakable
evils that [Timothy] McVeigh wrought is a speakable one . . . ,
namely, the so-called Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996.” 27 Stated more directly, there was a fear among
23. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). As discussed in more detail later in the Article,
§ 2254(d)(2) is a potential exception to the deference prescribed by (d)(1). To
date, however, the Court has made no effort to elaborate on the scope and
function of the (d)(2) escape hatch. See Marceau, supra note 13, at 57–59 (noting
that the Court has yet to decide the proper interpretation of § 2254(d)(2)).
24. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 406 (2000) (“On the other hand, a
run-of-the-mill state-court decision applying the correct legal rule from our cases
to the facts of a prisoner’s case would not fit comfortably within § 2254(d)(1)’s
‘contrary to’ clause.”).
25. Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011).
26. Id. at 785 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 410).
27. James S. Liebman, An “Effective Death Penalty”? AEDPA and Error
Detection in Capital Cases, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 411, 411–12 (2001).

CHALLENGING THE HABEAS PROCESS

95

scholars and practitioners that AEDPA was effecting a sub rosa,
procedural evisceration of the critical constitutional protections of
the Bill of Rights incorporated against the states by the Warren
Court. 28 As I have previously explained, “[t]he hallmark of
incorporation under the Fourteenth Amendment, or more
precisely, selective incorporation, is the promise that
constitutional rights must apply with the same force and breadth
in each of the fifty states, a promise that is impossible to realize
under the strictures of [AEDPA].” 29 The enactment of AEDPA,
then, was accompanied by predictions that federal habeas had
been “dramatically altered” to the detriment of our constitutional
democracy. 30
In the first several years after AEDPA’s enactment, however,
the Supreme Court granted relief in several cases under
AEDPA. 31 Moreover, the most notable cases were grants of
28. See, e.g., id. at 420–21; see also Stevenson, supra note 1, at 360. Alan
Chen similarly observed that the AEDPA would handcuff federal courts and
relegate a substantial amount of constitutional litigation to the realm of shadow
law. Alan K. Chen, Shadow Law: Reasonable Unreasonableness, Habeas Theory,
and the Nature of Legal Rules, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 535, 539 (1999).
29. Marceau, supra note 1, at 1232. Of course, not all scholars agree that
the denigration of the Great Writ is a negative legal development. Professors
Joseph Hoffmann and Nancy King believe that federal habeas has largely
outlived its utility and argue that, rather than “pouring tax dollars down the
[habeas] drain[,]” we should leave post-trial review of constitutional defects “to
the state courts.” Hoffmann & King, supra note 9, at 796; see also Hoffmann &
King, supra note 15, at 52 (“[T]he particular crisis of federalism that gave rise to
[the Writ’s] twentieth-century expansion has long since passed . . . .”). Notably,
King and Hoffmann’s suggestion has been adopted in function—though not in
form—by the Supreme Court—that is, constitutional review is largely delegated
to state courts following the Court’s recent decisions; however, the time and
costs associated with federal review, which animates the Hoffmann and King
proposal, have not been alleviated.
30. See, e.g., Bryan A. Stevenson, The Politics of Fear and Death:
Successive Problems in Capital Federal Habeas Corpus Cases, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV.
699, 702 (2002). Many other scholars and commentators joined this apparent
consensus. Contra Hoffmann & King, supra note 15, at 53–54; Kent S.
Scheidegger, Habeas Corpus, Relitigation, and the Legislative Power, 98 COLUM.
L. REV. 888, 888–93 (1998).
31. For example, between 2000 and 2005, there were three Supreme Court
decisions granting relief under AEDPA based on ineffective assistance of
counsel. There are no prior Supreme Court decisions granting relief on this
basis. See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 379–80 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith,
539 U.S. 510, 518–19 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 367 (2000); see
also Blume, supra note 4, at 280 (discussing this phenomena). Also noteworthy

96

69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 85 (2012)

habeas relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel
claims under Strickland v. Washington, 32 a constitutional claim
that the Court itself had never granted habeas relief on prior to
the enactment of AEDPA. 33 This spat of post-AEDPA victories,
among other things, led a prominent habeas scholar to conclude,
perhaps aspirationally, that the impact of the AEDPA reforms
was actually much less than it seemed. As Professor John Blume
emphatically summarized the state of the law up through 2005,
“AEDPA has been less ‘bite’ than ‘hype.’” 34 Simply put, AEDPA
had not achieved “the far reaching effects that many predicted.” 35
This is no longer true. In light of recent developments in the
interpretation and application of AEDPA, and in view of available
empirical data, the conclusion is unmistakable that AEDPA’s
bite, though perhaps slow to manifest symptoms, has gradually
and systemically infected and undermined the federal habeas
infrastructure. As Professor Blume did in 2005, I measure the
impacts of AEDPA based on two metrics: (1) changes in
substantive and procedural habeas doctrine under AEDPA as
compared to the pre-AEDPA habeas common law; and
(2) available empirical data—both a comprehensive 2007 study of
district court habeas cases and a more modest original empirical
project that mirrors the empirical work done by Blume on this
question but updates and broadens the scope of data. Based on
empirical data I gathered, the 2007 empirical study funded by the
Department of Justice, and, most importantly, doctrinal shifts in
the law, this Article conclusively demonstrates that AEDPA has
now developed into a major barrier to relief for state prisoners. As
is the fact that in 2000, state prisoners prevailed in four of the six habeas cases
arising under AEDPA in the Supreme Court.
32. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984) (determining
that to grant habeas relief on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a
plaintiff must show both that “counsel’s representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness” and that the “deficient performance prejudiced the
defense”).
33. Blume, supra note 4, at 279–80.
34. Id. at 261.
35. Id. at 274. Other leading scholars echoed this sentiment. Professor
Larry Yackle, for example, in describing AEDPA’s effect on access to an
evidentiary hearing noted that “on reflection I am not sure any really dramatic
change is afoot.” Larry W. Yackle, Federal Evidentiary Hearings Under the New
Habeas Corpus Statute, 6 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 135, 144 (1996).
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Professors King and Hoffmann have similarly observed, “the
Supreme Court and Congress clearly no longer perceive the need
for more aggressive federal habeas oversight of the state courts in
non-capital cases.” 36 Much more so than in the pre-AEDPA era,
state prisoners now face unique procedural barriers and one of
the most uncharitable standards of review known to law.
In sum, one might fairly describe AEDPA’s impact on
Supreme Court review as having three stages. The initial stage
preceded some or all of the Supreme Court’s decisions addressing
AEDPA and was characterized by substantial and vocal
opposition and criticism—this was the “hype.” 37 The next stage of
AEDPA’s application was characterized by the Court’s
willingness to grant relief in a handful of post-AEDPA cases in
the early 2000s, creating a correspondingly lessened interest by
the academic world in AEDPA. With a diminished bite, the
AEDPA-based concerns seemed less immediate or crucial. And
now, just as the fervent opposition to AEDPA has become less
vocal, or at least less widespread among academics, the Court has
entered a third phase in which the application of AEDPA has
evolved so as to become increasingly harsh and the reversal of
federal courts who disturb state court convictions increasingly
brazen. 38 The remainder of this Part substantiates the claim that
federal habeas review by the Supreme Court has evolved to the
point where it is, both from an empirical and a doctrinal matter,
substantially hostile to the efforts of state prisoners who attempt
to have their conviction or sentence set aside.

36. Hoffmann & King, supra note 15, at 53.
37. See Blume, supra note 4, at 274–87 (describing the “hype” surrounding
AEDPA).
38. The tone of recent Supreme Court decisions is itself worthy of attention.
Repeatedly this Term, the Supreme Court has reversed grants of habeas relief
by the lower courts in sternly worded decisions that accuse the lower courts of
judicial dereliction and “disregard.” See, e.g., Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct.
770, 785 (2011); Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733, 740–45 (2011); see also Cavazos
v. Smith, No. 10-1115, 2011 WL 5118826, at *9 (U.S. 2011) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (per curiam) (stating that “the Court is bent on rebuking the Ninth
Circuit for what it conceives to be defiance” as to the proper standard of review
required under AEDPA).
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A. Empirical Evidence of a Narrowing Scope of Habeas Review
Analyzing federal habeas corpus cases in the Supreme Court
from 1990 to 2005, Professor Blume concluded that the data was
emblematic of the old saying, “What if you gave a revolution and
nobody came?” 39 Blume examined the 105 Supreme Court cases
reviewing state convictions on habeas during this period—sixtyone were pre-AEDPA and forty-one were governed by AEDPA—
and found that AEDPA was having no impact on the success
rates of state habeas petitioners. 40 Specifically, Blume’s data from
1990 through 2005 41 shows that the pre-AEDPA petitioners
prevailed 33% of the time and the post-AEDPA petitioners
succeeded in 34% of the cases before the Court. 42 These numbers
Blume argued, supported the conclusion that many of the
hardships imposed on prisoners by AEDPA were, in reality,
already imposed under pre-AEDPA, court-created doctrines. 43
By updating Blume’s data and expanding the range of years
studied, one is left with the impression that, as an empirical
matter, Blume’s conclusion no longer holds true. I have updated
Professor Blume’s empirical data so that it now runs from 1985
through 2011 (as compared to 1990 through 2006). 44 Most
39. Blume, supra note 4, at 260.
40. See id. at 276 (noting no statistical difference between petitioner
success pre- and post-AEDPA).
41. It may seem anomalous that even after 1996, the year of AEDPA’s
enactment, there were still pre-AEDPA cases. The explanation is that
Amendments made to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244–2267 (2006) by AEDPA do not apply to
cases pending in federal court on April 24, 1996—AEDPA’s effective date. See
Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997) (determining that AEDPA’s
Amendments apply “only to cases filed after the Act became effective”).
42. Blume, supra note 4, at 277.
43. It is possible that Professor Blume’s finding that AEDPA had not had
much effect fails to account for the fact that AEDPA may have discouraged
many prisoners from even filing a petition. Knowing they were time barred, or
aware of how onerous relief had become, it is possible that petitioners were
discouraged from filing habeas petitions and, as such, the effective rate of denial
may have gone up. See KING & HOFFMANN, supra note 8, at 70 (charting the
declining rate of habeas filings by state prisoners).
44. The data was gathered by using the SCT database on Westlaw and
running the following search: habeas & da(aft 1984). The search produced 2,789
results. Each of the results was screened, and the cases that were not federal
habeas appeals from state prisoners were filtered out. We also filtered out
certiorari denials, certiorari grants, dismissals, and any orders or summary (no
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significantly, then, my data examine the Supreme Court’s
decisions in habeas cases brought by state prisoners from 2006
through 2011, critical years of AEDPA development that were not
yet available at the time of Blume’s study, and it provides a
larger set of non-AEDPA cases for purposes of comparison. 45
Whereas Blume’s study considered only 63 pre-AEDPA cases and
41 AEDPA decisions, my dataset includes 182 non-AEDPA cases
and all 115 of the AEDPA decisions to date. 46
opinion) decisions. The result is that some decisions, though they contain
significant reasoning, are not part of the dataset. See, e.g. Medellin v. Dretke,
544 U.S. 660, 666–67 (2005) (discussing the impact of AEDPA on various claims
but ultimately dismissing the case as improvidently granted). In order to
minimize errors in the data collection, at least three people reviewed all of the
cases and the coding. I personally reviewed the coding of all of the cases
included in the dataset. The citations and prevailing party for each case are
reproduced in the appendix. Notably, my dataset is not identical to Blume’s for
the years that were also covered by that study, 1990–2005. While I have
included all of the cases in his study, I have included additional habeas cases
decided by the Court that were, for reasons not explained, not part of Blume’s
dataset. I have included twelve cases that were not part of Blume’s study, each
of which is denoted by an asterisk in the appendix. Although the data gathering
involved the manual review of many cases, this study could be replicated. Lee
Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 38–45 (2002)
(“Research must be replicable.”).
45. Any empirical analysis that is limited to Supreme Court appeals is
subject to a selection effect. Alan K. Chen, The Ultimate Standard: Qualified
Immunity in the Age of Constitutional Balancing Tests, 81 IOWA L. REV. 261,
300–01 n.224 (1995) (“Under what is known as the ‘selection effect,’ the pool of
cases that reaches the trial and appellate courts is not representative of the
entire body of disputes in the legal system.”); id. (compiling sources discussing
the selection effect). Assuming, however, that the selection effect is relatively
constant over time, the comparative results between my study and Blume’s
should not be affected. The recent changes of Supreme Court personnel have
tended, as a general matter, to maintain the status quo on the Court without
any major ideological shifts to the left or the right, and, other than AEDPA
itself, there have not been other major legislative developments that would
make habeas relief more or less likely. I have not attempted to control for these
changes because to do so would require modeling of variables such as judicial
behavior that are difficult or impossible to quantify with precision.
46. Defining the “winner” of habeas cases is not always easy. The gradual
accretion of habeas doctrine means that even a case that reflects a win for an
individual may represent a loss for habeas petitioners more generally. A holding
might, for example, narrow the set of claims that are eligible for relief, and yet
find the petitioner before the Court within the narrowed set. It is true that, in
this way, “‘winners can be losers’ and visa versa.” Blume, supra note 4, at 278
n.104. Likewise, in some cases the prisoner wins on the seminal issue, but loses
on smaller issues. See, e.g., Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 680–81 (1993)
(refusing to apply Stone bar on habeas review to Miranda claims and remanding
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My study of Supreme Court decisions, suggests that there
may have been a lag time or period of time during which the
Court proceeded with caution as it familiarized itself with
AEDPA. 47 The updated dataset, including the years from 2006 to
2011, demonstrates that this unofficial grace period is over.
Between 2006 and 2011, nearly every habeas case reviewing a
state prisoner’s conviction arose under AEDPA, and, by contrast,
in the first two years of AEDPA’s existence, 1996 and 1997, there
was only one AEDPA case adjudicated in the Court. 48 The
on this issue, but reversing the grant on the grounds of involuntariness).
Moreover, this study counts as a “win” for both outright grants of relief by
the Court as well as cases in which the Court reverses a denial of relief by the
lower court and remands for further review. Obviously, this latter category of
victory is contingent, and may reflect only a short, rather Pyrrhic victory under
AEDPA; it is, nonetheless, a victory for that prisoner at that moment in an
AEDPA case. To this extent, a reversal of a lower court denial of relief
accompanied by a mere remand is fairly characterized as a victory in the
Supreme Court, and likewise, a reversal of a grant of relief accompanied by a
remand can reasonably be considered a loss for the prisoner. In light of these
limitations, however, I readily concede that the data compiled herein, classified
as it is in binary form and limited to Supreme Court cases, is probably less
revealing than the discussion elsewhere in this Article examining the doctrinal
developments that illuminate unequivocally the “bite” of AEDPA.
47. In studying the impact of AEDPA, I have focused only on those cases
for which AEDPA’s provisions have been directly applied in a reasoned
opinion—that is, the cases examined are only cases of state prisoners
challenging the constitutionality of their detention through federal habeas. In
this way, the dataset reflects only a study of the impact of AEDPA—positive,
neutral, or negative—on those cases for which AEDPA’s statutory terms are
relevant. One could re-orient this study to include, for example, the recent wave
of cases that challenge executive detentions at Guantanamo or immigration
detentions and perhaps get different results. Because my goal was to estimate
the impact of AEDPA in Supreme Court decisions, I did not consider cases for
which AEDPA was clearly irrelevant. The dataset also includes only reasoned
opinions and not summary orders dismissing a case as improvidently granted,
or granting certiorari, vacating the decision below, and remanding. See Zant v.
Moore, 489 U.S. 836 (1989); Webster v. Cooper, 130 S. Ct. 456 (2009). If,
however, the GVR or summary reversal took the form of a reasoned opinion,
even if relatively brief, then it was included. See Terrell v. Morris, 493 U.S. 1
(1989); Dye v. Hofbauer, 546 U.S. 1 (2005); Schriro v. Smith, 546 U.S. 6 (2005);
Corcoran v. Levenhagen, 130 S. Ct. 8 (2009); see also Medellin v. Dretke, 544
U.S. 660 (2005) (excluded from my dataset because the case was dismissed as
improvidently granted despite the fact that it contains a substantial reasoned
majority opinion as to the application of AEDPA to the claims in question).
48. During the relevant time period, from 2006 through 2011, the Court
only decided a few pre-AEDPA cases, two of which were merely summary
reversals of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. See generally Bobby v. Van
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commonplace nature of AEDPA cases before the Court has
allowed a fuller scope of the AEDPA limitations to be revealed in
recent years. The doctrinal shifts resulting from these new and
more frequent cases are discussed below, but the rate of prisoner
success in these cases, therefore, provides impressionistic
empirical data in support of the conclusion that AEDPA’s bite has
become severe. 49
As indicated in Table 1, the rate of relief in all non-AEDPA
cases from 1985 through 1995, the decade preceding AEDPA’s
enactment, was 37.5%, and the rate of success for cases not
governed by AEDPA in the Court from 1985 through 2011 was
nearly 35%. By contrast, the Supreme Court has issued 91
opinions in cases for which AEDPA applies since the legislation
was enacted in 1996, and the rate of relief in those cases is only
27.4%. 50
Table 1. Rate of Success in Habeas Cases 1985-2011
Category of Case

Success Rate of
Prisoner

1985–1995 (pre-AEDPA
cases)
1985–2011 (non-AEDPA &
pre-AEDPA cases)
1996–2011 (AEDPA cases)

37.5% (36/96)
34.8% (47/135)
27.4% (25/91)

Whereas Table 1 allows for a comparison of the pre-AEDPA
cases and the AEDPA cases across the entire period of AEDPA’s
existence, Table 2 looks at the data in five-year increments.
Hook, 130 S. Ct. 13 (2009) (per curiam); Wong v. Belmontes, 130 S. Ct. 383
(2009) (per curiam).
49. For example, during 2010 and 2011, only three state prisoners out of
eighteen, or roughly 16%, prevailed on a habeas petition before the Supreme
Court, a dramatic downtick from previous years.
50. To be sure, some of the cases in which relief was denied post-AEDPA
would have come out the same way under pre-AEDPA law. See, e.g., Berghuis v.
Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2265 (2010) (determining that prejudice could not
be shown, even under de novo review); Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 409
(2007) (holding relief is barred by Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), which
laid out the framework for when to retroactively apply a new rule to an old
criminal case).
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Specifically, from 1996 through 2011 there have been 91 total
AEDPA cases, and the prisoners have prevailed in 25 of the
cases. There are only 39 non-AEDA cases for this entire period.
Table 2. Rate of Success in 5 year Increments after AEDPA’s
Enactments
1996–2000

2001–2005

2006–2011 51

2010–2011

50% (5/10)

22.8% (8/35)

Non25% (5/20)
AEDPA 52

36.3% (4/11)

23.9%
(11/46)
25% (2/8)

13.6%
(3/22)
x

AEDPA

Table 2 provides support for the view that there was an
informal grace period for AEDPA cases in the Supreme Court
during which time the full force and scope of the statutory
reforms had not been realized. Initially, very few AEDPA cases
reached the Court, and the rate of success in these initial cases
was surprisingly high. Whereas the first 19 prisoners (1996–
2001) succeeded at a rate of over 45% (6/13), the last 24 prisoners
(2010–2011) have succeeded at a rate of about 14%. The
percentage of cases that are governed by AEDPA is approaching
100%, and the rate of success in these cases is plummeting. 53
To avoid the distortions of small datasets, it is most useful to
compare a robust sample of cases. From 1985 through 1995, for
example, 132 non-AEDPA cases were decided, and the rate of
51. The period from 2006 through 2011 is six years rather than five.
52. The non-AEDPA data is being provided in five-year increments in the
interest of having a complete census of the cases in the post-AEDPA era, but the
number of cases is likely too small for meaningful statistical inference.
53. It is worth briefly noting that there is one anomaly in the data that
defies easy explanation. Although the rate of success for all non-AEDPA cases
from 1985 through 2011 is roughly 35%, in the thirty-nine non-AEDPA cases
from 1996 through 2011, relief was only obtained 28% (11/39) of the time. One
might suggest that this low rate of success for non-AEDPA prisoners reflects a
general mood shift away from habeas relief in the AEDPA era. Or, perhaps, it
tends to confirm Blume’s conclusion that AEDPA had no consequence, at least
in terms of the raw rate of success for prisoners before the Court. But the
dataset for post-AEDPA cases that are not governed by AEDPA is relatively
small, only thirty-nine total cases spread across sixteen years. A similarly small
dataset reveals rates of success under AEDPA of only 14.2% for the past two
years. Both datasets are likely too small to make meaningful statistical
inferences.
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success for prisoners was 37.5%. That is to say, for the eleven
years leading up to the enactment of AEDPA, state prisoners
were victorious in the Supreme Court in one out of every 2.6
cases. By contrast, considering all 91 AEDPA cases from 1996
through 2011, the rate of prisoner success was only 27.7%, or one
out of every 3.6 cases. The data demonstrate, consistent with the
doctrinal narrative presented in the next section of this paper,
that the rate of success for habeas prisoners has declined.
More to the point, the contrast between all AEDPA cases
(1996–2011), and all non-AEDPA cases for the eleven years prior
to AEDPAs enactment (1985–1995) reveals a stark drop in the
rate of success, suggesting the bite of AEDPA has taken hold. To
be sure, one could argue that comparing data from 1985–1995 to
data from 1996–2011 is unrevealing as to AEDPA’s relative
impact insofar as the court’s pre-AEDPA jurisprudence was more
generous to state prisoners in the 1980s and early 1990s than it
was later in the 1990s. 54 As a practical matter, however, all of the
judicially imposed limitations on habeas relief, including the
Teague decision, 55 had been handed down by1995, making this a
valuable, if not conclusive, range for comparison. Indeed,
Professor Blume identified ten key pre-AEDPA “cutbacks” on
habeas relief that occurred prior to AEDPA and made AEDPA
somewhat redundant and superfluous; all ten of these major
developments occurred prior to 1995. 56
54. See, e.g., Blume, supra note 4, at 266–70, 276, 280 (discussing the
Court’s creation and use of new rules and limitations on habeas, especially in
the late 1980s and early 1990s, noting most of the Court’s habeas modifications
were in place by 1990, and stating the Court’s reforms had significantly
diminished the writ’s potency by the time of AEDPA); see also Mark Tushnet &
Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws: The Pathologies of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prison Litigation Reform
Act, 47 DUKE L.J. 1, 10–11 (1997) (contrasting the previous retroactivity
standard with the Court’s approach in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989),
which used an “extremely expansive definition of what would count as ‘new’ for
habeas purposes” and thus greatly reduced the number of claims that could
survive).
55. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 299–306, 310 (1989) (stating that
retroactivity of a new rule of constitutional criminal procedure is a threshold
issue, and asserting that “new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not
be applicable to those cases that have become final before the new rules are
announced” unless certain limited exceptions apply).
56. See Blume, supra note 4, at 265–68 (noting the Court’s habeas reform
efforts from the 1970s to the 1990s).
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A second and more salient critique of my study is that a
study of relief in the Supreme Court is unreflective of the broader
trends among lower courts regarding the likelihood of relief. 57 I
am also willing to concede this point and note, as Professor
Blume did in 2006, that this is “a limited empirical argument.” 58
However, just as Professor Blume looked exclusively at success
rates from the Supreme Court in order to support his claim that
the likelihood of success with or without AEDPA deference was
“remarkably stable,” 59 I look at success rates in the Supreme
Court in order to argue that while the AEDPA picture was
initially stable, it is no longer so. My data suggest that the
“arcane statutory language” used in AEDPA and the suddenness
with which “Congress enacted AEDPA” 60 may have caught the
Court off guard, slowed the impacts of the statutory reform, and
created a sort of AEDPA grace period. But the grace period
appears to be over. The data reflected in Tables 1 and 2, although
not conclusive, are usefully predictive of a downward trend in the
rate of success for state prisoners in the Supreme Court, and it
seems likely that as the rate of success in the Supreme Court
diminishes, lower courts seeking to avoid reversal will also
become more parsimonious with grants of relief to habeas
petitioners.
Finally, other available post-AEDPA research tends to
corroborate the findings of the original empirical study I have
presented here. Any empirical claim about the impacts of AEDPA
would be substantially incomplete if it failed to reference the
impressive empirical study completed in 2007 by Professors
Nancy King, Fred Cheesman, and Brian Ostrom, with funding
from the Department of Justice. 61 There does not appear to be
57. See Chen, supra note 45, at 300 n.224 (discussing authority regarding
the selection effect problem); cf. Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Distorting Slant of
Quantitative Studies of Judging, 50 B.C. L. REV. 685, 707 (2009) (noting that in
quantitative studies of judicial politics there is a “lopsided” focus on the
Supreme Court. This “disproportionate focus is not itself what misleads.”
Instead the “problem arises when scholars loosely slip from making assertions
about judging on the Supreme Court to assertions about judging generally”).
58. Blume, supra note 4, at 276.
59. Id. at 277.
60. Id. at 261.
61. See NANCY J. KING ET AL., FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT: HABEAS LITIGATION
IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF HABEAS CORPUS CASES FILED BY
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any consensus about the rate at which habeas relief was
ultimately granted to state prisoners prior to AEDPA. Professors
King and Hoffmann have speculated that “[e]xcluding capital
cases, success rates for state prisoners in habeas probably never
approached double-digit percentages.” 62 Wright and Miller, for
example, estimated, based on available studies, that no more
than 4% of habeas petitioners were granted relief. 63 Another
study found that, prior to AEDPA, relief was granted in 40% of
the capital habeas cases. 64 The DOJ-funded 2007 study, by
contrast, found that relief was granted in district courts in 0.35%
of non-capital cases (7/1986), and in 12% of capital cases (33/267)
after AEDPA. 65 By any measure, and based on any available preAEDPA data, the 2007 study suggests that relief is granted in
substantially fewer cases under the AEDPA. 66
STATE PRISONERS UNDER THE ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT
OF 1996 9, 10 (2007), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/219
559.pdf (“Each year, more than 18,000 cases, or one out of every 14 civil cases
filed in federal district courts, are filed by state prisoners seeking habeas corpus
relief . . . .”).
62. KING & HOFFMANN, supra note 8, at 89.
63. Martin A. Schwartz, The Preiser Puzzle: Continued Frustrating Conflict
Between the Civil Rights and Habeas Corpus Remedies for State Prisoners, 37
DEPAUL L. REV. 85, 103 n.108 (1988) (citing WRIGHT & MILLER, PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3261 (1981)).
64. See JEFFREY FAGAN, ET AL., FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT: GETTING TO
DEATH: FAIRNESS AND EFFICIENCY IN THE PROCESSING AND CONCLUSION OF DEATH
PENALTY CASES AFTER FURMAN 7, 56 (2004), available at https://www.ncjrs.
gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/203935.pdf (reporting the conclusions of a study that
considered more than 5,000 decisions in capital sentences and found that 40%
were reversed by state courts performing federal habeas review and 40% were
reversed by federal habeas courts).
65. KING ET AL., supra note 61, at 64. This study only takes into account
rates of relief in the trial court. Commentators who have considered the rate of
relief including appeals have suggested that the rate of relief might actually be
substantially higher. See Blume, Johnson & Weyble, supra note 11, at 452
(“[A]ccording to our data, the set of successful noncapital cases grows by 22%
when appellate outcomes are considered.”).
66. KING ET AL., supra note 61, at 59 n.109.
The study also notes another source of empirical data regarding the
impacts of AEDPA: In 2003 Judge Weinstein took on 500 non-capital
habeas cases that had been pending in the Eastern District of New
York for up to six years. . . . The concentrated disposition of 500 cases
provides a statistical snapshot of post-AEDPA habeas processing by
one judge in one federal district. He granted relief in 9 of the 494
cases terminated without transfer, a grant rate of 2.0%. This is nearly

106

69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 85 (2012)

B. Recent Doctrinal Developments Substantially Undercut Federal
Habeas Review
Professor Blume supported his conclusion that AEDPA was
over-hyped in 2005 not just through his empirical analysis of
Supreme Court cases but also by considering the scope and effect
of doctrinal shifts wrought by the AEDPA regime. 67 Blume
concluded that the habeas framework itself had not, contrary to
the fears and predictions of commentators, substantially shifted
to the detriment of the petitioners. 68 This too has changed. In the
past five years, the procedures and standards governing federal
habeas review have substantially evolved so as to reduce the
power of federal courts to reverse unconstitutional state
convictions. 69 The viability of federal habeas review has been
substantially undercut, and perhaps no single Term has been
more devastating for the modern habeas petitioner than the
Court’s 2010–2011 Term.

six times higher than the grant rate of 0.35% in our nationwide
sample.
67. See Blume, supra note 4, at 271–74 (describing the special expedited
capital case “opt-in” provision and § 2254(d) of AEDPA, highlighting that no
state has successfully opted into the expedited capital provisions, and stating
the Court has “said little about how § 2254(d) works beyond that it limits a
federal court’s power to grant relief”).
68. See Blume, supra note 4, at 260–61, 297 (noting that the Supreme
Court has been as active after AEDPA as it was before, and the success rate of
petitioners remained essentially unchanged after AEDPA’s passage).
69. See, e.g., Renico v. Lett, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1859 (2010) (“Because AEDPA
authorizes a federal court to grant relief only when a state court’s application of
federal law was unreasonable, it follows that ‘[t]he more general the rule’ at
issue . . . ‘the more leeway [state] courts have in reaching outcomes in case-bycase determinations.’” (first and third alterations in original) (citation omitted));
Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 119, 121–22 (2007) (stating that AEDPA limits
habeas and holding that a habeas “court must assess the prejudicial impact of
constitutional error in a state-court criminal trial under the ‘substitute and
injurious effect’ standard, whether or not the state appellate court recognized
the error and reviewed it for harmlessness” (citation omitted)); Shriro v.
Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007) (noting AEDPA’s prohibition of relief unless
the state court’s determination was unreasonable rather than incorrect is a
“substantially higher threshold” and stating that, when determining whether to
grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal court must take the deferential
standards from § 2264 into account).

CHALLENGING THE HABEAS PROCESS

107

Two recent Supreme Court decisions, Harrington v. Richter 70
and Cullen v. Pinholster, 71 are illustrative of the recent might of
AEDPA’s bite. These decisions substantially fill out the doctrinal
contours of § 2254(d) by answering longstanding questions about
the scope of federal habeas review post-AEDPA. 72 Both decisions
interpret § 2254(d), the modern centerpiece of federal habeas
practice, so as to limit state prisoners’ access to Writ. 73 As
developed in detail below, the thrust of these two decisions is to
simultaneously limit both the form and the function of federal
habeas corpus practice. Pinholster alters the form or procedures
of habeas practice by holding that new evidence, not originally
part of the state court record generally, “has no bearing” on the
federal court’s review of the state court decision. 74 The Richter
decision, by contrast, limits the functional work or substantive
merits review of a federal habeas court 75—that is to say, Richter
elaborates on the narrow set of circumstances in which a federal
court may disturb a state conviction. Just this Term, then, the
Court has considerably clarified the constricted nature of the
procedures available for federal habeas review as well as the
70. Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770 (2011).
71. Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011).
72. The issue presented in Richter, for example, had remained the subject
of heated debate since AEDPA’s enactment. More than seven years ago,
Professor Evan Lee foresaw the risk of deference to summary state dispositions
and counseled against such an approach. See Evan Tsen Lee, Section 2254(d) of
the Federal Habeas Statute: Is It Beyond Reason?, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 283, 284
(2004) (“One of the most pressing issues is how federal habeas courts should
review ‘silent’ state court decisions—that is, summary affirmances or summary
denials of relief, or opinions that dispose of whole claims in a perfunctory
manner.”).
73. See Scheidegger, supra note 30, at 945 (recognizing § 2254(d) as the
defining feature of the AEDPA statutory regime).
74. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1400.
75. See Harrington, 131 S. Ct at 786–87 (stating § 2254(d) requires that “a
state prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being
presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error
well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for
fairminded disagreement”). I am not the first commentator to consider the
standard of review language in § 2254(d)(1) to be one of AEDPA’s few
substantive limitations on relief. Leading scholar Larry Yackle, for example, has
observed, “One provision in AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), is more
substantive.” Larry Yackle, Federal Habeas Corpus in a Nutshell, HUMAN
RIGHTS MAGAZINE, Summer 2001, at 8.
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nature of the ultimate merits adjudication. In the wake of these
decisions, it is difficult to take seriously the claim that federal
habeas serves as a meaningful check on state post-conviction
proceedings. 76 As this subpart demonstrates, it is increasingly
clear that state collateral review is the last best chance for
constitutional review; the substantive deference 77 owed to state
courts provides a narrow window for achieving success on the
law, and the constricting procedural rules ensure that federal
habeas relief based on newly developed facts will be similarly
difficult.
1. The Habeas Standard of Review in Practice:
Harrington v. Richter
As previously mentioned, Professor Blume’s view in 2005 was
that the dire predictions about AEDPA’s impact far outpaced its
practical effect. 78 And other leading scholars shared this view. In
the months just after AEDPA’s enactment, for example,
Professors Larry Yackle and Mark Tushnet theorized that
AEDPA was largely a “symbolic” statute that made only trivial or
76. Professors King and Hoffmann have gone so far as to conclude that
“federal habeas review . . . completely fails” to correct or deter state court errors.
KING & HOFFMANN, supra note 8, at 81. The likelihood of relief, they note, is
“very close to zero,” and thus reliance on federal habeas for any error correction
function is, in their mind, “absurd.” Id. But see, e.g., Blume, Johnson & Weyble,
supra note 11, at 451–52 (disputing the empirical conclusions drawn by King
and Hoffmann by pointing out, among other things, that their study is limited to
habeas review in district courts and that a meaningful number of habeas relief
grants are awarded at the federal appellate level).
77. Some have rightly criticized the use of the term “deference” to describe
the restrictions on relief contained in § 2254(d), and with good reason because
the term “deference” nowhere appears in AEDPA. See, e.g., Kovarsky, supra
note 20, at 444 (critiquing the view that “AEDPA’s legislative history supports
an interpretive mood disfavoring habeas relief”). Nonetheless, the Court has
embraced the term’s use in this context. See, e.g., Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.
Ct. 770, 787 (2011) (noting that the court of appeals decision demonstrated
insufficient “deference to the state court’s determination”). But the term has
been adopted by the Court in this context. See, e.g., Renico v. Lett, 130 S. Ct.
1855, 1862 n.1 (2010) (“The dissent correctly points out that AEDPA itself ‘never
uses the term “deference.’” But our cases have done so over and over again to
describe the effect of the threshold restrictions in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) . . . .”
(citations omitted)).
78. Blume, supra note 4, at 297.
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“marginal changes” to the already existing judicially created
limitations on relief. 79 Early in AEDPA’s history, it was not
uncommon to conclude that the statutory reform would
ultimately only serve to “tinker at the edges” of habeas law and
that the Court would choose very “limited interpretations” of the
Act. 80 Recent decisions interpreting one of the centerpieces of the
AEDPA reforms, § 2254(d)(1), 81 standing alone, demonstrate that
such predictions have missed the mark.
In a nutshell, § 2254(d)(1) insulates unconstitutional state
convictions from federal oversight by providing that relief is
unavailable to a state prisoner unless he can demonstrate the
state court conviction amounted to “an unreasonable application
of, clearly established Federal law.” 82 In 2006, Professor Blume
observed that “the Court has . . . provided almost no guidance
regarding the necessary increment of error warranting habeas
relief” under this provision. 83 Presently, however, the Court’s
aggressive interpretation of § 2254(d)(1) serves to ensure that
most state prisoners are not eligible for relief despite the fact that
their convictions rest on unconstitutional procedures—that is to
say, “an unreasonable application of federal law is different from
79. See Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws:
The Pathologies of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the
Prison Litigation Reform Act, 47 DUKE L.J. 1, 3 (1997) (contrasting the previous
retroactivity standard with the Court’s approach in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S.
288 (1989), which used an “extremely expansive definition of what would count
as ‘new’ for habeas purposes” and thus greatly reduced the number of claims
that could survive).
80. Id. at 4. The work of Tushnet and Yackle in unpacking the relationship
between the Court and the Congress in the mid-1990s was brilliant and likely
descriptively accurate. As time has passed, however, it is clear that the Court’s
approach to AEDPA has far outpaced the preexisting limitations on habeas
relief. Recent cases undermine the previously sound conclusion that “[c]ourts
will eschew sharp breaks with judicially developed reforms and will prefer more
modest adjustments in the system.” Id. at 26.
81. This provision is often the determinative barrier between relief and
non-relief in modern habeas cases. Because of the breadth of this provision’s
application, it is often the provision that the Court focuses on to the exclusion of
other aspects of § 2254. See, e.g., Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733, 739 (2011)
(explaining that the provision “[r]elevant here” is § 2254(d)(1)); see also
Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 785 (2011) (noting that the lower court
had “relied” exclusively on (d)(1) in denying relief in this case).
82. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (1996).
83. Blume, supra note 4, at 292.
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an incorrect application of federal law.” 84 Unless an error is so
patent and egregious as to amount to an intentional disregard for
the supremacy of federal law, then the unconstitutional
conviction must not be reversed by a federal court, “lest intrusive
post-trial inquiry” threaten the autonomy of the states and the
comity interests at issue in our criminal justice system. 85
Accordingly, whereas prior to AEDPA a federal habeas
court’s review of a state court’s conclusions of law in support of a
conviction were reviewed de novo, without any deference, cases
like Harrington v. Richter from this Term make clear that federal
habeas review now has considerably less of a role in defining and
enforcing the substance of constitutional protections. In Richter,
the Court spends more than three pages elaborating on the
appropriate level of deference to be afforded to state courts, and
emphasizing that the lower courts’ application of AEDPA looked
too much like the pre-AEDPA standard of review and thus
reflected
an
“improper
understanding
of
§ 2254(d)’s
86
Firmly
rejecting
an
unreasonableness
standard . . . .”
application of (d)(1) that is primarily semantic and largely retains
the habeas status quo, the Court explained:
Here it is not apparent how the Court of Appeals’ analysis
would have been any different without AEDPA. The court
explicitly conducted a de novo review, and after finding a
Strickland violation, it declared, without further explanation,
that the “state court’s decision to the contrary constituted an
unreasonable application of Strickland.” AEDPA demands
more. Under § 2254(d), a habeas court must determine what
arguments or theories supported or, as here, could have
supported, the state court's decision; and then it must ask
whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that

84. Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 785 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410 (2000)); see also Larry W. Yackle, The
Figure in the Carpet, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1731, 1754 (2000) (“[T]his understanding
keeps faith with the Court’s insistence that federal courts must sometimes
withhold habeas relief even if they think that a state court reached an erroneous
determination of a mixed question. The test is not whether the state court
reached the correct decision, but whether that court reached a decision that was
reasonable.”).
85. Premo, 131 S. Ct. at 740 (internal quotation marks omitted).
86. Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 785.
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those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding
in a prior decision of this Court. 87

Federal relief is precluded, in other words, unless “there is no
possibility fairminded jurists could disagree.” 88 Far from a slight
adjustment to the pre-AEDPA de novo review, 89 the Court
stressed that (d)(1)’s “unreasonableness question” is not merely a
“test of [the federal court’s] confidence in the result it would reach
under de novo review.” 90 Instead, not even a particularly “strong
case” for constitutional relief justifies reversal under the newly

87. Id. at 786 (emphasis added).
88. Id. Notably, the notion that state court convictions should be affirmed
so long as any reasonable basis for denying relief exists—even if it is not
actually the basis for the state’s denial of relief—reflects the Supreme Court’s
rational basis review as to other constitutional questions. Under rational basis
review, a constitutional violation does not exist if there is any rational basis for
the government action, and under (d)(1) a violation of a constitutional right
must go without remedy if there is any rational basis for supporting the state
court’s misapplication of the Constitution. Compare Bd. of Tr. of Univ. of Ala. v.
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 366–67 (2001) (“Under rational-basis review, . . . the
State need not articulate its reasoning at the moment a particular decision is
made; [rather] any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a
rational basis for the classification [will suffice].” (internal quotation marks
omitted)), and Neelum J. Wadhwani, Note, Rational Reviews, Irrational Results,
84 TEX. L. REV. 801, 803 (2006) (identifying cases where the Court treats
rational basis scrutiny as satisfied “if there is any rationally conceivable basis
for the government’s conduct”), with Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1402
(2011) (“[A] habeas court must determine what arguments or theories . . . could
have supporte[d] the state court’s decision; and then it must ask whether it is
possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are
inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of this Court.” (quoting Richter,
131 S. Ct. at 786) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
89. Professors Yackle and Tushnet had previously predicted that “[j]udged
by its text, and the legislative history behind that text, section 2254(d)(1) may
reinforce the traditional scope of the writ . . . and confirm Brown’s principle of
independent federal adjudication. Thus the federal habeas courts may grant
relief whenever they conclude that a prisoner’s claim is meritorious, no matter
what view the state courts previously took.” Tushnet & Yackle, supra note 79, at
44; see also id. at 47 (“Once again, another of the AEDPA’s provisions produces
marginal results. This is only to be expected. Symbolic statutes must
nonetheless fit into the legal landscape.”). Obviously, in the wake of decisions
like Harrington, this is no longer a viable position. See Schriro v. Landrigan, 550
U.S. 465, 473 (2007) (recognizing that relief under (d)(1) required showing an
unreasonable decision by the state court, which is a “substantially higher
threshold” than showing a merely incorrect decision).
90. Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786.
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explained habeas standard. 91 It is no longer the case that federal
habeas serves as a reliable “federal forum” for adjudicating
constitutional questions regarding state convictions. 92 Only
“extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems”
justify federal intervention, 93 and the key, according to the Court,
is to recognize that “state proceedings are the central process, not
just a preliminary step for a later federal habeas proceeding.” 94

91. See id. (stating a “strong case for relief does not mean the state court’s
contrary conclusion was unreasonable”).
92. Professor Evan Lee helpfully organized the various theories in support
of federal habeas review into four distinct categories. Evan Tsen Lee, The
Theories of Federal Habeas Corpus, 72 Wash. U. L.Q. 151, 152–54 (1994)
(discussed in Yackle, supra note 84, at 1756). Lee has described the “federal
forum” theory as the conception of habeas that was embraced by Hart, Liebman,
Yackle, and others.
93. Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786. Richter has had an immediate impact on the
Court’s habeas decisions. In a per curiam decision later in 2011, the Court’s
opening sentence introduced the AEDPA standard of review not by quoting
§ 2254(d) but rather by quoting Richter. Bobby v. Dixon, No. 10-1540, 2011 WL
5299458, at *1 (U.S. Nov. 7, 2011) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct.
770, 786–87 (2011)).
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, a state
prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus from a federal court
“must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being
presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there
was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law
beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.”
AEDPA’s application during the Roberts’ Court makes it difficult to discern
what, if any, distinction there is between the Court’s current application of
§ 2254(d)(1) and the interpretation of that clause by the Fourth Circuit that was
rejected by Justice O’Connor, writing for the majority, in the first case
interpreting the meaning of the unreasonableness clause. See Williams v.
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409 (2000) (rejecting as erroneous the Fourth Circuit’s
conclusion that a “state-court decision involves an ‘unreasonable application
of . . . clearly established Federal law’ only if the state court has applied federal
law in a manner that reasonable jurists would all agree is unreasonable”).
94. Id. at 787. The centrality of the state proceedings does not compel the
conclusion that the federal proceedings are irrelevant. I continue to regard
federal habeas as a critical source of deterrence, even if relief is only
occasionally granted. As one group of commentators has recently remarked, “If
the prospect of subsequent federal habeas review was eliminated, there is every
reason to believe that relief rates in state courts would decrease, not because of
a reduction in the number of deserving cases, but because a key incentive for
state courts to acknowledge and remedy constitutional error would be absent.”
Blume, Johnson & Weyble, supra note 11, at 453.
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This approach to federal habeas review is not without
significant practical consequences. In Valdovinos v. McGrath, 95
for example, a three-judge panel from the Ninth Circuit
considered an instance of prosecutorial malfeasance in the form
of failing to disclose exculpatory evidence as required by Brady v.
Maryland. 96 Professor Scott Sundby has described the Brady
right as a sort of “constitutional superhero that not only would
ensure that a criminal defendant had access to all important
exculpatory evidence before facing the State at trial, but also
embodied the prosecutor’s ethical duty to pursue ‘justice’ and not
simply victory in the courtroom.” 97 The Brady right may be heroic
in form, but the modern interpretations of AEDPA make Brady
meek in function. The Ninth Circuit concluded that there was
little doubt “Valdovinos’s Brady rights were violated” but
nonetheless held that, because federal review is constrained by
§ 2254(d), the petitioner was not “entitled to habeas relief.” 98 The
point is, even as to the most sacrosanct of the constitutional
criminal procedure rights, under AEDPA, the duty of
constitutional enforcement is largely delegated to the state
courts.
Related to the issue of how much deference to give to a state
court judgment is the question of when state court judgments are
entitled to deference. In summarizing the “important issue[s]”
regarding AEDPA that remained unresolved up through 2005,
Professor Blume identified as critically unresolved the question of
“what significance an unexplained or summary state court
decision should have.” 99 Several other scholars and judges
95. Valdovinos v. McGrath, 42 F. App’x 720 (9th Cir. 2011).
96. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding “the
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request
violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to
punishment”).
97. Scott E. Sundby, Fallen Superheroes and Constitutional Mirages: The
Tale of Brady v. Maryland, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 643, 646 (2002).
98. Valdovinos, 423 F. App’x at 722–23. Professor Evan Lee has eloquently
argued that a standard of review that considers the degree of error, or “how far
off the mark” the decision is, must be recognized as nonsense. When, for
example, there is a Brady violation, asking “how far off the mark” the state was
in concluding that there was no Brady violation is “like asking how far off the
mark an answer of ‘on’ is when the correct answer is ‘off.’” Lee, supra note 72, at
289.
99. Blume, supra note 4, at 293.
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similarly identified the impact of summary state court denials—
e.g., “Relief is denied on the merits”—on AEDPA deference as a
pressing issue for purposes of understanding how severe the
AEDPA limitations on relief would be in practice. 100 Professor
Evan Lee eloquently explained his view on the issue as follows:
I would not require anything of state courts that is not already
required of them. They are already required to follow federal
law, but they are not required to write opinions justifying their
decisions. The pending question is what sort of review a
federal habeas court ought to perform if the state court
chooses not to write. If the state court wishes to take
advantage of the “unreasonable application” clause of
§ 2254(d)(1), it can write; if not, then not. Some may still
complain that this is tantamount to requiring state courts to
write because, it might be said, of course all judges want their
decisions reviewed as deferentially as possible. I am unmoved
by this argument. The statute establishes a sort of quid pro
quo: if state courts want their law application reviewed
deferentially, then they owe the reviewing court an
explanation of what they did. 101

100. Compare Lee, supra note 72, at 315–17 (concluding that AEDPA
deference ought not apply absent a reasoned state court decision), and Brittany
Glidden, When the State is Silent: An Analysis of AEDPA’s Adjudication
Requirement, 27 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 177, 205–14 (2002) (same), and
Adam Steinman, Reconceptualizing Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners:
How Should AEDPA’s Standard of Review Operate After Williams v. Taylor?,
2001 WIS. L. REV. 1493, 1529 (same), and Monique Anne Gaylor, Note,
Postcards from the Bench: Federal Habeas Review of Unarticulated State Court
Decisions, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1263, 1284–85 (2003) (arguing state court
decisions with no articulated reasoning should not be considered “adjudications
on the merits” for AEDPA purposes), with Scott Dodson, Habeas Review of
Perfunctory State Court Decisions on the Merits, 29 AM. J. CRIM. L. 223, 230–31
(2002) (concluding that AEDPA “contemplates some sort of judicial reasoning
process” but that the state court is not required to articulate its reasoning to get
deference from the habeas court), and Claudia Wilner, Note, We Would Not
Defer to That Which Did Not Exist: AEDPA Meets the Silent State Court
Opinion, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1442, 1461–64 (2002) (describing the “adjudicated on
the merits” language of AEDPA as including all state court decisions “except
denials on procedural grounds” and making an analogy to exhaustion doctrine,
in which a silent state court decision is treated as a denial on the merits).
101. See Lee, supra note 72, at 312 (commenting that, in the context of
independent and adequate bars to federal litigation, the Supreme Court has
explained that a state may insulate a decision from review by stating clearly
and unequivocally that the decision rests on state rather than federal law
grounds) (citations omitted).
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Likewise Judge Calabresi provided a similar explanation of the
proper functioning of § 2254(d)(1):
[T]he AEDPA runs the risk of imposing a heavy, and
sometimes unwanted and unmanageable, burden on State
courts. Specifically, if AEDPA deference were deemed
automatically and universally to apply, then that law would
require extremely busy State court judges to figure out what
can be very complicated questions of federal law at the pain of
having a defendant incorrectly stay in prison should the State
court decision of these complex questions turn out to be
mistaken (but not unreasonably so). . . . In contrast, a reading
of the AEDPA under which AEDPA deference does not apply
where a State court has rejected a petitioner's claim without
expressly mentioning its federal aspects allows State courts to
avoid this burden. It enables State courts to choose whether or
not they wish to take on the burden and be deferred to. . . .
Under this interpretation, State courts that wish fully to
evaluate federal claims need only indicate that they have done
so, and their decisions will be deferred to. 102

This question of how to deal with silent or summary state court
decisions is not of interest only to academics or academically
oriented judges; the deference owed to silent state court
judgments is of immense practical importance. The Supreme
Court has highlighted that the California Supreme Court issues
at least “several hundred” summary denials each year, each of
which is so cursory as to make it impossible to even discern
whether the denial of relief is on the merits or, for example,
because of untimeliness. 103 This Term, however, also in
Harrington v. Richter, the Supreme Court held that there is no
requirement that a “state court . . . give reasons before its
decision can be deemed” entitled to deference under § 2254(d). 104
102. Washington v. Schriver, 255 F.3d 45, 62–63 (2d Cir. 2001) (Calabresi,
J., concurring).
103. See Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 198–99 (2006).
104. Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 785 (2011). Likewise, Blume
observed that the Court’s retroactivity doctrine had yet to be reconciled with the
strictures of AEDPA. Blume, supra note 4, at 294. But the Court has now
granted certiorari to resolve this issue. See Brief of Petitioner at i, Greene v.
Fisher, 131 S. Ct. 1813 (2011) (No. 10-637), available at http://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/previewbriefs/other_brief_updates/
10-637_petition er.authcheckdam.pdf (“[W]hat is the temporal cutoff for whether
a decision from this Court qualifies as ‘clearly established Federal law’ under 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
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Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Kennedy explained that
“[t]here is no text in [§ 2254] requiring a statement of reasons,”
and the Court seemingly responded to the likes of Judge
Calabresi by commenting that the “[o]pinion-writing practices in
state courts are influenced by considerations other than avoiding
scrutiny by collateral attack in federal court.” 105 After Richter,
even where the state court denial of relief does not state that the
denial of relief is on the merits, federal courts are ordered to
presume that the state court adjudication was on the merits and,
therefore, to apply the onerous limitations on relief contained in
§ 2254(d).
In short, AEDPA’s maturation process has not been good for
state prisoners. Decisions like Richter leave no doubt that
AEDPA has wrought significant changes to the role that federal
courts play in substantively reviewing state convictions. 106
Federal constitutional errors by state courts present an evershrinking target for federal habeas courts. Only the clearest state
court errors—indeed, only those errors that border on outright
defiance or rejection of federal supremacy—will warrant federal
intervention to cure an unjust conviction or sentence. And even
state court judgments that do not contain any reasoning are
entitled to the full scope of AEDPA shielding deference.

Act of 1996?”); see also Evan Tsen Lee, Section 2254(d) of the New Habeas
Statute: An (Opinionated) User’s Manual, 51 VAND. L. REV. 103, 119 (1998) (“If
‘clearly established’ is measured as of the time of the trial, then the Teague
doctrine has been expanded. If ‘clearly established’ is measured as of the time
direct appeals are concluded, then Teague has been codified, at least in that
respect.”).
105. Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784. Justice Ginsburg concurred only in the
judgment of the case, but she did not dissent as to any of the Court’s analysis.
Id. at 793 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); see also id. at 784 (majority opinion)
(explaining that the “issuance of summary dispositions in many collateral attack
cases can enable a state judiciary to concentrate its resources on the cases
where opinions are most needed”).
106. A media article cited a prominent capital lawyer, reporting that “‘We all
understood AEDPA seriously cut back federal habeas review,’ said Tarik S.
Adlai, a Pasadena-based appellate attorney who represents defendants. ‘But the
Supreme Court has said, “No, the pond is much more shallow than you
thought.”’ Robert Iafolla, High Court and 9th Circuit Battle Over Federal
Habeas Claims, LOS ANGELES DAILY J., May 16, 2011, at 1 (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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2. The Procedural Abyss of Federal Habeas Practice:
Pinholster v. Cullen in Context
AEDPA’s demanding substantive standard of review is not
the only feature of the 1996 Act that has recently come into focus
so as to substantially disadvantage state prisoners. Recent
procedural developments further portend the conclusion that
AEDPA’s bite has caught up to its initial hype.
Professor Yackle has aptly observed that “[c]onstitutional
claims invariably turn on the underlying historical facts.” 107 Facts
are the critical foundation upon which a claim of constitutional
defect can rise to the level of “unreasonableness” as required for
federal intervention under § 2254(d). This conclusion has been
confirmed by the King Report from 2007. 108 The study found that
one of the most reliable predictors of ultimate success for a
habeas petitioner was whether the federal court ordered an
evidentiary hearing in the case. 109 Specifically, “a case in which
an evidentiary hearing was held was 32 percentage points more
likely to result in a grant than a case in which an evidentiary
hearing was not held, controlling for other factors.” 110 Similarly,
the study found that grants of discovery in federal habeas cases
are also significantly correlated with ultimate success rates. 111
The study concedes that “[i]t is unclear whether evidentiary
hearings and discovery are granted because the judge first
determines that a claim is potentially meritorious, or whether the
causal relationship operates in the other direction, with discovery
and hearings revealing proof of merit that would otherwise be
unavailable.” 112 What is clear, however, is that AEDPA now
substantially curtails the availability of hearings and discovery
and diminishes the importance of any evidence garnered through
these mechanisms. One study conducted prior to the enactment of
107. Yackle, supra note 35, at 135.
108. See KING ET AL., supra note 61, at 89 (“An evidentiary hearing has a
more powerful relationship with the probability of relief than any variable other
than location.”).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 87 n.159.
111. See id. at 89 (“Also increasing the likelihood of relief (by nine to 12
percentage points) was an order of discovery.”).
112. Id.
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AEDPA found that capital habeas petitioners received hearings
at a rate of about 19%, but the King study found that capital
habeas petitioners received hearings in only 9.5% of cases. 113 The
King study also shows that during the relevant post-AEDPA
years, non-capital habeas petitioners received a federal
evidentiary hearing at the almost non-existent rate of 0.4%, or
“one of every 243 cases.” 114
The absence of access to discovery or an evidentiary hearing
in the period of the study, between 2000 and 2005, is not directly
attributable to AEDPA. AEDPA contains a provision,
§ 2254(e)(2), which specifically limits access to evidentiary
hearings, but the limit is merely a codification of the pre-AEDPA
rule. By its plain text, § 2254(e)(2) limits access only to those
prisoners who are “at fault and bear[] responsibility for the
failure” to develop the facts in state court. 115 Notably, an
unwillingness to permit factual development in federal court,
when the prisoner could have presented such facts through
reasonable diligence in state court, is entirely consistent with the
pre-AEDPA barriers announced in Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes. 116
That is to say, even prior to AEDPA, prisoners’ efforts to develop
new facts in federal court after being dilatory in state court were
113. Id. The study also confirms that significantly fewer capital habeas
petitioners are receiving relief post-AEDPA. See id. at 61 (finding that
approximately 13% of capital habeas petitioners receive federal relief, as
compared to roughly 40% of petitioners at a point in time considerably before
the enactment of the AEDPA). The study also found that petitioners only
received discovery in post-AEDPA cases about 12.5% of the time. Id. at 64.
114. Id. at 36. Interestingly, the rate of relief under AEDPA is, according to
the King study, also less than one-half percent. See id. at 52 (finding 0.35%
relief rate in non-capital cases). Apparently, there is not a reliable source of data
regarding the rate at which pre-AEDPA evidentiary hearings were granted in
non-capital cases, but the authors of the AEDPA study speculate that at least
1.1% of all habeas cases received an evidentiary hearing prior to AEDPA. Id. at
60. The study also found that only 0.3% of non-capital defendants received
discovery. Id. at 36.
115. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 432 (2000).
116. Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 6 (1992). There is, however, one
critical difference between the pre- and post-AEDPA limits on evidentiary
hearing access. Prior to AEDPA, if a prisoner “failed” to develop the facts in
state court through non-diligence, he was merely required to demonstrate cause
and prejudice for the failure. Id. By contrast, under § 2254(e)(2), a prisoner who
fails is barred from a hearing absent a showing of a set of conditions that, to the
best of the author’s knowledge, no prisoner has satisfied.
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substantially curtailed. Perhaps, then, the decline in evidentiary
hearings found in the King study can best be understood as a
product of the general anti-habeas petitioner interpretive mood
that scholars like Lee Kovarsky identified in the wake of AEDPA
and less as a result of any direct textual or judicial limitation. 117
Notably, starting in 2007, after the King study’s data
collection was complete, the Supreme Court began to take a more
active approach to limiting state prisoner access to federal habeas
hearings. 118 Whereas previous AEDPA decisions had focused
primarily on the merits of the state court decision and the proper
application of § 2254(d)(1)’s deference, in Schriro v. Landrigan, 119
the Court granted certiorari and reversed a lower court’s mere
grant of an evidentiary hearing. 120 That is to say, the court of
appeals had not granted habeas relief but had merely remanded
for an evidentiary hearing in order to develop more facts in
support of the alleged constitutional violation, and the Court
reversed. 121 Given the Supreme Court’s stingy standards for
reviewing cases, 122 it is noteworthy that the Court deemed the
mere provision of factual discovery an issue of sufficient national
importance to warrant briefing, argument, and ultimately,
reversal. On a micro level, the Court’s decision resulted in Jeffrey
Landrigan’s being executed without the benefit of factual
development in support of a claim of ineffective assistance of
sentencing counsel. 123 On the macro level, Landrigan left lower
117. See Kovarsky, supra note 20, at 444.
118. In truth, some such efforts to formally limit access to new facts had
occurred prior to 2007, but they were relatively limited. See, e.g., Holland v.
Jackson, 542 U.S. 649, 653 (2004) (holding that the AEDPA limits on
evidentiary hearings, § 2254(e)(2), applied as well to efforts to expand the record
to include new facts even in the absence of a hearing).
119. Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465 (2007).
120. Id. at 473.
121. Id.
122. See SUP. CT. R. 10 (“A petition for writ of certiorari will be granted only
for compelling reasons.”); see also Cavazos v. Smith, No. 10-1115, 2011 WL
5118826, at *5 (U.S. Oct. 31, 2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (per curiam)
(criticizing the majority for taking a law correcting approach, rather than
looking for broad issues in need of sweeping clarification, in the realm of
AEDPA interpretation).
123. The Court refused to permit discovery or a hearing as ordered by the
court of appeals, despite the fact that the trial court judge who had sentenced
Landrigan to death signed an affidavit stating that she would not have
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courts considerably less certain about their post-AEDPA
authority to order evidentiary hearings in cases in which the
prisoner was not at fault for failing to develop the facts in support
of his claim in the state courts. Prior to Landrigan, it was de
rigueur for a lower court, barring a failure by the prisoner that
would trigger the onerous requirements of § 2254(e)(2), to order
an evidentiary hearing under the generous pre-AEDPA standard
for granting hearings. Indeed, outside of § 2254(e)(2), AEDPA did
not explicitly mention, let alone limit, evidentiary hearing
access. 124
Consequently, although there is not yet any empirical data
on this point, it is very likely that lower federal courts became
even more reluctant to grant evidentiary hearings in the postLandrigan world because, much more so than the text of AEDPA
itself, the Landrigan decision called into question the preexisting
framework for obtaining an evidentiary hearing. 125 But if AEDPA
generally, and the Landrigan decision more specifically, made
access to evidentiary hearings more difficult, the Court’s recent
decision in Cullen v. Pinholster 126 threatens to fundamentally
alter the way federal habeas courts consider factual development.
Under Pinholster, new facts developed during federal habeas
proceedings have “no bearing” on federal habeas review such that
the “federal habeas petitioner must overcome the limitation of

sentenced him to death had she known about some of the mitigating evidence
that his lawyer had failed to uncover. See Editorial, No Justification for the
Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2010, at A30.
124. See, e.g., Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 669–70 (9th Cir. 2005)
(recognizing the pre-AEDPA rule of a mandatory hearing applies barring a
failure for purposes of (e)(2) by the petitioner); United States ex rel. Hampton v.
Leibach, 347 F.3d 219, 234 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Having thus determined that the
AEDPA posed no bar to taking additional evidence on Hampton’s claim, the
court turned to pre-AEDPA standards.”).
125. The pre-AEDPA law governing evidentiary hearings was generous to
state prisoners who were not at fault for the non-development of facts in state
court. See ANDREA LYON ET AL., FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS: CASES AND MATERIALS
(2d ed. 2011) (referring to these standards as the “high-water mark” for access
to federal courts). Under Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963), for example, a
federal court was required to hold an evidentiary hearing when the habeas
petitioner stated a colorable claim of constitutional deprivation and had not had
a full and fair opportunity to develop the facts in state court. Id. at 322.
126. Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011).
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§ 2254(d)(1) on the record that was before the state court” without
the benefit of any facts developed through a federal hearing. 127
In Pinholster, the defendant was convicted of murder by a
California jury and sentenced to death. 128 A federal district court
judge granted Pinholster an evidentiary hearing in order to
develop facts in support of his claim that trial counsel was
constitutionally ineffective during the sentencing proceedings of
his trial and ultimately granted Pinholster relief based on the
facts adduced during the evidentiary hearing. 129 In reversing the
grant of relief, the Supreme Court held that the lower court erred
when it considered the newly adduced evidence in determining
the prisoner’s eligibility for relief. 130 The majority opinion cited
two reasons in support of the holding.
First, the five-Justice majority explained:
Section 2254(d)(1) refers, in the past tense, to a state-court
adjudication that “resulted in” a decision that was contrary to,
or “involved” an unreasonable application of, established law.
This backward-looking language requires an examination of
the state-court decision at the time it was made. It follows that
the record under review is limited to the record in existence at
that same time i.e., the record before the state court. 131

In addition, the Court invoked a general view of congressional
purpose to support the result:
This understanding of the text is compelled by “the broader
context of the statute as a whole,” which demonstrates
Congress’ intent to channel prisoners’ claims first to the state
courts. “The federal habeas scheme leaves primary
responsibility with the state courts . . . .” Section 2254(b)
requires that prisoners must ordinarily exhaust state remedies
before filing for federal habeas relief. It would be contrary to
that purpose to allow a petitioner to overcome an adverse
state-court decision with new evidence introduced in a federal
habeas court and reviewed by that court in the first instance
effectively de novo. 132
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at 1400.
Id. at 1396.
Id. at 1397.
Id. at 1398.
Id.
Id. at 1398–99 (citations omitted).
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It is important not to understate the potential significance of
the Pinholster holding on future federal habeas litigation. In the
short term, Pinholster has resulted in a rush of GVRs from the
Supreme Court, 133 and orders from lower courts requesting
briefing as to whether previously granted evidentiary hearings
are no longer justified under Pinholster. 134 Over the longer term,
however, Pinholster threatens to substantially reduce the
viability of federal habeas relief in cases where court assistance—
e.g., subpoenas or discovery orders—is needed in order to
substantiate a claim of constitutional injury. 135 Writing shortly
after AEDPA’s enactment, Professors Tushnet and Yackle were
confident that “[i]n the end, courts are likely to read [AEDPA] to
authorize federal evidentiary hearings in most of the same
circumstances in which hearings were conducted in the past.” 136
133. See, e.g., Ryan v. Detrich, 131 S. Ct. 2449 (2011) (vacating and
remanding lower court decision in light of Pinholster). For a thorough discussion
of the Supreme Court’s GVR procedure, see generally Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl,
The Supreme Court’s Controversial GVRs—And an Alternative, 107 MICH. L.
REV. 711 (2009). GVR stands for “grant, vacate, remand” and refers to the
Court’s procedure for granting certiorari, vacating the lower court decision
without a finding of error, and remanding the case back to the lower courts for
additional review. Id. at 712. The GVR device allows “the lower court the initial
opportunity to consider the possible impact of intervening developments and, if
necessary, to revise its decision accordingly.” Id.
134. See Bruhl, supra note 133, at 712 (“[T]he purpose of the GVR device is
to give the lower court the initial opportunity to consider the possible impact of
intervening developments and, if necessary, to revise its decision accordingly.”).
For an example of GVRs in this context, see Atkins v. Clarke, 642 F.3d 47, 48
(1st Cir. 2011) (applying Pinholster to deny a hearing and relief). Illustrative is
a recent federal district court decision in which a grant of discovery and a
federal hearing was revoked by the court after Pinholster was decided. See
Carter v. Bigelow, No. 2:02-cv-326, 2011 WL 2551325, at *2 (D. Utah 2011)
(“[F]urther factual development in this case would be futile since the results of
such factual development could not be considered by this Court in resolving
Petitioner’s claims.”).
135. Factual development through discovery and evidentiary hearings has
long been considered a hallmark of good federal habeas practice. Justin F.
Marceau, Deference and Doubt: The Interaction of AEDPA § 2254(d)(2) and
(e)(1), 82 TUL. L. REV. 385 (2007); see also Yackle, supra note 35, at 135 (noting
that “[c]onstitutional claims invariably turn on the underlying historical facts”).
And, for the most part, discovery orders and hearings in a § 2254 case do not
occur until after the federal habeas petition has been filed. If district courts are
amenable to granting hearings and discovery prior to the filing of the petition,
then the impact of Pinholster might be mitigated for reasons discussed in the
next Part of the Article. Infra Part V.
136. Tushnet & Yackle, supra note 79, at 40. Professors Tushnet and Yackle
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The limitation on access to a federal hearing under Pinholster,
however, substantially curtails the availability of hearings by
limiting hearings to circumstances where the defendant can
satisfy § 2254(d)(1) without the benefits of any newly adduced
evidence. In other words, the excruciating standard of review
commanded by cases like Richter apparently must be satisfied
completely on the basis of the state court record and without the
benefit of federal court fact-finding or discovery.
The data has shown that federal hearings are one of the best
indicators of success on the merits, but after Pinholster, the
circumstances in which habeas discovery or an evidentiary
hearing is available seem perilously narrow. When § 2254(d)
applies, a strong argument can be made that any evidence
extrinsic to the state court record that a petitioner seeks to rely
on is precluded for one of two reasons—either the evidence is
merely cumulative of what was produced below and thus a
hearing is unnecessary and unavailable, or the evidence is
conclusively non-cumulative or novel, and thus barred under
Pinholster. 137 Stated another way, Pinhoster creates a stifling
catch-22 for many federal habeas petitioners. On the one hand,
Pinholster holds that “if the factual allegations a petitioner seeks
to prove at an evidentiary hearing” would not satisfy the
requirements for relief under (d)(1), then “there is no reason for a
hearing.” 138 In other words, a hearing is generally not permitted
unless the facts sought to be developed at the hearing would
satisfy the strictures of (d)(1). But on the other hand, under the
Pinholster rule, if the new evidence that would be adduced at a
hearing would demonstrate that (d)(1) is satisfied, then the use of
observed that it would be quite “extraordinary” if § 2254 were read to limit
evidentiary hearings to circumstances in which the prisoner could establish a
strong claim of innocence and either the existence of “new” law or “new” facts
that were previously undiscoverable. Id. at 38. The limitation on access to a
federal hearing in Pinholster, however, may actually be even more
extraordinary.
137. Habeas Rule 6, governing discovery, permits discovery only where
“good cause” is shown. R. GOVERNING SEC. 2254 CASES IN U.S. DIST. CTS. 6,
printed in 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006). Surely mere cumulative factual support will
rarely, if ever, amount to good cause. The Rule also requires that the party
specify exactly what information will be sought. Teti v. Bender, 507 F.3d 50, 60
(1st Cir. 2007).
138. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1414 (citing Shriro v. Londrigan, 550 U.S. 465,
481 (2007)).

124

69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 85 (2012)

the evidence is conclusively barred because the review for relief
eligibility under § 2254(d)(1) “is limited to the record that was
before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the
merits.” 139 A hearing is barred if it would not generate the sort of
evidence that would justify relief, and yet evidence that is
sufficiently new so as to justify relief is outside of the federal
court’s scope of review.
Procedural labyrinths are nothing new for those versed in
AEDPA practice, but the Pinholster decision creates a system of
federal review that is particularly inhospitable to efforts to
establish an entitlement to constitutional relief. The impact of
this limitation, particularly in view of the increased deference
prescribed by (d)(1) in cases like Richter, will be to profoundly
limit the availability of federal habeas relief. 140 When a state
court summarily and without explanation denies relief, the
limitations enshrined in (d)(1) apply. Moreover, when a prisoner
is at fault for failing to develop facts in the state court, those facts
ordinarily cannot be raised in federal court under § 2254(e)(2).
And even if a petitioner is diligent so as to avoid (e)(2)’s bar on
hearings, now, under Pinholster, a hearing is permitted only
when the prisoner can satisfy (d)(1) on the basis of the state court
record alone. This trifecta of procedural barriers ensures that the
safekeeping of substantive federal constitutional rights in the
realm of criminal law is increasingly outside the purview of
federal courts, and instead reserved for state post-conviction
review. 141
139. Id. at 1398.
140. The most robust limitation on Pinholster that could reasonably be
imagined would be that a federal hearing is permitted whenever the petitioner
attempts and fails, through no fault of his own, to develop facts in state court.
The expectation that a hearing is available under such circumstances would
require the Court to read very narrowly its own recent and nearly unanimous
decision in Pinholster, a seemingly unlikely result. It is far from clear that the
sort of diligence—i.e., non-fault—required to satisfy the strictures of § 2254(e)(2)
will also suffice to satisfy Pinholster.
141. There will still be rare instances in which new evidence will be
admitted in federal habeas proceedings in support of a prisoner’s claim of
constitutional injury. Ervin v. Cullen, No. C 00-01228, 2011 WL 4005389, at *3
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2011) (applying the “new claim” exception and permitting
discovery in service of a Brady claim); Bemore v. Martel, No. 08cv0311, 2011 WL
2650337, at *1 (S.D. Cal. July 6, 2011) (permitting an expansion of the record to
include an affidavit that confirms the factual allegations that were assumed to
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III. Considering the Consequences of a Diminished Writ: Abolish
or Reorient the Writ in Criminal Cases?
There is a distinguished line of scholars and judges who have
argued federal habeas must function so as to “guarantee[] a
federal forum for every claim of non-harmless constitutional error
by a state convict.” 142 As illustrated by the discussion above, this
theory of federal habeas review—the “federal forum” theory—is
almost entirely rejected by the AEDPA-centered decisions of the
Roberts Court in this past Term. 143 Under AEDPA, the primary,
and often final, arbiters of federal constitutional law are state
post-conviction courts, 144 and federal habeas review of state
convictions is substantively de minimis for the first time since
1867, when federal habeas review of state convictions became
statutorily recognized and roundly accepted. 145 Accepting that
be true by the state court adjudicating the claim).
142. See Lee, supra note 92, at 153 (compiling authorities).
143. As Professor Lee has explained, it is possible to understand the
conceptual underpinnings for a broad approach to federal habeas review as
being rooted either in a belief in the “federal forum” imperative, or in a belief
(which I share) that regards federal review as playing a necessary role in
deterring state court errors as to constitutional law. Id. at 153–54. Despite
commentary to the contrary, there is still room to argue that the existence of
federal habeas review deters state courts from defying federal constitutional
mandates. The relief may be rare, but this could be explained, in part, by the
existence of federal review itself, which serves as a deterrent to state courts
reviewing constitutional challenges. But see Hoffmann & King, supra note 9, at
811 (“[B]ecause grants of habeas relief are so infrequent, and often occur long
after the trial is over, they cannot possibly pose a meaningful deterrent for state
actors in noncapital cases.”).
144. See supra Part I.
145. Commentators and courts frequently invoke the Habeas Corpus Act of
1867 as the point at which habeas corpus was first made generally available to
state prisoners. See, e.g., DONALD E. WILKES, JR., FEDERAL POSTCONVICTION
REMEDIES & RELIEF HANDBOOK § 5:8 (2010) (compiling Supreme Court cases and
academic commentary making this point). But one leading commentator has
compellingly explained that the modern view that the writ was unavailable to
state prisoners prior to the Act of 1867 is entirely ahistorical. Eric Freedman
has explained:
In approaching Suspension Clause issues, the Court, like scholars,
proceeds on the assumption that the [Suspension] Clause originally
protected only federal, not state, prisoners. This assumption is a
mistake. It should be corrected, lest it undermine the Court’s
willingness to recognize the applicability of the Clause to state
prisoners and encourage Congress to disregard the constitutional
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AEDPA has stripped substantive federal habeas review to the
bone, it is necessary to consider what, if any, doctrinal or policy
changes ought to result. 146 Stated another way, in light of the
general futility of the federal habeas remedy, the necessary
question is what statutory- or case-law-based changes should be
pursued. Presently, scholars have charted two related but
divergent paths for federal review based on the empirical and
doctrinal reality of the writ’s diminished power. 147
First, Professors Nancy King and Joseph Hoffmann have
urged courts and commentators to regard the infinitesimally
small rate of relief in non-capital habeas cases post-AEDPA as
justifying a nearly complete abandonment of the writ in this
context. 148 King and Hoffmann conclude that “the federal courts
limits on its ability to deny those prisoners federal vindication of their
rights.
Eric M. Freedman, Milestones in Habeas Corpus: Part I: Just Because John
Marshall Said It, Doesn’t Make It So: Ex Parte Bollman and the Illusory
Prohibition on the Federal Writ of Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners in the
Judiciary Act of 1789, 51 ALA. L. REV. 531, 535–37 (2000); see also id. at 537 (“To
the extent that legal arguments regarding the meaning of the Suspension
Clause proceed from history, they should recognize that, since the Constitution
came into force, the federal courts have had the authority—both by statute and
independently of it—to free state prisoners on habeas corpus.”). Moreover, a
strong argument has been advanced that, even if the writ did not originally
apply to state prisoners, the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment had the
effect of extending federal habeas review to state prisoners. Jordan Streiker,
Incorporating the Suspension Clause: Is There a Constitutional Right to Federal
Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners?, 92 MICH. L. REV. 862, 868 (1994).
146. Alternatively, there is certainly room for robust scholarly criticism of
the cramped federal review permitted under AEDPA. See, e.g., Blume, Johnson
& Weyble, supra note 11, at 452–53 (calling for the limitations on habeas relief
to be revisited). I have previously joined a chorus of scholars in making novel
constitutional challenges to AEDPA. See, e.g., Marceau, supra note 1. The
present Article, however, takes the AEDPA framework for granted and
considers what, if any, logical conclusions one can draw about the future of
federal habeas review.
147. Presently, only one academic article provides a detailed critique of the
conclusions reached by King and Hoffmann. See Blume, Johnson & Weyble,
supra note 11, at 452–53 (urging, as an alternative to the general elimination of
non-capital habeas, the elimination of certain restrictions on federal review—
e.g., the statute of limitations and the procedural default rules—so as to
enhance the deterrent effect of federal habeas).
148. KING & HOFFMANN, supra note 8, at 87–107; see also Hoffmann & King,
supra note 9, at 819–23. King and Hoffmann have also made their case to the
general public in op-eds. See, e.g., Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Op-Ed.,
Justice, Too Much and Too Expensive, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2011, at WK8
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remain in a 1960s-style habeas rut [and] continue to receive tens
of thousands of habeas petitions from convicted state
prisoners,” 149 and argue the statistics indicating the
improbability of federal relief “speak for themselves: habeas
review of routine state criminal cases is no longer needed to
enforce federal constitutional rights.” 150 According to this view,
federal habeas ought to be relied on only for certain fundamental
structural corrections to our democratic system. In other words,
the use of habeas corpus to safeguard against novel uses of
executive power to detain, for example, alleged enemy
combatants at Guantanamo is a necessary and appropriate use of
habeas corpus jurisdiction. 151 Likewise, King and Hoffmann
acknowledge that the expansion of federal habeas review of state
convictions during the Warren Court era played a similarly
important role in preserving the structure of our democracy by
insisting on federal supremacy at a time when “defiant state
judges . . . [might] thumb their noses at, or deliberately ignore,
federal law.” 152 Maintaining a flexible and prudently applied
habeas remedy, however, requires, according to King and
Hoffmann, that when the conditions giving rise to the need for
the writ recede, so too must the writ’s use in that arena cease. 153
Consequently, they summarize their conclusions by explaining
that: “Retaining that system might make sense today if the
problems that gave rise to it persisted, but they do not. Retaining
the current system might also make sense today if it represented
(“Congress should limit habeas review of state criminal cases to two categories
in which it actually can do some serious good: capital cases and cases in which
the prisoner can produce persuasive new evidence of his innocence.”).
149. Hoffmann & King, supra note 148, at WK8 (“Still, the habeas
machinery runs on, wasting resources and dissipating respect for the Great
Writ, while benefiting almost nobody.”); Hoffmann & King, supra note 9, at 793
(“In 99.99% of all state felony cases—excluding those cases in which the
defendant is sentenced to death—the time, money, and energy spent on federal
habeas litigation is wasted, generating virtually no benefit for anyone.” (citation
omitted)).
150. Hoffmann & King, supra note 148, at WK8.
151. See KING & HOFFMANN, supra note 8, at 42–47 (describing the writ’s
“starring role” as preserving democracy by serving to balance or offset executive
detentions).
152. Hoffmann & King, supra note 9, at 805.
153. Id.
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an effective and efficient way of enforcing the Constitution’s
commands in individual cases, but it does not.” 154
In a nutshell, King and Hoffmann conclude that, because
there is no longer a crisis of federalism like that of the 1960s and
because the rate of habeas relief is extremely small, 155 federal
habeas review of state convictions should be largely
abandoned. 156 For King and Hoffmann, “[t]he resources now
wasted on reviewing and rejecting claims of constitutional error
in habeas litigation should be redeployed” such that the money
currently spent on federal habeas would be diverted to funding
programs in support of trial-level indigent defense. 157 Federal
habeas review for non-capital prisoners would be permitted in
only two circumstances:
The first category would include those petitioners incarcerated
in violation of federal law who can offer ‘clear and convincing’
proof of factual innocence . . . . The second category would
allow for the postconviction enforcement of new constitutional

154. Id. King and Hoffmann defend maintaining federal habeas review of all
capital sentences, in part, based on the relatively higher rates of federal relief in
capital cases. That is to say, they regard the fact that “habeas courts continue to
grant relief regularly” in capital cases as an indication that “there is a special
need for habeas review in capital cases that is not present in noncapital cases.”
KING & HOFFMANN, supra note 8, at 147, 149. It is worth noting, however, that
only capital petitioners have a statutory right to counsel for federal habeas
review, and thus the disparity in relief rates, for those who practice in the field,
is not terribly surprising in view of the disparate provision of rights facilitating
meaningful access to the courts. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3599 (2011); McFarland v.
Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 855, 858 (1994) (discussing the statutory right to habeas
counsel in capital cases, holding that the right to counsel applies, and holding
that a motion for appointment of counsel provides a federal court with the
authority to stay a state execution); Rohan ex rel. Gates v. Woodford, 334 F.3d
803, 813 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that a capital habeas petitioner’s statutory
right to counsel encompasses the right to competence in habeas proceedings).
155. See KING ET AL., supra note 61, at 52 (noting non-capital prisoners
obtain habeas relief post-AEDPA in just 0.35% of all cases).
156. See Hoffmann & King, supra note 9, at 818; see also KING & HOFFMANN,
supra note 8, at 100–01. These sentiments, though more empirically supported,
are not new. See Schwartz, supra note 63, at 104 (referring to Judge Friendly’s
path-marking 1970 article and explaining that “Friendly referred to federal
habeas corpus as ‘a gigantic waste of effort’ because the remedy produces no
result in the overwhelming majority of cases and a good result only rarely”).
157. Hoffmann & King, supra note 9, at 818; see also KING & HOFFMANN,
supra note 8, at 100–01.
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rules that have been held to apply retroactively to cases
already final on direct appeal [under Teague v. Lane]. 158

So for non-capital habeas petitioners, only those who can
demonstrate their innocence or the retroactivity of a new rule of
law would be entitled to federal habeas review.
To be sure, increased funding for trial-level indigent defense
would improve the criminal justice system in many
jurisdictions. 159 But conditioning such funding on the elimination
of non-capital habeas review in nearly all cases is a conclusion
that, with due respect for King and Hoffmann’s empirical work,
does not naturally or necessarily flow from the observation that
the Constitution is already severely under-enforced through postAEDPA habeas corpus litigation. Neither of the two explanations
proffered for the elimination of non-capital habeas review stands
up to scrutiny. First, by their own admission, the question of
whether there remains a crisis of federalism justifying such
review is, at the very least, an open question. To their substantial
credit, King and Hoffmann concede that reasonable persons could
disagree about the conclusion that the federalism concerns that
justified the expansion of habeas corpus litigation in the 1960s
have passed, 160 but they do not acknowledge that such a
concession substantially undermines their conclusion that the
federal review of state convictions is futile and “utterly

158. Hoffmann & King, supra note 9, at 820–21.
159. It must be noted that the sort of political trade that is envisioned by
King and Hoffmann seems improbable. If federal habeas review is regarded as
disposable at the whim of Congress, then initially some of the funding may be
diverted to a federal resource center for trial level representation. However, in
tight budgetary times, surely this office would see cuts to its budget just as
similar systems at the state level have. See, e.g., Blume, Johnson & Weyble,
supra note 11, at 468 (“To [succeed], the new federal initiative that Hoffmann
and King advocate would require . . . a massive amount of federal money, a
commitment by Congress and the President to spend that money on indigent
defense, and a willingness on the part of the states to commit their own
resources to improving defense representation. None of these ingredients are in
good supply . . . .”).
160. King and Hoffmann note that “[r]easonable people . . . may resist our
claim that the serious federalism conflict that originally provoked the Warren
Court into action has passed. But whatever one might think about that claim,
the stark statistical picture . . . is impossible to ignore.” KING & HOFFMANN,
supra note 8, at 169.
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worthless.” 161 In reality the empirical data raises more questions
than it answers.
As an initial matter, if federal habeas is rarely a source of
relief under AEDPA, does the conclusion that the system should
be scrapped “speak for itself” as they have concluded? Certainly
not. Data suggesting that federal oversight has become
increasingly futile might be used just as compellingly to support
the conclusion that some of the modern limitations on federal
habeas review should be revisited and abandoned. Indeed, one
group of commentators has explained:
If . . . the chief problems with the existing noncapital habeas
review scheme are too much volume (and corresponding cost)
and too little success, then we would offer a different recipe for
fixing them. The most obvious solution to the problem of too
many habeas filings is to stop imprisoning so many people for
such long periods of time. . . . [Moreover,] Congress could
effectively address the problem of too little success in
noncapital habeas by modifying, rather than abandoning, the
current scheme. 162

Interestingly, King and Hoffmann flippantly reject a loosening of
the AEDPA noose with little discussion, noting only that peeling
back the limitations on federal habeas review reflects a “possible
way to respond,” but “not a sensible” one. 163
While reasonable people could differ as to whether curtailing
limits on federal review is the best approach, King and
Hoffmann’s abrupt rejection of such reforms as not only
161. Id. King and Hoffmann’s approach also appears to be unabashedly
utilitarian. They ultimately argue that retaining habeas corpus review would
only make sense if “habeas actually corrected or deterred enough error to be
worth its cost.” Id. at 81. It is not obvious that habeas corpus, the most
cherished writ, ought to be subject to a raw cost-benefit metric like that applied
to the exclusionary rule—perhaps there is some intrinsic value in having a
safety net, even if the safety net is often more theoretical than practical or
actual.
162. Blume, Johnson & Weyble, supra note 11, at 471–72.
163. KING & HOFFMANN, supra note 8, at 85; see also Hoffmann & King,
supra note 9, at 813 (explaining that “[r]emoving the AEDPA- and Courtimposed restrictions on habeas” would not be effective at curbing
unconstitutional state practices because, among other reasons, many state
prisoners are not in custody long enough to file federal habeas petitions, plea
bargains limit the range of viable claims, and the deterrent effect of such
reversals is suspect).
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impractical but nonsensical is surprising. Habeas relief for state
prisoners has not been a common phenomenon over the last
several decades, 164 but relief was not so entirely implausible as to
justify the “futile,” “worthless,” and “illusory” labels that King
and Hoffman use to describe the modern habeas review and
justify its elimination. Specifically, King and Hoffmann defend
the retention of federal habeas review in capital cases, in part, by
concluding that the courts “continue to grant relief regularly” and
by describing the post-AEDPA rate of relief as non-futile and
“broad.” 165 Notably, the rate of relief in capital cases post-AEDPA
according to their data is only about 12%. 166 Certainly, if rates of
relief around 10% are considered to be substantial and “regular”
so as to justify retaining habeas review, then rates of relief that
are only 5–9% lower should not be dismissed out of hand as
useless and futile. 167 More to the point, it is, contrary to the
conclusions of King and Hoffmann, entirely “sensible” to consider
whether relaxing some of the restrictions on federal habeas might
serve a role no less important than the funding of indigent
defense proposed by King and Hoffmann. 168 The rates of relief in
164. See KING ET AL., supra note 61, at 89 (stating that success rates for noncapital state prisoners in “habeas probably never approached the double digit
percentages”). Just prior to AEDPA’s enactment, it is likely that the rate of relief
was already substantially diminished based on court-created limitations. Id. at
58; see also Hoffmann & King, supra note 9, at 809 (“The grant rate for
noncapital cases has dropped from 1% in the early 1990s to only 0.34% today.”).
The study also reports that the rate of relief in capital cases has dropped from
40% pre-AEDPA to about 12% post-AEDPA. KING ET AL., supra note 61, at 61.
165. See KING & HOFFMANN, supra note 8, at 146–48 (explaining one key
difference between sentences of death and life in prison is the more generous
stance taken by courts toward granting relief to those sentenced to death and
identifying specific categories of cases associated with a higher likelihood of
habeas relief).
166. See id. at 46.
167. See id. at 149 (describing the 12% rate of relief as illustrating a
perception of a “continuing need for broad habeas jurisdiction in capital cases” by
the federal courts).
168. To be sure, it is unlikely that King and Hoffmann would agree with this
view, but I merely point out that the data does not, as they suggest, speak for
itself. See Hoffmann & King, supra note 15, at 52 (“The problem with habeas
review of state criminal cases is that, even though the particular crisis of
federalism that gave rise to its twentieth-century expansion has long since
passed, the federal courts continue to entertain, on a routine basis, vast numbers
of habeas petitions . . . .”). That is to say, their conclusion—that federal habeas
ought to be largely abandoned—does not necessarily follow from the low grant
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non-capital cases might not ever reach the level of relief seen in
capital cases; the higher rates of relief in capital cases, however,
do not necessarily suggest some innate connection between
reversible errors and capital convictions. Rather, a variety of
factors, including a statutory right to counsel in capital cases,
substantially explain the lower rates of relief for capital and noncapital prisoners. As one group of commentators observed:
Hoffmann and King fail to acknowledge a key distinction
between capital and noncapital habeas petitioners: the former
enjoy a statutory right to the assistance of appointed counsel
while the latter do not. If noncapital habeas petitioners had
access to counsel like their death-sentenced counterparts
already do, their success rates would undoubtedly be
higher . . . . 169

In short, the rate of relief in non-capital cases is likely to be much
higher if these prisoners are also afforded a right to counsel. And
even without counsel, in the years preceding AEDPA, non-capital
prisoners obtained relief at a rate that King and Hoffmann have
themselves regarded as non-trivial and as justification for
retaining federal review. Nonetheless, the reform proposed by
King and Hoffmann would, with only the narrowest of exceptions,
abolish non-capital habeas review.
Professor Eve Brensike Primus proposed a second and
slightly more measured reform based on the empirical data
regarding the low rate of habeas grants post-AEDPA. The
empirical data convinced Professor Primus, like King and
Hoffmann, that habeas review as currently structured is not
working and that the “the federal habeas system is broken
largely because of its resolute focus on individual petitioners.” 170
rate in habeas cases, but rather reflects their policy view, consistent with
Bator’s institutional competence model of habeas review, that because state
courts are less “defiant” as to federal law and because all states have “appellate
and collateral review procedures,” habeas is simply not the “best place to invest
federal resources.” Hoffmann & King, supra note 9, at 795—96; see also Andrea
Lyon, Liberty Requires More Habeas in This Corpus, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 24,
2011, 12:56 PM) http://www.huffingtonpost.com/andrea-lyon/ liberty-requiresmore-hab_b_853020.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2012) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
169. Blume, Johnson & Weyble, supra note 11, at 461.
170. Eve Brensike Primus, A Structural Vision of Habeas Corpus, 98 CAL. L.
REV. 1, 3 (2010) (emphasis added). King and Hoffmann, in reviewing Primus’s
work, actually congratulate her for accepting their premise that habeas
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Rather than suggesting an outright abandonment of federal
criminal habeas review, however, Primus suggests that the
system be reconfigured so as to focus its resources and attention
on “systemic state violations” of the Federal Constitution. 171
Under this systemic model of habeas review, “a petitioner would
have to show that his individual rights were prejudicially violated
and would also have to produce some evidence that the violation
was systemic rather than an idiosyncratic error in his case.” 172
Stated another way, Primus would limit relief in much the same
way that Monell v. Department of Social Services curtails
municipal liability under § 1983. 173 Just as Monell conditions
relief on a showing by the plaintiff of a pattern or custom of
violations by the municipality, 174 Primus would condition habeas

litigation should no longer be permitted as a means of vindicating individual
violations of the Constitution on a case-by-case basis: “This is the crucial lesson
of the recent empirical findings, and it is a lesson that Professor Primus takes to
heart.” Hoffmann & King, supra note 15, at 50.
171. Primus rejects the notion that individual litigation regarding
constitutional violations is appropriate in federal habeas: “On all sides, the
literature is large. But from each perspective, these scholars share the
assumption that the point of federal review of state convictions should be to
correct errors in individual cases. They only differ as to which errors they think
are worth correcting—process errors, guilt-innocence errors, or errors affecting
certain favored federal rights.” Primus, supra note 170, at 4.
172. Id. at 7. Although Primus would condition habeas relief on a two-part
showing: (1) denial of the individual’s constitutional rights; and (2) a systemic
constitutional problem in the state, she does not address the order of decisionmaking problem that is common to this sort of two-part constitutional decisionmaking. Cf. John C. Jeffries Jr., Reversing the Order of Battle in Constitutional
Torts, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 115, 137 (advancing the idea that the Saucier v. Katz
order of decision-making for constitutional tort claims should still be used when
money damages are the best remedy for violation of the right in question);
Nancy Leong, The Saucier Qualified Immunity Experiment: An Empirical
Analysis, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 667, 667–71 (2009) (providing an empirical analysis of
sequencing issues arising from a two-part test for qualified immunity under
§ 1983); Sam Kamin, An Article III Defense of Merits-First Decisionmaking in
Civil Rights Litigation: The Continued Viability of Saucier v. Katz, 16 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 53, 57 (2008) (urging continued use of the order of the two-part
qualified immunity test announced in Saucier).
173. See Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 663, 690 (1978)
(removing municipal immunity from § 1983 suits and limiting that liability to
deprivations of constitutional rights stemming from any formally adopted policy
or custom not formally adopted).
174. See id. at 690.
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relief on a showing that the state’s post-conviction process had
engaged in a pattern of unfairness or systemic failures. 175
Interestingly, there is notable overlap between Primus’s
proposal for reform, which apparently would permit only facial
challenges to a state’s post-conviction system, and the constraints
on King and Hoffmann’s proposal that they regard as
constitutionally required. For King and Hoffmann, the
Suspension Clause necessitates federal substantive review when
the state fails to provide a “reasonable level” of constitutional
oversight, 176 and for Primus, when there are systemic state
failures, federal oversight is available. The common denominator,
then, is that individual constitutional violations, even if
prejudicial to the prisoner, do not warrant relief under either
proposal—“If the federal court found no systemic problem, it
would dismiss the petition.” 177
The two approaches are not, however, identical. Despite the
similarities in approach and ultimate conclusion, there is a
feature of Primus’s reform that is fundamentally at odds with
King and Hoffmann’s proposal. Primus still believes that federal
habeas can and should correct extreme errors of state court
process in individual cases, although she requires a showing of
systemic harm in the individual case. 178 King and Hoffmann, by
contrast, reject federal oversight on a case-by-case review basis
even when the individual litigant can demonstrate a systemic
defect. 179 Whereas King and Hoffmann urge a near complete
abandonment of the habeas remedy when the state has a facially
due-process-compliant post-conviction system, 180 Primus seeks to
175. See Primus, supra note 170, at 7.
176. Hoffmann & King, supra note 9, at 836–37.
177. Primus, supra note 170, at 7.
178. Id.
179. Hoffmann & King, supra note 9, at 836–37.
180. King and Hoffmann acknowledge “[p]roblems in state criminal justice”
but argue that such problems “are not the kinds of problems that habeas is
designed to, or can, solve.” Hoffmann & King, supra note 15, at 54. King and
Hoffmann’s proposal, apparently, would only permit relief when the state’s
system, as intended to function, was, in effect, an inadequate substitute for
federal review; it is almost as though the state system must be facially invalid—
i.e., non-existent—in order for suspension problems to arise under this model.
Primus would allow challenges to the state process, as applied, but only when
the defect in the prisoner’s case was representative of a systemic failure—in
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retain federal habeas for individual litigants in the limited class
of cases in which a systemic injury can be demonstrated by an
individual litigant. 181 For my purposes, however, the similarity
between the proposals is more striking than the difference. Both
reforms advocate for reimagining habeas in a way that refuses
relief to individual petitioners whose constitutional rights have
been demonstrably, even patently, violated. 182 Under either
other words, the first several constitutional errors of the same type and form
would be without remedy and would serve, instead, only as a necessary element
of a later prisoner’s entitlement to relief. Id.
[W]e think Professor Primus does not go far enough with her
structural analysis. When Professor Primus refers to the ‘structural
vision’ of habeas, she is talking about using habeas to try to force a
change in the structure of state criminal justice. When we talk about
a ‘structural approach’ to habeas, by contrast, we are talking about
using habeas to force a change in the relationship between institutions
of government—either a change in the federal balance of powers, or a
change in the balance of federalism.
Id.
181. See Primus, supra note 170, at 7.
182. Primus stated: “I do not object in principle to federal courts’ reviewing
state criminal convictions to correct individual errors. . . . Given a world of
limited resources, however, we must slice the habeas pie somehow,” and for
Primus this means limiting federal review to systemic violations of the Federal
Constitution. Id. at 26–27. One wonders, however, whether the systemic
approach proffered by Primus saves as many resources as she suggests, or
protects as many state prisoners as she hopes. In each case in which relief is
available under her proposal, the prisoner would have to prove not just a
violation of his rights, but a systemic pattern of such violations in the state
system. Id. at 7. Presumably the judicial labor, the amount of proof, and the cost
of establishing a violation in a series of past cases will not be significantly less
than the burden of proving that same violation in each case. Indeed, it is
generally less resource intensive, not more, to prove an error of constitutional
magnitude occurred in one’s own case. I also suspect that litigation attempting
to establish a pattern and practice of constitutional deprivation will, in many
instances, be subject to the same sort of litigation gamesmanship that she finds
too resource intensive.
Moreover, in those cases in which Primus says “demonstrating a systemic
problem will be easy” because, for example, the constitutional error is “clear on
the face of trial and appellate records,” id. at 30, should it not be equally clear
that there was an individual violation worthy of relief under AEDPA in each of
these cases? In other words, if there is truly a body of cases, as Primus predicts,
in which the entitlement to relief is so clear-cut, then one would expect that
these cases would result in reversal even under AEDPA’s deferential standard
of review. In short, I am skeptical that proving systemic harms will be so easy.
And if demonstrating the harm really is clear-cut or obvious, then I suspect that
relief should generally be available for these claims under AEDPA.
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reform, an individual instance of constitutional deprivation, no
matter how grave and no matter how many rights were violated,
does not justify federal habeas review.

****
Leading commentators like Primus, King, and Hoffmann
have responded to the empirical data that indicates the general
impotence of federal habeas review of state convictions with
groundbreaking calls for reform. I agree that the data suggests a
need for change, but I part ways with these scholars as to the
appropriate course change. Rather than abandoning federal
habeas or permitting federal habeas relief only upon a showing of
a systemic failure, federal review should continue on a case-bycase basis, but more of the resources should be focused on the
state process. Although it is true that AEDPA and other limits on
federal habeas review have cast a long shadow over federal
habeas proceedings, the absence of substantive relief ought to
inspire increased attention to challenges of process and not the
elimination of all federal review. As substantive challenges
become increasingly impotent, it is the duty of the federal courts,
all the more, to ensure that the state court process served as a
minimally adequate substitute for federal habeas review. 183 As I
have previously explained, due process forbids a federal court
from turning a blind eye to federal challenges to the validity of
one’s sentence or conviction when the state post-conviction
system fails “to provide a procedurally fair and full review of
one’s federal constitutional claims.” 184 Accordingly, there is a
need for federal challenges to the process rather than the result
of state post-conviction proceedings. 185
Consequently I regard as dubious the claim that this systemic model would save
resources and as doubly dubious the claim that this systemic model of habeas
will actually increase opportunities for relief in many instances.
183. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 795 (2008) (holding that the
Suspension Clause requires either full federal habeas review or an adequate
substitute).
184. Marceau, supra note 13, at 7.
185. Professor Ann Woolhandler, among others, has described the limited
theory of habeas review associated with procedural fairness as the “institutional
competence” model of habeas review. See Ann Woolhandler, Demodeling
Habeas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 575, 577 (1993) (“Under this model, federal courts
considering habeas applications from state prisoners would be precluded from
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In Part IV, the need for a basic check on the fairness of the
state procedures as a constitutional matter is briefly developed.
Part V then considers methods of challenging inadequate state
procedures on federal habeas review. And finally, in Part VI, the
viability and potential advantages of a novel non-habeas
challenge, such as a § 1983 action, to the fairness of state
procedures is considered.
IV. Federal Courts Have a Constitutional Duty to Remedy State
Procedural Unfairness
For the last fifty years the federal habeas debate has
centered on the appropriateness of substantive federal review of
state court convictions. On one side of the debate, many scholars
have argued that the integrity of the Constitution requires a
merits-based review of every conviction’s constitutionality, even
at the great cost of occasionally disturbing the final convictions of
state courts. 186 At the other extreme, some have called for a more
parsimonious, purely proceduralist model of federal oversight
such that a state court conviction could not be overturned unless
the state process for ensuring federal constitutional compliance
was less than full and fair. 187 Presently, however, federal habeas
reconsidering most issues of federal constitutional law provided there had been
a ‘full and fair’ opportunity to address those issues in the state court.”).
“Institutional competence” is a term of art employed by legal process theorists to
describe those features of an institution that make a certain system the best
suited to solve a particular problem.
186. See id. (summarizing the “full-review” model as requiring federal courts
to provide de novo review of all federal constitutional issues properly raised in
state court).
187. See Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas
Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 455–56 (1963) (explaining that
if the procedure was not full or fair there is no need to immunize the state
court’s result, and if the process employed for fact determination was fit for the
task, there had already been an opportunity to litigate the issue and it should
not be re-litigated); see also Woolhandler, supra note 185, at 579 (describing
Bator). For decades legal scholars have identified Paul Bator as having voiced
the most “extreme” set of limitations on federal habeas review. Woolhandler,
supra note 185, at 577; see also Barry Friedman, A Tale of Two Habeas, 73
MINN. L. REV. 247, 277 (1988) (describing Bator’s theory); Lee, supra note 92, at
152 (describing Bator’s approach as the stingiest). Under this approach, the
range of “[q]uestions appropriate for habeas would include allegations that the
state accorded no meaningful opportunity to litigate the federal question”
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petitioners are at risk of having the worst of both worlds—all of
the disadvantages of both approaches without the respective
advantages. On the one hand, petitioners today are theoretically
entitled to a merits-based, non-procedural review of the state
court adjudication 188; the AEDPA regime, however, has wrought
a world in which less than 1% of non-capital habeas petitions
obtain relief, and over 40% of the petitions are dismissed by the
district court on the basis of one of AEDPA’s procedural
provisions, without any consideration of the actual merits of the
claim. 189 So merits review exists as a theoretical mirage but not
as a practical reality. But on the other hand, the low rate of
substantive-based relief has generated a vocal group of scholars
calling for the substantial elimination of case-by-case habeas
litigation, to include, apparently, the rejection of case-by-case
procedural oversight of state post-conviction procedures. 190
Stated more directly, the writ of habeas in 2012 presents a
lose-lose situation for state prisoners. There is very little
substantive review of the merits of constitutional claims, and the
review of state processes, which was previously the backbone of
the stingiest form of relief, has been substantially called into
insofar as the state process was not fundamentally fair and adequate.
Woolhandler, supra note 185, at 585 n.55; see also id. at 584–85 (“[T]he Court
undertook what Bator saw as a salutary expansion of the concept of
institutional competence by allowing federal courts to consider whether the
state court system had provided a full and fair opportunity to litigate the federal
constitutional issue.”).
188. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2011).
189. KING ET AL., supra note 61, at 56, 61.
190. Conceptual support for a robust federal habeas review, according to
Professor Evan Lee, can generally be linked to theories recognizing either the
need for a federal forum for constitutional adjudication or the need for a federal
deterrent against non-compliant or disinterested state court judges. Lee, supra
note 92, at 153–54. But Lee also points out that the deterrent theory does not
require one to assume bad faith on the part of state court judges:
A much larger number of state court judges accepts and respects the
Supreme Court’s criminal procedure edicts, but from time to time
considerations of economy and convenience tempt such judges to cut
corners on enforcement. Even more commonly, these judges do not
always do their best to keep track of where the Court’s criminal
procedure decisions are headed. According to the deterrence theory,
the ready availability of federal habeas review encourages greater
effort by state judges to toe the constitutional line.
Id. at 154.
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question. In a paradox of habeas history, then, the proceduralist
reforms of legal process theorists like Paul Bator, once deemed
draconian and overly dismissive of the writ, now seem generous
when juxtaposed with modern practice and proposed reforms of
commentators like King and Hoffmann. 191 Such a narrow view of
federal habeas is problematic from a constitutional standpoint. 192
As Bator elaborated:
Let me now put the point specifically in terms of due process
and the federal habeas corpus jurisdiction . . . . When should
state determinations, subject to direct Supreme Court review,
not be final? I suggest that one answer, at least, fits into the
very category we have been discussing: cases where the state
has, in effect, failed itself to provide process. It is, after all, the
essence of the responsibility of the states under the due
process clause to furnish a criminal defendant with a full and
fair opportunity to make his defense and litigate his case: the
state must provide a reasoned method of inquiry into relevant
questions of fact and law (including, of course, all federal
issues applicable to the case). If a state, then, fails in fact to do
so, the due process clause itself demands that its conclusions
of fact or law should not be respected: the prisoner's detention
191. See Primus, supra note 170, at 24–26 (describing the situations in
which federal courts could consider state criminal cases under Bator’s process
model and King and Hoffmann’s more recent proposal to eliminate federal
habeas review entirely for most state prisoners). Bator subscribed to the views
of the legal process theorists who reasoned that so long as the state courts had
personal and subject matter jurisdiction, then they had the institutional
competence required to make final and binding determinations as to one’s
detention. Woolhandler, supra note 185, at 584. But Bator regarded “allowing
federal courts to consider whether the state court system had provided a full
and fair opportunity to litigate the federal constitutional issue” as a “salutary
expansion of the concept of institutional competence” such that “questions of
jurisdiction, together with the question of full and fair opportunity to litigate,
exhausted the appropriate scope of collateral review of criminal convictions.” Id.
at 584–85; see also Henry M. Hart, Jr., Foreword: The Time Chart of the
Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84, 103–04 (1959) (describing a more limited process
of habeas review such that the habeas court is limited to inquiring “into the
competence of the tribunal—that is, its jurisdiction—to enter the judgment of
conviction as well as into the question whether the judgment which it had
entered authorized the detention”).
192. Cf. Martin H. Redish & Colleen McNamara, Habeas Corpus, Due
Process and the Suspension Clause: A Study in the Foundations of American
Constitutionalism, 96 VA. L. REV. 1361, 1365–67 (2010) (arguing that the Due
Process Clause supersedes and invalidates portions of the Suspension Clause
that are inconsistent with due process—e.g., the authority to suspend the writ
in times of rebellion or invasion).
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can be seen as unlawful, not because error was made as to a
substantive federal question fairly litigated by the state
tribunals, but because the totality of state procedures did not
furnish the prisoner with a fair chance to litigate his case.
Thus if a state fails to give the defendant any opportunity at
all to test federal defenses relevant to his case, the need for a
collateral jurisdiction to afford this opportunity would seem to
be plain, and federal habeas is clearly an appropriate remedy:
the state has furnished no process, much less “due” process, for
the vindication of an alleged federal right. Similarly, if the
state furnishes process, but it is claimed to be meaningless
process—if the totality of state procedures allegedly did not
provide rational conditions for inquiry into federal-law (or,
indeed, state-law) questions, it seems to me clear that the
federal habeas jurisdiction may appropriately examine the
allegation. 193

Stated more concisely, when the state fails “to provide
adequate process to correct the constitutional violation,” due
process requires a federal “backstop.” 194 It is far from clear that
the proposals for reform discussed above sufficiently account for
this due process requirement, and as such they raise substantial
constitutional questions. To be sure, King and Hoffmann are
correct in concluding that, at least in some important ways, the
crisis of federalism that motivated more expansive habeas review
in the past has substantially receded. All fifty states now have
post-conviction review, thus making federal habeas review a truly
duplicative layer of constitutional litigation. It is, however, a
serious misstep to conclude that the mere existence of a state
post-conviction system is, without more, a full and
constitutionally adequate substitute for federal review. In
support of her conclusion that proposes limiting habeas relief to
193. Bator, supra note 187, at 456–57.
194. Bator asked, “Is there not political wisdom in using a federal collateral
jurisdiction as a ‘backstop’ for inadequacies of state process . . . ?” Id. at 492. In
the context of challenging a denial of parole, the Supreme Court has recently
recognized that due process regulates the state parole system in an extremely
limited fashion. Swarthout v. Cooke, 13 S. Ct. 859, 862–63 (2011). But as I have
explained previously, there is a strong pedigree for recognizing a right to a
fundamentally fair post-conviction review process. Marceau, supra note 13, at
24–34. To the extent that the Suspension Clause might provide more extensive
protections than due process in ensuring fundamental fairness, id. at 20 n.7, it
is beyond the scope of this Article to address whether the Suspension Clause
might give rise to a cause of action in a § 1983 action.
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cases demonstrating a pattern of violations, Professor Primus
notes that due process and the Suspension Clause clearly permit
“some restrictions on the scope of federal review of state court
convictions, as demonstrated by the Supreme Court’s removal of
most Fourth Amendment claims from federal habeas review in
Stone v. Powell.” 195 Critically, however, Stone v. Powell 196 is
constitutional precisely because of what it does not do; it does not
remove federal oversight from unfair state proceedings. Under
Stone, any state court review that is not “full and fair” is entitled
to a complete round of federal habeas proceedings. Even one of
the most far-reaching examples of limitations on federal review,
Stone v. Powell, is tempered by a requirement of federal oversight
of the state procedures on a case-by-case basis.
Notably, neither Primus nor King and Hoffmann explicitly
provide for federal oversight on a case-by-case basis of the
procedural adequacy of the state process. These scholars
recognize the need to temper reform proposals to federal habeas
with an “escape valve” like the one carved out in Stone. 197
However, the proposed reforms seem to take for granted that
failures of substance or process by a state will not, in any single
case, give rise to a right to federal review—that is to say, they
would permit only facial or systemic challenges to the state’s
procedures rather than challenges based on the circumstances of
a particular case. 198 Professors King and Hoffmann identify as a
virtue of their proposal the fact that the litigation of challenges to
a state’s procedures under the Suspension Clause will “be a
195. Primus, supra note 170, at 40.
196. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
197. Hoffmann & King, supra note 9, at 823. “Escape valve” in this context
may be considered synonymous with “adequate substitute” for federal review,
both of which serve as core constitutional protections based on due process and
the Suspension Clause. Notably, I have discussed at length in a previous article
the link between due process and the full-and-fair requirement of Stone. See
Marceau, supra note 13, at 24–34. Contra Philip Halpern, Federal Habeas
Corpus and the Mapp Exclusionary Rule After Stone v. Powell, 82 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 17 n.115 (1982) (suggesting that due process does not mandate Stone’s
limitation).
198. By contrast, Richard Fallon has observed that the “normal if not
exclusive mode of constitutional adjudication involves . . . as-applied
challenge[s].” Richard H. Fallon Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and
Third-Party Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1321 (2000).
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temporary rather than a long-term problem.” 199 They specifically
emphasize that:
Any Suspension Clause litigation generated by our proposal
thus would initially impose a new and additional burden on
the federal courts,—which might appear to undermine our
goal of conserving resources[;] however, [it] should diminish
quickly as the Supreme Court decides whether the review
processes in various states are such that the proposed new
habeas restrictions comply with the Suspension Clause. 200

In other words, they anticipate one-time general challenges,
perhaps even consolidated cases, challenging the state’s
procedures, and not repeated, case-specific challenges to the
procedures applied in any particular case. Professor Primus
seems to agree with this sentiment, explaining that as a general
matter, “[i]f the systemic challenge were rejected or if the state
remedied the systemic problem, the ban on successive petitions
would prohibit other petitioners from raising the same
challenge.” 201
This once-and-for-all approach to procedural challenges is
incompatible with a vision of due process as a backstop for fair
state processes. Permitting only facial or one-time challenges to
the robustness of the state’s post-conviction review system is
irreconcilable with due process and the Suspension Clause. 202 For
199. Hoffmann & King, supra note 9, at 846.
200. See id. (“While the Court may have to evaluate the constitutionality of
the proposed statute as applied in several different states with varying
appellate and postconviction review, it could do so in one or two consolidated
cases.”).
201. See Primus, supra note 170, at 42–43 (“Once that initial determination
is made, federal review would be streamlined.”). Nowhere does Professor Primus
suggest that procedural failings on the part of the state review would, as under
the institutional-competence model of review, justify federal intervention.
Indeed, in her only direct reference to the constitutional frailty of her argument,
she concludes that the availability of original writs and certiorari review would
indicate that her proposed “systemic habeas review system would not entail an
unconstitutional suspension.” Id. at 40.
202. See Hoffmann & King, supra note 9, at 837 (“Should the states fail to
maintain robust postconviction review . . . the Suspension Clause would prohibit
our proposed cutback of federal habeas.”). The idea of one-time litigation
regarding procedural adequacy was rejected in the context of another AEDPA
challenge. See Spears v. Stewart, 283 F.3d 992, 1016–18 (9th Cir. 2002)
(reviewing Arizona’s compliance with AEDPA after the Supreme Court denied
certiorari because petitioner was not appointed counsel in a timely manner).
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example, in the context of describing the Stone v. Powell escape
valve, Professor Wayne LaFave has explained that the
“opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment
claim . . . appears to require assessment of what was done in the
particular case rather than what is customarily done.” 203
Consistent with this view, nearly all courts and scholars have
rejected and criticized a narrow reading of the Stone bar as
adopted by the Fifth Circuit, which holds that in the absence of
proof that the state’s processes are “routinely or systematically
applied” in an unfair manner, Stone precludes federal habeas
review. 204 Just as the constitutional limitation on eliminating
review under Stone is not appropriately understood as requiring
a showing of systemic or facial defects with the state process,
reforms to federal habeas must, more generally, retain a process
for overseeing the fairness of the state process in individual
cases. In other words, the Stone bar is limited such that state
courts in each individual case must provide an adequate
substitute for federal habeas review. Each prisoner is entitled to
challenge the fairness of the state system as applied to his
particular case. 205 Contrary to the proposals of Hoffmann and
203. WAYNE LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 11.7(g) (2010) (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 481–82
(1976)). But see Frank v. Magnum, 237 U.S. 309, 335 (1915) (considering
customary practice and finding no due process violation in a particular case
based, in part, on the fact that “[r]epeated instances are reported of verdicts and
judgments set aside and new trials granted for [constitutional defects within the
trial]”). There is some language to the contrary in Frank. See id. at 335
(concluding that due process was not violated in a particular case based, in part,
on the fact that “[r]epeated instances are reported of verdicts and judgments set
aside and new trials granted for” constitutional defects with the trial).
204. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Epps, No. 1:04CV865(LG), 2010 WL 1141126, at
*16 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 19, 2010) (quoting Williams v. Brown, 609 F.2d 216, 220
(5th Cir. 1979)).
205. In this way, federal oversight of state convictions can be placed on a
simple continuum—the more process the state provides, the less need there is
for federal oversight. A doctrinal analogue exists in the realm of the adequateand-independent-state-grounds doctrine, which essentially allows a state to
apply its procedural rule so as to bar federal oversight so long as the state’s rule
is rational, reasonable, and fairly applied. See Catherine T. Struve, Direct and
Collateral Federal Court Review of The Adequacy of State Procedural Rules, 103
COLUM . L. REV. 243, 277, 315 (2003) (recognizing the need for the lower federal
courts to conduct an “as-applied analysis of state procedures” on habeas review).
Professor Struve supports the claim that the denial of post-conviction relief
based “merely on a hypertechnical application of a procedural rule” must be
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King and Primus, to date, the Court has not permitted the
modern writ to be interpreted so as to foreclose relief in an
individual case when the state process in that particular case was
not full and fair. 206
In short, there is room for debate as to whether state court
review ought to be considered a substantially adequate substitute
for federal review in any circumstances, but if the state court
review is not procedurally full and fair, then such processes ought
to be easily recognized as an insufficient substitute for federal
habeas review. 207 “[D]ue process mandates that every prisoner
avoided through case-by-case review. Id. at 315. Given that procedural defaults
in the context of federal habeas review arise in the same federalism-fraught
setting, it is useful, if not dispositive, to realize that such challenges are
available on a case-by-case basis and that a “state procedural rule that violates
due process will be inadequate.” Id. at 252.
206. Individual challenges are, after all, the bread and butter of
constitutional criminal procedure. Just as challenges to a death sentence could
be brought as facial challenges to the state’s capital sentencing system or as
challenges to the state system as it applies to the individual case, it is only
logical that a state prisoner ought to be able to challenge the state system as it
applied in his particular case and not just the state system in a more general
sense as the reform proposals seem to anticipate. See Struve, supra note 205, at
177–86 (compiling cases where federal habeas review is not precluded when the
state process as applied to a particular prisoner was an inadequate procedural
bar).
207. I have previously advanced this argument with considerably more
detail and care. See Marceau, supra note 13, at 8–9 (“[T]he constitutional
pedigree of a right to full and fair review, so as to ensure fundamental fairness
in the justice system, is beyond question.”). It is true that the Supreme Court
held that the Suspension Clause was not violated by AEDPA’s limits on
successive habeas petitions. See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 654 (1996)
(“Conclud[ing] . . . that the operative provisions of the [Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty] Act do not violate the Suspension Clause of the
Constitution, Art. I, § 9.”). However, the Suspension Clause is much less directly
implicated by efforts to file multiple habeas petitions, as opposed to efforts to
obtain a single, meaningful opportunity to litigate the constitutionality of one’s
conviction. Accordingly, I reject the conclusion that Supreme Court review is an
adequate safeguard for purposes of due process and the Suspension Clause.
Contra Primus, supra note 170, at 40 (“Given the Supreme Court’s small docket
and the rarity with which original writs have been issued, [the alternatives for
Supreme Court habeas review may not be adequate], but the Supreme Court
may well consider them to be enough.”). Certiorari review is not available on
direct review for many post-conviction claims, and the Supreme Court has
specifically and repeatedly expressed its unwillingness to grant review of state
post-conviction proceedings. See Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 335 (2007)
(Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that the Supreme Court traditionally waits for
“federal habeas proceedings” to consider federal constitutional claims rather
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receive at least one full and fair review of his constitutional
claims, either through direct or collateral proceedings, and either
in state or federal court.” 208 And, any reform in the scope of
federal oversight must be mindful of this limitation. Defects in
state process will not magically or spontaneously manifest
themselves. 209 Accordingly, determining whether a state court’s
review of a constitutional claim relating to one’s detention was
procedurally adequate is of the utmost importance. If substantive
review is to be rare and limited, as it is under AEDPA, then
process-based review must be all the more frequent and
capacious. 210 Consequently, understanding the proper procedural
mechanisms for litigating challenges of process is critically
important. The remainder of this Article proposes and considers
the available federal procedures for developing and litigating
than use its certiorari review power (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 498 U.S. 931, 932
(1990))).
208. Marceau, supra note 13, at 18 (quoting Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277,
298–99 (1992) (White, J., concurring)); see also id. (compiling authorities
regarding the scope of a due process right to one full and fair review of one’s
conviction).
209. Moreover, when a core unfairness or absence of state process is
detected, contrary to the conclusions of King and Hoffmann’s reform, it is
insufficient to simply revert to the current model of deferential AEDPA review
permitted under cases like Harrington v. Richter. Under King and Hoffmann’s
approach, an unfair state process would simply “reinstate the existing, postAEDPA version of habeas for state prisoners.” Hoffmann & King, supra note 9,
at 843. As I have explained in detail, deference under § 2254(d)(1) to a
procedurally unfair state process is not constitutionally compliant. See Marceau,
supra note 13, at 7 (“Due process forbids the substantive deference announced
in § 2254 where a prisoner has not received a full and fair review of his
constitutional claims, either in state or federal court.”).
210. Contrary to the conclusions of scholars like King and Hoffmann that
state post-conviction systems have developed in a manner that is sufficiently
fair and adequate so as to reduce the need for federal oversight, there is good
reason to believe that states remain resistant to providing robust state postconviction review that would approximate the protections provided through
federal review. By way of example, AEDPA provides substantial procedural
benefits, such as a shortened statute of limitations, to any state that satisfies
certain minimal procedural requirements in state capital post-conviction
procedures. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2261–66 (providing that “[a]ny application under
this chapter for habeas corpus relief under section 2254 must be filed in the
appropriate district court not later than 180 days after final State court
affirmance of the conviction and sentence”). To date, however, no state has
created a mechanism for the timely appointment of qualified counsel that would
satisfy the attorney general, as the certifying authority under § 2265, that the
state is entitled to opt-in to the procedural benefits. See id. § 2265.
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challenges to failures of process in the state post-conviction
system on a case-by-case basis.
V. Challenging Deficient State Procedures Through Federal
Habeas Litigation
One forum that affords an opportunity for a federal challenge
based on the inadequacy of state proceedings is federal habeas
review. To be sure, federal habeas review is presently centered on
challenges to the state court’s result, but federal review, even
constrained by AEDPA, can function as a meaningful review
mechanism for state procedures. 211 In a process-based habeas
challenge, clearly demonstrating that the state process for
litigating a constitutional challenge was unfair is, in a very literal
sense, collateral to resolving the issue of whether the prisoner is
in fact in “custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States.” 212 Insofar as that is the case, a
habeas-based challenge will surely not result in reversal of
conviction. Nonetheless, on habeas review, challenges to process
rather than to pure result will play a critical role in the next
wave of habeas litigation as courts attempt to understand the
scope of the limitations on federal habeas imposed by recent
decisions like Pinholster v. Cullen.
In habeas cases, as in other forms of constitutional litigation,
one’s success in developing facts correlates strongly with his
211. I have previously discussed the reasons that process-based habeas
litigation has faded into the background:
In view of the Court’s willingness [for decades] to revisit the merits of
federal constitutional litigation impacting a state conviction,
regardless of the adequacy of the state process, the diminished role of
federal courts in reviewing the [due process] question—whether the
state court’s process was full and fair—was inevitable.
Marceau, supra note 13, at 15–16 (explaining that the emergence of “selective
incorporation cases, and the Warren Court’s habeas jurisprudence”
overshadowed the process-based rights and made them less important and,
therefore, less litigated).
212. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2006) (providing for federal review of habeas
corpus on behalf of a state court defendant “only on the ground that he is in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States”);
see also id. § 2241(d) (providing federal habeas review for “a person in custody
under the judgment and sentence of a State court”).
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ultimate success on the merits. 213 Accordingly, an important
feature of pre-Pinholster habeas law was the recognition by
federal courts of appeal that, even after AEDPA, evidentiary
hearings were mandatory so long as the prisoner was relatively
diligent, he made a colorable claim of constitutional violation, and
there were material issues of fact. 214 As the Tenth Circuit
summarized the state of the law after AEDPA:
We now join every other circuit that has confronted this
question and hold that where, as here, a habeas petitioner has
diligently sought to develop the factual basis underlying his
habeas petition, but a state court has prevented him from
doing so . . . . [T]he AEDPA does not preclude [him] from
receiving an evidentiary hearing. 215

The focus of litigation efforts aimed at obtaining a hearing or
factual development was oriented toward demonstrating some
defect in the state process, whether the problem was a one-time
procedural lapse or a longstanding systemic gap. More precisely,
the issue of whether the prisoner was entitled to federal factual
development turned on whether he was diligent in his efforts in
state court or, in the language of § 2254(e)(2), whether he had
“failed” to develop the facts in support of his claim. 216 If the
defendant was to blame—non-diligent—for the lack of factual
development, then federal hearings and discovery were generally
not permitted. 217 Alternatively, where a defect in the state
213. Cf. Yackle, supra note 35, at 142 (“[I]f a prisoner failed to develop the
facts in state court in circumstances constituting ‘a deliberate bypass’ of state
procedures, a federal court could decline to hold a federal evidentiary hearing.”
(quoting Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 317 (1963))).
214. See, e.g., Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 670–71 (9th Cir. 2004)
(recognizing a hearing as mandatory when the petitioner states a colorable
claim (citing Townsend, 372 U.S. at 313)); United States ex rel. Hampton v.
Leibach, 347 F.3d 219, 233–34 (7th Cir. 2003) (determining “AEDPA posed no
bar to taking additional evidence” after finding “no evidence that prisoner had
been anything but diligent in pursuing his ineffectiveness claim in state court”);
Miller v. Champion, 161 F.3d 1249, 1253 (10th Cir. 1998) (“Mr. Miller is entitled
to receive an evidentiary hearing so long as his allegations, if true and if not
contravened by the existing factual record, would entitle him to habeas relief.”
(citing Medina v. Barnes, 71 F.3d 363, 368–69 (10th Cir. 1995))).
215. Miller, 161 F.3d at 1253 (citing Medina, 71 F.3d at 368–69).
216. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1996).
217. See Hampton, 347 F.3d at 233 (“Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), forbids a district court from holding an
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process was to be blamed for the failure to develop the factual
record in state court, a federal hearing was not barred by
§ 2254(e)(2). 218 Satisfying (e)(2), in other words, was generally
regarded as synonymous with establishing an entitlement to
federal factual development through a hearing, discovery, or an
expansion of the record.
Pinholster imposes novel limitations on a prisoner’s access to
a federal hearing and other less formal discovery devices. 219 The
pre-Pinholster question that seemed to be dispositive as to
whether a hearing was permitted—whether the petitioner
satisfied (e)(2) through diligent pursuits of the relative
evidence—is now substantially displaced by the question of
whether § 2254(d)(1) can be satisfied without the benefit of new
facts developed during federal habeas proceedings. 220 As the
seven-justice majority explained, “[i]t would be strange to ask
federal courts to analyze whether a state court’s adjudication
resulted in a decision that unreasonably applied federal law [for
purposes of (d)(1)] to facts not before the state court.” 221 And
because the majority expressly addressed the interaction of (d)(1)
and (e)(2) regarding evidentiary hearing access—“section
evidentiary hearing on a habeas claim if the petitioner failed to develop the
factual basis of that claim in state court.”).
218. See (Michael) Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 437 (2000) (noting an
evidentiary hearing is not barred “where [appellant] was unable to develop his
claim in state court despite diligent effort. In that circumstance, an evidentiary
hearing is not barred by § 2254(e)(2)”).
219. See Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011) (“We now hold
that review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the state
court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.”). I equate less formal factual
development mechanisms with evidentiary hearings because the Supreme Court
has explained that, for purposes of federal habeas, unless one has satisfied the
requirements for obtaining a hearing, then he is generally ineligible for other
factual development as well. See Holland v. Jackson, 542 U.S. 649, 652 (2004)
(“Those same restrictions [respondent was diligent in state court, or the
conditions required by § 2254(e)(2) were met] apply a fortiori when a prisoner
seeks relief based on new evidence without an evidentiary hearing.” (citing
Cargle v. Mullin, 317 F.3d 1196, 1209 (10th Cir. 2009))).
220. See Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1400 (rejecting the contention of the
petitioner and the dissent that the Court’s holding renders § 2254(e)(2)
substantially superfluous).
221. Id. at 1399. But see id. at 1419–20 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (arguing
that there is nothing strange about allowing consideration in federal court of
new evidence under § 2254(d)(1)).
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2254(e)(2) continues to have force where § 2254(d)(1) does not bar
federal habeas relief” 222—it seems that the threshold question in
determining access to an evidentiary hearing is now a question of
§ 2254(d), and the questions of diligence and non-fault that
dominate the (e)(2) analysis may be only secondarily important.
Nonetheless, the best reading of Pinholster is that its
limitations on federal factual development are, like the deference
in (d)(1) more generally, conditioned on a full and fair state
process. When either section of 2254(d) is satisfied—either (d)(1)
or (d)(2)—then the Pinholster bar on evidentiary hearings does
not apply. 223 Likewise, when the claim presented in federal court
was not “adjudicated on the merits” in state court, the limitations
contained in (d)(1) and in Pinholster do not apply. 224 Accordingly,
understanding the limitations on (d)(1)’s reach is of the utmost
importance in understanding not just whether the federal review
is de novo but also whether new facts may be adduced during the
federal proceedings. Although it is too early to predict with
confidence the ultimate application of Pinholster, my careful
study of the decision has led me to conclude that the bar on
factual development is still implicitly conditioned on the existence
of a full and fair underlying state process; as Justice Sotomayor’s
dissenting opinion explains: “I assume that the majority does not
intend to suggest that review is limited to the state-court record
when a petitioner’s inability to develop the facts supporting his
claim was the fault of the state court itself.” 225
The remainder of this Part sets out to demonstrate that the
due process command of procedural fairness will operate so as to
condition Pinholster’s application to circumstances in which the
state process for developing and litigating factual disputes was
full and fair. Specifically, I contend that unfairness in the state
factual development procedures will render (d)(1) and Pinholster
inapplicable because of two separate but related safeguards
within the text of § 2254. When factual development
opportunities are robust and adequate in state court, Pinholster
222. Id. at 1402.
223. See Pape v. Thaler, 645 F.3d 281, 288 (5th Cir. 2011) (summarizing
Pinholster and applying the (d)(1) and (d)(2) tests).
224. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1996).
225. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1417 n.5 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing
Transcript of Oral Argument, Bell v. Kelly, 555 U.S. 55 (2008) (No. 07-1223)).

150

69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 85 (2012)

serves as a more definitive barrier to federal hearings and fact
development, but when the state process is inadequate,
Pinholster does not impose any new barriers to relief.
A. Section 2254(d)(2) as a Safety-Valve to Pinholster and
Deferential Review
When a state court process is patently unfair and this
unfairness taints the factual conclusions, then the state court
adjudication rests on an “unreasonable determination of the
facts” such that § 2254(d)(2)’s limitation on relief is satisfied. 226
Because § 2254(d)(1) and (d)(2) serve as alternative limitations
on relief, 227 a petitioner who is able to satisfy (d)(2) in this
manner is no longer constrained by (d)(1). Stated more directly,
a prisoner who, in the language of § 2254(d)(2), demonstrates
that the state court decision was “based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in
the state court,” is entitled to a de novo review of his legal
claims and is not barred from adducing new facts conclusive of
the constitutional injury in federal court. 228 A showing under
(d)(2) is AEDPA’s silver bullet insofar as the legal deference of
(d)(1) and the cramped factual procedures of Pinholster are both
rendered inapplicable.
Lest one think that (d)(2) represents a rare mark of
congressional generosity to state prisoners under AEDPA, it is
important to note that the advantages of satisfying (d)(2),
although substantial, are not disproportionate. Far from a
windfall for the prisoner, it is reasonable that one who is able to
demonstrate that the state court’s management of the factual
record was unfair or unreliable would be entitled to develop a
more complete and reliable factual record and obtain legal
review unencumbered by the unfair proceedings. But the
advantages of establishing a (d)(2) claim should not be
understated. Because § 2254(d) is phrased in the disjunctive so
as to impose two alternative limitations on relief, either (d)(1) or
226. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) (1996).
227. Section 2254(d) limits federal habeas relief for a state conviction unless
either (d)(1) or (d)(2) is satisfied.
228. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) (1996).
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(d)(2), a state prisoner can obtain federal habeas relief where
(d)(2) is satisfied without also satisfying the onerous limits set
out in (d)(1) and defined in cases like Pinholster and Richter. 229
For example, a prisoner who satisfies (d)(2) may be entitled to
relief, even without demonstrating a violation of his “clearly
established” federal rights, insofar as the clearly-establishedlaw requirement exists only in § 2254(d)(1). In this way, relief
under (d)(2) is actually more expansive than relief in many
types of § 1983 actions; whereas a petitioner satisfying
§ 2254(d)(2) need not demonstrate the existence of clearly
established law, a plaintiff under § 1983 generally must
overcome the qualified immunity standard announced in cases
like Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 230 which explicitly requires a
deviation from clearly established law. 231 Similarly, Pinholster
imposes its limitations on factual development only in those
cases where § 2254(d)(2) does not apply. 232 Specifically, the
majority in Pinholster holds that “evidence introduced in federal
court has no bearing on § 2254(d)(1) review,” 233 but where the
229. Professor Evan Lee’s analysis of the statute supports this conclusion.
See Lee, supra note 72, at 292 (“The statute should be construed in a way that
makes sense of the separation between (d)(1) and (d)(2).”); see also Cullen v.
Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1415 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (concluding
that the text of the § 2254 compels the conclusion that (d)(1) analysis is not
confined to the record before the state court).
230. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817–18 (1982) (“Reliance on the
objective reasonableness of an official’s conduct, as measured by reference to
clearly established law, should avoid excessive disruption of government and
permit resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment.”).
231. See id. (“We therefore hold that government officials performing
discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” (citations
omitted)). This is a remarkable fact in view of the Supreme Court’s aggressive
interpretation of (d)(1) and the Court’s extension of a habeas-like standard of
review into the exclusionary rule realm. Cf. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S.
135, 144–46 (2009) (construing the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule
broadly so as to bar relief when the police errors were merely the product of
negligence).
232. See Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1400 (“If a claim has been adjudicated on
the merits by a state court, a federal habeas petitioner must overcome the
limitation of § 2254(d)(1) on the record that was before that state court.”).
233. See id. (majority opinion) (rejecting the previous assumption “that
§ 2254(d)(1), despite its mandatory language, simply does not apply when a
federal habeas court has admitted new evidence that supports a claim
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petitioner satisfies (d)(2), this limit on factual development has
no application. 234
In short, by challenging a state process as inadequate and
therefore inconsistent with § 2254(d)(2), a petitioner can avoid
the strictures of (d)(1), and thus likewise avoid the harshness of
AEDPA’s deference as well as the stingy factual development
rules announced in Pinholster. 235 But there are limitations to
this method of litigating challenges to the fairness of the state
process, and the scope of such limitations remains to be
developed through litigation. 236
previously adjudicated in state court” (citing Holland v. Jackson, 542 U.S. 649,
653 (2004))).
234. See id. at 1412–13 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Breyer wrote a
separate concurrence in Pinholster, which ostensibly serves but one purpose: to
alert habeas petitioners that the sky is not falling and that the decision will not
have terribly broad applications. Justice Breyer notes, for example, “[i]f the
federal habeas court finds that the state-court decision fails (d)’s test (or if (d)
does not apply), then an (e) hearing may be needed.” Id. at 1412 (Breyer, J.,
concurring). Most likely Justice Breyer is envisioning a scenario in which the
state court assumes all facts in the light most favorable to the prisoner, or where
the state court summarily denies relief, and thus implicitly assumes the truth of
the prisoner’s allegations. But Justice Breyer’s opinion also leaves open the
possibility that, at least in some circumstances, gross procedural violations
might, in his words, “fail (d)’s test” by violating § 2254(d)(2) and thus factual
development would be appropriate and necessary. Id. Several lower courts have
attempted to apply Justice Breyer’s reasoning to avoid the Pinholster bar on
hearings. See Skipwith v. McNeil, No. 09-60361-CIV, 2011 WL 1598829, at *2–3
(S.D. Fla. Apr. 28, 2011); Hale v. Howes, No. 07-cv-12397, 2008 WL 2858458, at
*1 (E.D. Mich. July 23, 2008).
235. It is unfortunate that even Justice Sotomayor, who provided a reasoned
and impassioned dissent to the procedural narrowing of factual development in
Pinholster, has not acknowledged the full scope of the safety valve built into
(d)(2). See Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1413–36 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Although Justice Sotomayor rejects the majority’s willingness to punish diligent
prisoners when unfairness in the state system prevents them from developing
critical factual evidence, she is equally firm in her conviction that the evidence
that is newly admitted through a federal evidentiary hearing should be
considered in light of (d)(1). See id. at 1413 (“I also disagree with the Court
that . . . § 2254(d)(1) analysis is limited to the state-court record.”). New
evidence is not barred from consideration when the state process is unfair, but
the unfairness of the state process, under this view, would not impede the
application of (d)(1).
236. Scholars and judges that favor extreme deference to the states will no
doubt respond to this reading of (d)(2) by asserting that such a reading is
inappropriate insofar as it substantially undercuts the force of § 2254(d)(1),
which is often regarded as the centerpiece of AEDPA. But just as the Court was
content to conclude in Pinholster that “Section 2254(e)(2) continues to have force
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Although it seems eminently reasonable to conclude that
(d)(2) will apply where, for example, the evidence before a state
court on a material issue is in conflict or unclear and the state
court resolves the issue against the prisoner without a fair
hearing or other procedural steps to fairly determine the
strength of the relative evidence, 237 there is a wide range of
rather less compelling factual scenarios that will arise after
Pinholster. For example, many federal habeas petitioners will
likely argue that Pinholster does not apply so as to bar federal
fact development whenever the state court record is factually
undeveloped through no fault of the petitioner. That is to say, so
long as the petitioner was diligent—not at fault for purposes of
§ 2254(e)(2)—then gaps in the state court record may be filled
through factual development. This form of procedural challenge
is likely to be very common, particularly in non-capital cases,
where the prisoner’s post-conviction pleadings were filed pro se,
or otherwise without considerable factual specificity so as to
create material issues of fact. This narrow reading of Pinholster
seems doomed to fail. Such a reading of AEDPA prioritizes the
pre-Pinholster (e)(2) inquiry into diligence to the substantial
exclusion of the analysis offered in Pinholster. Given the tenor of
the Pinholster majority opinion and its focus on the need to
generally limit federal review to the “record in existence” at the
time of the state court adjudication, such a narrow reading of
Pinholster, while not entirely implausible, seems unlikely. 238
where § 2254(d)(1) does not bar federal habeas relief,” it is appropriate to note
that Section 2254(d)(1) continues to have force where § 2254(d)(2) does not
require relief. Id. at 1401 (majority opinion).
237. I have previously discussed a more detailed scenario that presents a
similarly straightforward application of (d)(2). See Marceau, supra note 135, at
390–93 (discussing a hypothetical in which a state prisoner did not receive fair
process in state court).
238. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1398. This is not to suggest that a state process
that is truly unfair will be deferred to under Pinholster. The point I am making
here is simply that the pre-Pinholster analysis as to whether a hearing was
required focused on § 2254(e)(2). See (Michael) Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420,
424 (2000) (limiting the § 2254 issue to whether § 2254(e)(2) as amended by
AEDPA “bars the evidentiary hearing petitioner seeks”). And after Pinholster it
seems unlikely that a showing of diligence on the part of the petitioner, without
more, will lead the Court to hold that federal factual development is permitted.
The line between petitioner diligence for purposes of (e)(2) and state court
unfairness for purposes of (d)(2) is surely undefined, subject to change, and hard
to identify, but there is space between these two concepts. Whereas the diligence
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Another potential limitation on the use of § 2254(d)(2) as a
mechanism for litigating procedural unfairness in state postconviction procedures derives from the plain text of the statute,
which provides that the prisoner must demonstrate that the
state court decision “was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts.” 239 Arguably, a state court decision is
never based on an unreasonable determination of the facts when
a state court concludes that the petitioner’s factual allegations
fail to state even a prima facie case for relief. That is to say,
when a state court concludes that the prisoner’s allegations, if
regarded as true, do not entitle him to relief, it is difficult for the
petitioner to colorably argue on federal habeas review that the
state court’s factual findings were unreasonable; after all, the
findings purportedly were all made in favor of the defendant.
And this is not an altogether unlikely or uncommon occurrence.
Many states, such as California, deny thousands of habeas
petitions per year through summary dispositions, and many of
these states have laws that prohibit summary dispositions
unless the state court finds “that the claims made in the petition
do not state a prima facie case entitling the petitioner to
relief.” 240 To be sure, a state court that purports to construe all
factual conflicts in the defendant’s favor and nonetheless denies
relief might be incorrect or even procedurally unfair; it is,
however, difficult to characterize the defects in the state process
required under (e)(2) might best be understood as subjectively focused on the
reasonable efforts by the petitioner in light of available information known at
the time, the unfairness required under (d)(2) might focus on some objective
characteristic of the state process that was affirmatively unfair or obstructive of
efforts to develop a claim. Notably, Justice Sotomayor seems to share the view
that a distinction exists between factual development failures based on an
unfair state process and factual development failures despite relative diligence
by the petitioner. Compare Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1436 (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting) (“I fear the consequences of the Court’s novel interpretation of
§ 225(d)(1) for diligent state habeas petitioners with compelling evidence
supporting their claims who were unable through no fault of their own, to
present that evidence to the state court.”), with id. at 1417 n.5 (“I assume that
the majority does not intend to suggest that review is limited to the state court
record when the inability to develop the facts . . . was the fault of the state court
itself.”).
239. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) (1996).
240. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1402 n.12 (majority opinion) (quoting In re
Clark, 855 P.2d 729, 741–42 (Cal. 1993)).
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as, strictly speaking, defects in the state court’s “determination
of the facts” or fact-finding procedures as required in order to
satisfy § 2254(d)(2). 241
Confronted with such a case, a savvy habeas defense lawyer
might argue that a federal court considering a claim for which the
state court assumed all facts in favor of the defendant, though
perhaps unable to permit relief under (d)(2), would be required to
review the claim for relief under (d)(1) based on the assumed
facts from the state court record. The § 2254(d)(1) inquiry in cases
where the state court purported to take as true the petitioner’s
factual allegations should ask whether the state court’s
application of federal law to the facts, as asserted (not proved) by
the prisoner in state court, would amount to an unreasonable
application of federal law. In other words, the question is whether
clearly established law was applied in an unreasonable manner
to the facts as alleged by the prisoner in his state pleadings.
Thus, in most cases of summary disposition or where the state
court explicitly states it is assuming the petitioner’s factual
allegations are true, the analysis is purely one of law and not of
process. 242 In this way, an otherwise unfair state process may be
insulated from expansive federal review, rendering § 2254(d)(2)
an inconsistent and sometimes inadequate means of challenging
state post-conviction processes. In order to obtain de novo review
or a federal hearing in circumstances where the state court
241. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) (1996).
242. As favorable as this formulation initially appears, a prisoner’s success
under (d)(1) will hinge substantially on the quality and clarity of his state court
pleadings. If the factual allegations that preceded a summary disposition were
generic or overly conclusive, then there is no concrete set of facts upon which the
(d)(1) inquiry can be conducted. Indeed, the Supreme Court acknowledged that
state courts will not accept as true “wholly conclusory allegations.” Pinholster,
131 S. Ct. at 1402 n.12. The quality and specificity of the briefing in the state
court is, therefore, of the utmost importance. Unfortunately, this sort of
speculative briefing is likely to be difficult in many cases and impossible in
others, particularly where counsel is not appointed to the prisoner for state
proceedings. Expecting a pro se prisoner to determine which constitutional
provisions apply, much less which facts must be alleged in a state pleading or
potentially waived forever, is expecting too much. Cf. Kenneth Williams, The
Deregulation of the Death Penalty, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 677, 689–90 (2000)
(explaining that with the assistance of counsel, capital habeas petitioners
“frequently include factually disputable claims in their habeas petitions” and
noting that the petitioner does not even know the accuracy of some of these
allegations until the facts are developed through a hearing).
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assumed the facts as alleged by the prisoner, a federal court will
have to be persuaded that § 2254(d)(1) is satisfied. 243 To be sure,
this presents a considerable burden to prisoners, particularly pro
se prisoners, who, in presenting their claims to the state court,
are expected, even without discovery, to colorably assert facts not
yet known to them in order to meaningfully preserve the claims
for federal habeas review. Viewed in this light, (d)(2) provides a
meaningful but insufficient check on the fairness of the state
procedures. 244
B. New Facts Creating a “New” Claim for Purposes of
AEDPA Review
An alternative framework for limiting the scope of Pinholster
and indirectly providing a mechanism for challenging unfair state
procedures relies on a prisoner arguing that the claim he is
presenting to the federal habeas court is new or materially
different from the claim he presented to the state court. 245 The
243. It seems likely that federal hearings in this context will be limited to
circumstances in which the federal court concludes that, based on the prisoner’s
allegations, (d)(1) is satisfied but the court needs a hearing to confirm the
validity of the allegations and conclusively establish the constitutional violation.
This scenario could arise if the state court “assumed the habeas petitioner’s
facts” and then a federal court concluded that the state court’s denial of relief,
based on the petitioner’s version of the facts, was contrary to or an unreasonable
application of clearly established federal law. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1412
(Breyer, J., concurring). In these circumstances, a “hearing might be needed in
order to determine whether the facts alleged [in state court] were indeed true”
so as to justify relief. Id.
244. I reiterate, however, that (d)(2) is not an insignificant mechanism for
reviewing state procedures in many cases. For example, when the state postconviction court refuses to fund a single defense expert despite the presentation
of expert testimony by the State as to a material issue, a finding of fact in favor
of the State as to the material issue should be regarded as satisfying the
unreasonableness requirement of (d)(2) such that federal review is
unconstrained by the Pinholster limitation on factual development and
unconstrained by the deferential review of (d)(1).
245. In a habeas case, Bell v. Kelly, which the Court ultimately dismissed as
improvidently granted, there was a significant amount of valuable briefing by
the parties and amici for both parties. See Bell v. Kelly, 555 U.S. 55, 55 (2008).
Members of the Court continue to cite the briefs and arguments in this case.
See, e.g., Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1417 n.5 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing
Transcript of Oral Argument, Bell v. Kelly, 555 U.S. 55 (2008) (No. 07-1223)). In
Petitioner Bell’s opening brief, counsel explained with considerable care the
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limitations on relief contained in § 2254(d) only apply to claims
“adjudicated on the merits by a state court.” 246 Consequently, if
the claim presented to the federal habeas court is materially
different than the claim presented to the state court, then
§ 2254(d) would not apply. As a general rule, arguing that a claim
or issue of law is new is not a desirable approach for a federal
habeas petitioner. New rules of law are barred by the Teague rule
governing retroactive application of new laws and by
§ 2254(d)(1)’s requirement that federal habeas petitioners state a
claim under “clearly established federal law as determined by the
Supreme Court.” 247 Likewise, if a claim is brought for the first
time on federal habeas review, then the claim is typically said to
be unexhausted and therefore defaulted. 248 Thus, even though the
odds of winning on habeas review are always immensely small, a
denial of relief is typically certain if the prisoner alleges that
something new, never before presented, justifies federal relief.
Such a petitioner does not lose because of § 2254(d)(1); he loses
because his claim is said to be procedurally defaulted. 249
notion that new evidence can render a claim new, and therefore unadjudicated
for purposes of AEDPA. See Brief for Petitioner at 19, Bell v. Kelly, 555 U.S. 55
(2008) No. 07-1223, 2008 WL 2958115, at *23–39. Petitioner’s counsel
specifically stated:
[W]here, as here, a petitioner establishes his entitlement to fact
development and proves facts not before the state court that
significantly affect the court's application of the relevant
constitutional rule (or one of its components) or its impression of the
relevant facts, then the claim adjudicated by the state court ceases to
be susceptible to meaningful review under § 2254(d).
Id. at *20.
246. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1996).
247. Id.
248. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844 (1999) (“[W]hen a prisoner
alleges that his continued confinement for a state court conviction violates
federal law, the state courts should have the first opportunity to review this
claim and provide any necessary relief.” (citing Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509,
515–16 (1982); Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204 (1950))).
249. Practically speaking, the new claim is simply unexhausted and thus
non-cognizable. However, courts tend to recognize that when a claim is not
presented to a state court and no state court remedy remains available, then the
claim is “technically exhausted but procedurally defaulted.” See, e.g., Lopez v.
Ryan, 630 F.3d 1198, 1210 (9th Cir. 2011). Some states completely bar all
successive habeas applications, and thus a claim not presented in one’s first
state petition is technically exhausted because there is no state court remedy,
and the only question is whether the procedural default can be overcome. See
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Significantly, however, there is an important exception to the
rule that bringing a new claim on federal habeas review will
result in an automatic denial of relief, and the exception may
have relevance in the context of challenging state procedures. A
prisoner’s procedural default for failing to raise a claim in the
state courts is forgiven and federal habeas review is available if
the defendant can demonstrate cause and prejudice from the
failing to previously raise the claim. 250 The sort of “cause”
necessary to overcome a default is understood to require a
showing “that some objective factor external to the defense
impeded counsel’s efforts to comply with the State’s procedural
rule.” 251 Accordingly, where state court procedures are so
inadequate or unfair as to prevent the full development of a claim
by the prisoner, cause exists to excuse the procedural default.
Ordinarily, when a prisoner seeks to demonstrate cause and
prejudice, he is pursuing an entirely new claim that came to light
after the state post-conviction proceedings had already concluded.
A paradigmatic example would be a due process Brady claim
based on the prosecution’s failure to disclose certain exculpatory
evidence. 252 Equally strong would be a claim that the state court
Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1418 n.6 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting “that
Virginia law bars all successive habeas applications, even in cases where the
petitioner has new evidence”).
250. In addition to the cause and prejudice limitations, a claim can only be
defaulted if the state procedural bar is independent and adequate. If the state’s
procedures in defaulting a claim are patently unfair, one might also argue that
the default is not predicated on an adequate state law. See, e.g., Lee v. Kemna,
534 U.S. 362, 366 (2002) (holding “that the Missouri Rules, as injected into this
case by the state appellate court, did not constitute a state ground adequate to
bar federal habeas review”); Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 448 (1965)
(holding that “[t]he Mississippi rule requiring contemporaneous objection to the
introduction of illegal evidence” would not bar federal review). In other words, a
state procedure that is, as-applied, unfair or inadequate cannot serve as a basis
for barring federal review.
251. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986); see also MEANS, supra note
22, at § 9B:51 (interpreting Murray). Means specifically states:
Without attempting an exhaustive catalog of objective impediments
to compliance with a procedural rule, the Court in Murray identified
the following: (1) interference by officials that makes compliance with
the state’s procedural rule impractical; (2) a showing that the factual
or legal basis for the claim was not reasonably available; and (3) the
procedural default was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Id.
252. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding “that the
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procedures or mechanisms for litigation directly impede the
development of a claim. For example, the Supreme Court has
permitted relief on a new claim when the facts of a juror
misconduct claim could not have reasonably come to light
through the state process. 253 So long as the best efforts of the
defense are insufficient to discover and present a claim to the
state court, there is said to be cause to excuse the failure to
exhaust the claim. Moreover, when litigating a claim in state
court was impractical because of procedural or prosecutorial
unfairness, the federal review of the claim is de novo. 254 That is to
say, an unfair state procedure that prevents an entirely new claim
from being presented to the state court will provide the prisoner
an opportunity to develop and litigate the claim for the first time
on federal review, unencumbered by AEDPA. 255
In an effort to benefit from the absence of AEDPA deference,
state prisoners who are seeking a forum to challenge a state
process as unfair ought to urge the Court to adopt a capacious
view regarding what constitutes a new claim. As discussed
immediately above, if a claim is truly new, then the restrictions
on relief contained in § 2254 and Pinholster do not apply. Thus,
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request
violates due process” and will not procedurally bar petitioner from raising the
claim in federal court).
253. See (Michael) Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 442 (2000) (explaining
that the state record lacked evidence suggesting material misrepresentations by
a juror during voir dire). The Court noted that “[s]tate habeas counsel did
attempt to investigate petitioner’s jury” by filing “a motion for expert services
with the Virginia Supreme Court, alleging “irregularities, improprieties and
omissions” in the empanelling of the jury. Id. at 442 (quoting Williams v. Taylor,
189 F.3d 421, 426 (4th Cir. 1999)). The Court further noted that “the Virginia
Supreme Court denied [the motion] and dismissed the habeas petition,
depriving petitioner of a further opportunity to investigate,” and despite the fact
that petitioner’s allegations of juror misconduct in the state court were “vague,”
the Court concluded that such “vagueness was not the fault of petitioner”
insofar as he had no knowledge that one of the jurors had concealed personal
and professional relationships with the prosecutor. Id.; see also id. at 444
(holding that the petitioner’s failure to present the claim to the state court was
excused insofar as the unavailability of the evidence constituted “cause” and on
remand the prejudice issue could be determined).
254. See id. at 444.
255. See id. (finding that the failure to exhaust is excused because there is
cause and prejudice). AEDPA does not apply because the same claim at issue
was not “adjudicated” on the merits as required by § 2254(d). Id.
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the more robust the understanding of what constitutes a new,
unadjudicated claim, the more opportunity there is for prisoners
who are able to demonstrate an unfair state process, and thus
cause for the non-exhaustion, to avoid AEDPA. 256 Specifically, a
state prisoner might plausibly argue that a claim was not
adjudicated for purposes of § 2254(d) when new evidence
discovered after the completion of the state proceedings
substantially bolsters a legal claim raised in state proceedings.
The broadest articulation of this principle—substantial new facts
developed in federal habeas render (d)(1) inapplicable—was
presented to the Court in a prior case, Bell v. Kelly. 257 Although
the Bell case was ultimately dismissed as improvidently granted,
the briefing and oral argument from the case continues to be cited
by the Justices and considered by lower courts. 258 The petitioner’s
brief in Bell was the apotheosis of the argument that new facts
will suffice to render a claim new:
By its plain language, [§ 2254(d)] applies only to “claims” that
were “adjudicated on the merits” in state court. A “claim” is
the application of governing law to a particular set of facts.
The admission of significant new evidence on federal habeas,
therefore, may give rise to a new “claim” that no state court
has previously “adjudicated on the merits.” 259

In Pinholster, the Court expressly rejected the broad notion
of new claim that regarded the admission of any substantial new
evidence during federal habeas review as precluding the
application of § 2254(d). 260 Nonetheless, the Court left open the
256. The scenario presented in (Michael) Williams, while an important limit
on AEDPA, is likely to be less common because it requires habeas counsel to
uncover an entirely new legal theory justifying relief, as opposed to merely
substantial new facts in support of a claim raised in state court. In (Michael)
Williams, the petitioner raised for the first time in his federal habeas petition
an entirely new claim of juror bias. Id. at 427.
257. Bell v. Kelly, 555 U.S. 55 (2008) (denying cert. in part).
258. See, e.g., Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1417 n.5 (2011)
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
259. Brief for Petitioner at 19–20, Bell v. Kelly, 555 U.S. 55 (2008) No. 071223, 2008 WL 2958115, at *19–20.
260. See Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1400 (noting that in a prior decision the
Court had assumed, without deciding, that (d)(1) did not apply when significant
new evidence had been admitted, and holding that “[t]oday, we reject that
assumption and hold that evidence introduced in federal court has no bearing on
§ 2254(d)(1) review”).
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possibility that, in certain circumstances, significant new
evidence will justify regarding a federal claim as sufficiently new
so as to be unadjudicated for purposes of § 2254(d) and therefore
unaffected by Pinholster. 261 Specifically, there is a footnote in
Pinholster that is destined to be revered by habeas defense
lawyers as the only redeeming feature of the decision and bound
to be reviled by proponents of less federal habeas oversight as an
unnecessary point of confusion. In footnote 10, the Court left a
crack in the door leading to the habeas looking glass: “Though we
do not decide where to draw the line between new claims and
claims adjudicated on the merits, Justice Sotomayor’s
hypothetical involving new evidence of withheld exculpatory
witness statements may well present a new claim.” 262 It may
ultimately prove unwise to place too much weight on the Court’s
failure to directly foreclose such an argument, 263 but this single
footnote will, for many habeas petitioners, be the strongest
argument against the application of (d)(1) and the Pinholster
prohibition on a court’s ability to consider new evidence on
habeas review. Accordingly, it is necessary to consider with due
care the hypothetical in Justice Sotomayor’s dissent that spurred
this soon to be infamous footnote:
Consider, for example, a petitioner who diligently attempted in
state court to develop the factual basis of a claim that
prosecutors withheld exculpatory witness statements in
violation of Brady v. Maryland. The state court denied relief
on the ground that the withheld evidence then known did not
rise to the level of materiality required under Brady. Before
the time for filing a federal habeas petition has expired,
however, a state court orders the State to disclose additional
documents the petitioner had timely requested under the
State’s public records Act. The disclosed documents reveal that
the State withheld other exculpatory witness statements, but
state law would not permit the petitioner to present the new
evidence in a successive petition. 264

261. Id. at 1401.
262. Id. at 1401 n.10.
263. Similar reliance was placed on Holland v. Jackson, 542 U.S. 649 (2004),
which had assumed without deciding that the introduction of new evidence in
federal court rendered (d)(1) inapplicable. Holland, 542 U.S. at 653.
264. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1417–18 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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Responding to her own hypothetical, 265 Justice Sotomayor makes
a series of observations that all but forces the majority to concede
that, at least in some circumstances, new evidence justifies
regarding a legal theory or claim that was exhausted in state
court as a new claim:
Under our precedent, if the petitioner had not presented his
Brady claim to the state court at all, his claim would be
deemed defaulted and the petitioner could attempt to show
cause and prejudice to overcome the default. If, however, the
new evidence merely bolsters a Brady claim that was
adjudicated on the merits in state court, it is unclear how the
petitioner can obtain federal habeas relief after today’s
holding . . . . Because the state court adjudicated the
petitioner’s Brady claim on the merits, § 2254(d)(1) would still
apply. Yet, under the majority’s interpretation of § 2254(d)(1),
a federal court is now prohibited from considering the new
evidence in determining the reasonableness of the state-court
decision.
The majority's interpretation of § 2254(d)(1) thus suggests the
anomalous result that petitioners with new claims based on
newly obtained evidence can obtain federal habeas relief if
they can show cause and prejudice for their default but
petitioners with newly obtained evidence supporting a claim
adjudicated on the merits in state court cannot obtain federal
habeas relief if they cannot first satisfy § 2254(d)(1) without
the new evidence. 266

265. It is interesting to note that the Justice’s hypothetical refers to a state
court’s discovery order as providing the relevant new evidence. Id. If no such
state procedures are available, then many state prisoners will never develop
such evidence without the aid of a federal court’s discovery order. My research
has not revealed any statistics regarding the frequency with which federal
courts grant discovery prior to the filing of a federal petition, but my experience
suggests that this is not the norm in most jurisdictions.
266. Id. at 1419 (citations omitted). Although Justice Sotomayor’s
hypothetical does seem to uncover an anomaly insofar as prisoners who raise a
claim are at a greater disadvantage than prisoners who do not raise the claim,
this is not the only instance of such an anomaly under AEDPA. For example, a
prisoner who raises a claim in his first federal habeas petition is absolutely,
categorically barred from raising the same claim in a second or successive
petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(b)(1). By contrast, a prisoner who has never before
raised the claim may do so in a successive petition if, for example, the claim is
subsequently announced as a new rule of law made retroactive by the Supreme
Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (b)(2)(A).
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In response to this discussion in the dissent, the Pinholster
majority responds in footnote 10 by noting that this hypothetical
petitioner who obtains new Brady evidence “may well [have] a
new claim” such that § 2254(d) would not apply. 267 In short, if
government misconduct, or state procedural unfairness, or even
simply circumstances beyond the defendant’s control prevented
the discovery of substantial new facts, then an “old” claim
reviewed in federal court in light of the “new” facts might be
deemed a new claim and thus free of the restrictions in § 2254. 268
The dissent seems to have prompted the majority to concede that
the presentation of substantial new facts in support of a claim
may be sufficient to render a preexisting claim “new” and
therefore unadjudicated for purposes of § 2254(d), 269 and, to be
sure, this is one of the few chinks in the AEDPA armor. Notably,
however, there remain some substantial deficiencies with this
approach as a model for ensuring full and fair state court
proceedings.
Most importantly, it seems unlikely that any new facts can
be considered after the filing of the federal habeas petition. That
is to say, if there is an exception to Pinholster’s limitation when
substantial new evidence is discovered to support the claim, the
exception may extend only to evidence presented prior to the
filing of the federal habeas petition. This rule necessarily follows
from Pinholster because Pinholster bars the consideration of
evidence outside of the state court record unless § 2254(d)(1) is
satisfied. 270 If the claim presented in the federal petition is not
“new” based on the substantial additional facts, then it is the
267. Id. at 1401 n.10 (majority opinion). Of course, if the new evidence
renders a claim new, then the claim is also unexhausted. If the state law bars
the filing of a successive petition, see, e.g., id. at 1400 n.6, then the petitioner
must overcome the default by demonstrating cause and prejudice. Cf. (Michael)
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 432–33 (2000) (recognizing that the diligence
required for § 2254(e)(2) will typically also constitute the cause needed to
overcome a default). By contrast, if the state procedures would allow a new
claim to be presented, then the claim would have to be exhausted. Notably, if
the claim (or substantial new facts) were not discovered until after the habeas
petition was filed in district court, then it is unlikely that the new claim can be
added by amendment to the pending habeas petition. See Mayle v. Felix, 545
U.S. 644, 657 (2005).
268. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1400 (majority opinion).
269. Id. at 1418 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
270. Id. at 1398 (majority opinion).
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same claim that was adjudicated by the state court. And “if a
claim has been adjudicated on the merits by a state court,”
federal review is constrained by (d)(1) and limited to the state
court record. 271 In essence, this means that a petitioner relying on
this “new” claim approach must establish the facts in support of
his claim prior to the filing of his federal habeas petition and
without the assistance of the court in the form of subpoenas and
discovery orders. This presents a number of barriers to relief that
will often prove insurmountable unless federal judges, alerted to
this conundrum, more regularly permit pre-petition discovery or
hearings. 272
For example, in the vast majority of non-capital habeas
cases, the prisoner will be unrepresented. 273 The prisoner will
finish his state post-conviction proceedings and, still without
counsel, be expected to generate substantial new facts in support
of his claims within the one-year statute of limitations for filing a
federal petition as prescribed by AEDPA. 274 In the absence of
federal procedures, such as a court ordered evidentiary hearing to
develop facts in support of the claims, it is all but impossible for
the vast majority of prisoners to uncover relevant, substantial
271. Sotomayor’s dissent highlights this confusion when she notes: “Even if
it can fairly be argued that my hypothetical petitioner has a new claim, the
majority fails to explain how a diligent petitioner with new evidence supporting
an existing claim can present his new evidence to a federal court.” Id. at 1418
n.8 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
272. It should be noted that recent limitations on certain types of civil
actions under § 1983, particularly in the context of supervisory liability, impose
similar burdens on prisoners. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949
(2009) (finding that in § 1983 suits, a government official is only responsible for
his or her own actions and mere knowledge is not sufficient to hold an official
liable for his or her subordinate’s discriminatory behavior). Certainly a prisoner
seeking to construct a well-pleaded complaint so as to state a claim under the
heightened standards of Iqbal would benefit from pre-filing discovery as well.
Cf. Adam Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1336–39
(2010) (positing that, in reality, the Iqbal standard does not impose a materially
higher pleading burden on plaintiffs).
273. See Louis Bloom & Helen Hershkoff, Federal Courts, Magistrate
Judges, and the Pro Se Plaintiff, 16 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 475,
479 (2002) (noting that a significant increase in habeas filings involve pro se
litigants).
274. See id. at 483 (addressing the fact that pro se claims present complex
issues because these applicants lack resources to interpret the law or to obtain
evidentiary support for claims).
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evidence in support of their claims. 275 Presently, however, there is
no federal procedure for obtaining an evidentiary hearing prior to
the filing of a federal habeas petition. 276 Moreover, in the unlikely
event that a state prisoner who filed a federal petition convinced
a federal judge to grant an evidentiary hearing in order to
develop new facts, it is unlikely that the petitioner would
ultimately be permitted to benefit from these new facts. On the
one hand, if the new facts merely supported existing, exhausted
claims, then Pinholster expressly holds that such facts are not
relevant to the determination of whether habeas relief may be
granted. 277 On the other hand, if the petitioner claimed that the
newly developed facts that resulted from the hearing were
sufficiently substantial so as to render his claim “new” under the
terms of footnote 10 from Pinholster, the new claim would likely
not be cognizable because habeas petitions can be amended so as
to add new claims only when the new claims relate back to the
claims in the original petition. 278 In Mayle v. Felix, 279 the Court
limited amendments to habeas petitions 280 such that
amendments are permitted only insofar as they arise out of “the
same core facts as the timely filed claim.” 281 It would obviously be
difficult for a petitioner to argue that he is permitted to amend
his petition because the newly developed facts arise out of the
same “core of facts” while simultaneously arguing that the new
facts that are the source of the amendment are sufficiently

275. See id.
276. The text of Habeas Rule 8 seems to explicitly foreclose the possibility of
a pre-filing evidentiary hearing: “If the petition is not dismissed, the judge
shall . . . determine whether an evidentiary hearing is warranted.” Rules
Governing § 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, Rule 8, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 (2010). Likewise, in McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 857–58 (1994), a
closely divided Court concluded that the statutory right to counsel is triggered
prior to the filing of a habeas petition. Id.
277. See Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1398 (majority opinion).
278. Id. at 1419 n.10 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
279. Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644 (2005).
280. The Mayle v. Felix issue applies only to efforts to amend that occur
after AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations has expired. Id. at 656. An
amendment as of right that occurs before the one year deadline should be
immune from this difficulty. Id.
281. Id. at 657.
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material and different so as to render the previously presented
claim unadjudicated by the state court. 282
I do not purport to have all of the answers about this rapidly
developing and unsettled area of law, but as this brief discussion
illustrates, the “new” claim approach suffers from substantial
shortcomings. Even where a state process is patently unfair—the
state actively obstructs the development of relevant facts in
support of a colorable claim by denying funding, or experts, or
hearing—the federal court probably can only consider new facts
when those facts are discovered prior to the filing of the habeas
petition and included in the federal petition. Perhaps the Court
will simply read a procedural fairness requirement into the
Pinholster rule, but if not, the new-claim approach, like the
efforts to litigate procedural unfairness under § 2254(d)(2), are
likely to prove an insufficient check on unfair state procedures.
VI. Challenging Deficient State Procedures Through
§ 1983 Actions
In view of the fact that AEDPA poses procedural and
substantive barriers that are often insurmountable, it is time for
courts to consider seriously the viability of a non-habeas
challenge to state procedures, i.e., a challenge under § 1983
seeking declaratory or injunctive relief because of an unfair state
practice. Ideally, a § 1983 action could serve as a collateral forum
for litigating procedural fairness issues—it is collateral review of
the collateral review.
Until very recently, such challenges seemed unnecessary in
view of the accepted wisdom that AEDPA was more legislative
hyperbole (or hype) than bite. Moreover, lawyers have likely been
deterred from bringing such actions, which thematically resemble
a post-conviction or collateral challenge, by the Court’s repeated
admonition that habeas proceedings are the exclusive vehicle for

282. Potentially the prisoner could file the "new" claim as a successive
habeas petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). However, in order to satisfy the limitation
on successive petitions the new facts must not have been discoverable through
“due diligence” and “the facts underlying the claim” would have to demonstrate
the petitioner’s innocence. Id.

CHALLENGING THE HABEAS PROCESS

167

challenging the legality of one’s conviction. 283 Presently, however,
there is both a need for procedural challenges unconstrained by
AEDPA and a viable option for such challenges based on the
Court’s recent decision in Skinner v. Switzer. 284 Whereas the
Court’s recent decisions in Pinholster and Richter signal that
AEDPA’s restrictions on federal review are maturing in their
severity, within weeks of these two habeas decisions the Court
also decided Skinner, which opens the door to procedural 285
challenges to state post-conviction286 proceedings under § 1983.
As the remainder of this Article explains, a § 1983 challenge to
state post-conviction proceedings seems to provide a plausible
alternative (or supplement) to challenging unfair state processes
through federal habeas proceedings. Assuming a mechanism for
staying petitions during the pendency of non-habeas challenges
so as to avoid the prohibitions on successive habeas petitions and
amendments, civil litigation under § 1983 promises a unique
opportunity to prompt systemic reform of state processes, like
that urged by Professor Primus, without eliminating
individualized habeas corpus review. As with procedural
challenges brought within the habeas framework, it is an
imperfect solution to a complicated problem, but § 1983 litigation
provides advantages to prisoners seeking to challenge the
procedural adequacy of their state court proceedings.
283. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 478 (1994) (finding that certain
claims, such as challenging the fact or duration of confinement, “must be
brought in as habeas corpus proceedings, which do contain an exhaustion
requirement”).
284. Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1298–1320 (2011) (allowing a claim
under § 1983 to proceed so long as it does not demonstrate invalidity of
conviction).
285. The Skinner majority is clear that challenges to a state’s procedures (or
lack thereof) as a matter of substantive due process are not generally viable. See
id. at 1293 (“Osborne rejected the extension of substantive due process to this
area . . . .” (citing Attorney’s Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct.
2308, 2321 (2009))); id. (holding that a viable claim is one that alleges that the
available state procedures denied “him procedural due process”).
286. See id. at 1301 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Like Osborne, Skinner seeks
to challenge state collateral review procedures.”); id. at 1301 n.2 (explaining
that the procedure in question is a collateral, post-conviction procedure even
though the challenged DNA procedure “does not itself provide a vehicle for
obtaining relief” (quoting Ex Parte Tuley, 109 S.W.3d 388, 391 (Tex. Crim. App.
2002))).
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A. Understanding Skinner as Permitting § 1983 Actions

In Skinner, the Court considered whether a state prisoner
could assert a claim under § 1983 challenging a state’s DNA
testing procedures or whether such a claim must be brought in a
habeas petition under § 2254. Skinner brought a § 1983 action
seeking an injunction forcing the state of Texas to allow him to
test DNA evidence from the crime scene. More precisely, Skinner
brought an action against the district attorney whose office had
control of the evidence that Skinner sought to test, claiming that
the failure to permit testing in his case was procedurally
improper. 287 In a 6–3 decision, the Court held that a challenge to
the procedural fairness of a “postconviction claim . . . is properly
pursued in a § 1983 action.” 288 This holding could prove to be
pathmarking in the field of post-conviction review. 289
At the outset, however, it is critical to point out that
Skinner’s allowance of non-habeas challenges to state postconviction proceedings is limited to challenges of process rather
than challenges of substance. 290 The first sentence of Skinner
emphasizes the limits of the holding by explaining that the
decision is limited to the narrow question “left unresolved in
District Attorney’s Office for Third Judicial District v.
Osborne.” 291 In Osborne, the Court unequivocally held that there
is no substantive right to access DNA evidence, and such a
conclusion is consistent with the prior decisions concluding that
there is no due process right to post-conviction proceedings more
generally. 292 As the Court has explained, “Osborne rejected the
287. See id. at 1294–95 (majority opinion).
288. See id.
289. Prior to Skinner, it was far from obvious that § 1983 authorized such
challenges. See, e.g., Dickerson v. Walsh, 750 F.2d 150, 152–54 (1st Cir. 1984)
(holding that such claims could only be raised through habeas corpus because
the ultimate relief sought was release); Schwartz, supra note 63, at 160 (“A
forceful argument can be made that Younger abstention normally should
preclude federal court relief that interferes with state post-conviction
proceedings.”).
290. See Skinner, 131 S. Ct. at 1293.
291. Id.
292. See Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2322 (“Osborne seeks to defend the judgment
on the basis of substantive due process as well . . . . We reject the invitation and
conclude, in the circumstances of this case, that there is no such substantive due
process right.”). As a general matter, courts operate on the assumption that

CHALLENGING THE HABEAS PROCESS

169

extension of substantive due process to this area, and left slim
room for the prisoner to show that the governing state law denies
him procedural due process.” 293 There is, in short, no right to
certain state post-conviction procedures, but when a state
provides post-conviction review, and therefore earns federal
deference to its review, the process must be fundamentally fair. 294
Skinner-type challenges, then, will be limited to claims that the
state has deprived the prisoner of a liberty interest in a full and
fair state post-conviction process in contravention of procedural
due process. 295
there is no due process (or other constitutional) right to state post-conviction
procedures of any particular form, or even at all. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v.
Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 557 (1987) (explaining that “[s]tates have no obligation to
provide” opportunities for collateral challenges). However, when such
procedures exist, they must be fundamentally fair as required by procedural due
process. Cf. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2320 (asking whether “the State’s procedures
for postconviction relief ‘offends some principal of justice so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental,’ or
‘transgresses any recognized principle of fundamental fairness in operation’”
(quoting Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 446, 448 (1992))). The requirement
of procedural fairness operates as a sort of quid pro quo—the state’s review is
insulated with deference under the habeas common law and AEDPA, but the
state’s review must earn such deference by honoring basic precepts of fairness.
Cf. id. at 2332 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Although States are under no
obligation to provide mechanisms for postconviction relief, when they choose to
do so, the procedures they employ must comport with the demands of the Due
Process Clause . . . .” (citing Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 393 (1985))).
293. Skinner, 131 S. Ct. at 1293 (citations omitted).
294. The conclusion that there is no right to state post-conviction review is
often explained by reference to the even more surprising conclusion that there is
no constitutional right to a direct appeal. See Marc M. Arkin, Rethinking the
Constitutional Right to a Criminal Appeal, 39 UCLA L. REV. 503, 503–04 (1992)
(noting that the Court has bolstered its conclusion that state habeas is not
required by relying on the conclusion that state appeals are not even required).
As one commentator has explained,
Criminal appeals did not exist at the time of the Founding; Congress
did not provide for federal criminal appeals until the late nineteenth
century; accordingly, the criminal appeal cannot form part of the
historic tradition of due process. As recently as 1987, the Supreme
Court reaffirmed its allegiance to this conventional view, stating that
there is no constitutional right to appellate review of criminal
convictions, a proposition that the Court has repeated with
remarkable regularity since first enunciating it in 1894.
Id.
295. As expressed in Osborne, “Federal courts may upset a State’s
postconviction relief procedures only if they are fundamentally inadequate to
vindicate the substantive rights provided.” Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2320.
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In short, Skinner opens the door to § 1983 challenges to the
procedural adequacy of state collateral proceedings. In Skinner,
the challenge was to the state’s construction and application of a
DNA access statute; however, subsequent challenges could be
brought on procedural due process grounds against any state
collateral proceeding implicating constitutional rights so long as a
favorable outcome for the prisoner in the proceeding would not
necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction. 296 It is true that
the “ultimate aim” of these procedural challenges by a prisoner is
to undermine the validity of a conviction. 297 And in this regard,
Justice Thomas is surely correct that such a claim “sounds in
habeas” and provides a “roadmap” for prisoners seeking to avoid
the constraints of AEDPA. 298 Nonetheless, Skinner leaves no
doubt that, as a procedural matter, such challenges can be
brought in a § 1983 action, and, as such, § 1983 may serve to
impose an important additional deterrent on state courts such
that they will be more careful about the procedures employed to
review claims of unconstitutional incarcerations. 299
296. See Skinner, 131 S. Ct. at 1298.
297. See id. at 1299.
298. Id. at 1302. The Court has repeatedly held that “[c]hallenges to the
validity of any confinement or to particulars affecting its duration are the
province of habeas corpus.” See Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 579 (2006)
(holding that a challenge to the State’s proposed method of execution may be
brought under § 1983) (quoting Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004)).
The Court reasoned that such claims must be more akin to a challenge to the
conditions or circumstances of confinement than an outright challenge to the
legality of one’s sentence or conviction, and thus, the habeas bar on successive
petitions did not apply to such actions. Id.
299. See Skinner, 131 S. Ct. at 1298–99. The range of challenges to process
available to petitioners is legion and far from hypothetical. For example, the
Tenth Circuit observed a recurring procedural trap in Oklahoma: the state
courts would treat a claim as defaulted if it was not raised on direct appeal,
even if the claim in question could not be raised on direct appeal. See Miller v.
Champion, 161 F.3d 1249, 1252 (10th Cir. 1998) (“In this case, the record
contains no evidence that Mr. Miller had the opportunity to consult with
separate appellate counsel in order to evaluate his attorney’s performance or
that Oklahoma provided him with any procedural mechanism to develop the
factual basis of his ineffective assistance claim on direct appeal.”). Professor
Primus has gathered several other useful examples. See Primus, supra note 170,
at 2 (noting, for example, that “[c]apital defendants in Idaho who discover six
weeks after sentencing that the state withheld impeachment evidence about
prosecution witnesses are statutorily barred from challenging the state’s
misconduct in state court”).
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B. The Advantages of a § 1983 Challenge to State PostConviction Procedures
Summarizing his objections to Skinner’s approval of § 1983
challenges to state collateral proceedings, Justice Alito explained:
“In truth, the majority provides a roadmap for any unsuccessful
state habeas petitioner to relitigate his claim under § 1983: After
state habeas is denied, file a § 1983 suit challenging the state
habeas process rather than the result. What prisoner would not
avail himself of this additional bite at the apple?” 300
The prospect that Skinner provides a procedural bypass
around AEDPA is significant, and this section catalogues the
various advantages that such litigation would provide to
prisoners. Given that Congress has shown no signs of imminently
overhauling AEDPA, a “roadmap” around the limitations would
be a welcome development for those interested in restoring a
system of more substantial oversight of state convictions. A welltimed § 1983 challenge to state procedures would enable the
prisoner to avoid, to varying degrees, the onerous exhaustion,
discovery, and deference provisions of AEDPA and would likely
even facilitate class actions that would conserve judicial
resources, attorney time, and promote efficiency. 301 Equally
important, such litigation would carry with it the promise of
attorney fees in successful cases and thus spur the representation
of non-capital prisoners who, with few exceptions, are forced to
litigate pro se in federal habeas review. All the while, because
such litigation is done outside the realm of habeas corpus, one
avoids the concerns raised by King and Hoffmann that the
overuse of habeas corpus has the effect of diminishing the writ
insofar as the judge who has to sort through the habeas haystack
ends up resenting the needle. 302
Nonetheless, there is also reason to believe that the concerns
raised by Justices Alito, Thomas, and Kennedy—that Skinner
“undermines the [AEDPA] restrictions”—are substantially
overblown. In view of the fact that federal habeas actions remain
the only litigation vehicle through which a conviction can actually
300.
301.
302.

Skinner, 131 S. Ct. at 1303 (Alito, J., dissenting).
KING & HOFFMANN, supra note 8, at 73.
See id.
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be set aside, the siren song of AEDPA’s fundamental demise is
overstated. 303 After briefly surveying some of the positive
attributes of litigation under § 1983 as opposed to § 2554, I will
consider the shortcomings of this § 1983 approach.
1. Exhaustion
The first significant advantage of § 1983 litigation is that, as
a general rule, actions litigated under § 1983 do not require
exhaustion. 304 The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 requires
that prisoners bring grievances through the prison’s
administrative processes before filing a § 1983 action, 305 and the
Court has interpreted this requirement as imposing a duty to
timely and properly exhaust the available procedures for
The
exhaustion
of
redressing
prisoner
grievances. 306
administrative remedies required of prisoners is, however, less
onerous and less time consuming than AEDPA-based exhaustion,
and, most importantly, it is limited to circumstances where the
prisoner brings an action “with respect to prison conditions.” 307 In
other words, the limited form of exhaustion that applies to
303. For example, rigid limitations on filing successive habeas petitions,
without more, substantially ameliorate Justice Thomas’s concerns. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(b).
304. See Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 500–01 (1982); Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961). There is good reason not to require exhaustion
in the context of such litigation. As Professor Martin A. Schwartz has observed,
the “1983 remedy exists, in part, because of congressional mistrust for the
‘factfinding processes of state institutions,’” and thus § 1983 is designed to
provide persons with “immediate access to the federal judicial system despite
state laws to the contrary.” Schwartz, supra note 63, at 98. It should be noted
that insofar as exhaustion does not apply to § 1983 actions, the procedural
default barriers applicable to habeas actions are also inapplicable. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(b)(1)(A).
305. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Prisoners had no exhaustion requirement prior to
a 1979 enactment that provided a milder exhaustion requirement. See Woodford
v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 84 (2006) (“Before 1980, prisoners asserting constitutional
claims had no obligation to exhaust administrative remedies.” (citing
Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 251 (1971))).
306. See Ngo, 548 U.S. at 93 (“[E]xhaustion requirement requires proper
exhaustion.”); Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 740–41 (2001) (finding that
Congress amended § 1997e(a) to demand exhaustion of administrative remedies
regardless of relief offered).
307. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2006).

CHALLENGING THE HABEAS PROCESS

173

prisoners bringing § 1983 actions is inapplicable to prisoners
challenging state post-conviction review procedures. 308 Indeed, in
Osborne, the Court expressly stated that nothing in the opinion
should be construed as requiring a petitioner to “exhaust statelaw remedies,” 309 and Skinner himself did not exhaust his
“challenge to Texas’[s] procedures for postconviction relief to the
Texas courts.” 310
The avoidance of an exhaustion requirement is a significant
advantage for prisoners seeking to challenge state procedures. 311
Under § 2254(b)–(c), a prisoner is explicitly required to exhaust
all federal claims in state court, and a prisoner “shall not be
deemed to have exhausted . . . if he has the right under the law of
308. Indeed, if a petitioner were to raise a federal claim in state court and,
after losing, proceed with the identical claim in a § 1983 action, the so-called
Rooker-Feldman doctrine or the preclusion doctrines would likely deprive a
federal court of jurisdiction. See D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462,
486 (1983) (holding that federal courts other than the Supreme Court do not
have jurisdiction over challenges to state court decisions arising out of judicial
proceedings); see also Rooker v. Fidelity Trust, 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923) (stating
that appellate jurisdiction over final state court decisions rests solely with the
Supreme Court of the United States). In Skinner, rather than bringing a federal
challenge to a state court’s adjudication of his challenge to state procedures,
Skinner “target[ed] as unconstitutional” the specific procedures applied in his
case. See Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1298 (2011) (recognizing that
while a state court decision is not reviewable by a federal court under § 1983,
the statute or rule governing the decision may provide a basis for a federal
action).
309. Dist. Attorney’s Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct.
2308, 2321 (2009) (citing Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 500–01 (1982)).
While rejecting the exhaustion requirement, the majority commented, “[i]t is
difficult to criticize the State’s procedures when Osborne has not invoked
them. . . . These procedures are adequate on their face, and without trying them,
Osborne can hardly complain that they do not work in practice.” Id.
310. Skinner, 131 S. Ct. at 1303 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
311. The significance of the fact that exhaustion does not apply to § 1983
actions, particularly as they relate to challenges predicated on state postconviction review, has not escaped the attention of several of the Justices. In a
concurring opinion in the Osborne judgment, Justice Alito, writing also for
Kennedy and Thomas, observed that exhaustion is not required when the
challenges to post-conviction procedures are pursued under § 1983. Osborne, 129
S. Ct. at 2324 (Alito, J., concurring) (explaining that such challenges ought to be
forced into the habeas jurisdiction because exhaustion is not required for § 1983
actions); see also Skinner, 131 S. Ct. at 1304 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (describing
the majority opinion as facilitating an intrusion by § 1983 “into the boundaries
of habeas corpus” and lamenting the absence of an exhaustion requirement in
cases like Skinner).
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the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question
presented.” 312 Exhaustion, in other words, requires complete
exhaustion in the sense that the prisoner must invoke “one
complete round” under all of the established state review
procedures. 313 Complete exhaustion is time consuming and filled
with procedural pitfalls, and, for these reasons, Professor Martin
Schwartz has identified the exhaustion requirement as being “at
the heart” of the reasons why individuals prefer § 1983 over
habeas litigation. 314
2. Section 2254(d)(1) & Factual Development
Prisoners seeking to challenge the fairness of state
procedures under § 1983 will also enjoy the opportunity to avoid
the centerpiece of AEDPA, § 2254(d)(1), and one of the more
onerous pre-AEDPA limits on habeas relief: the rule of nonretroactivity. 315 As Justice Thomas explained in his dissent, the
312. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)–(c) (2006) (emphasis added).
313. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999).
314. See Schwartz, supra note 63, at 98 (“The exhaustion requirement under
the federal habeas corpus doctrine lies at the heart of the section 1983—habeas
corpus conflict.”). It is also worth noting that § 1983 does not contain a statute of
limitations; instead, the federal courts apply the forum state’s personal injury
statute of limitations. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985) (agreeing
to adopt, for a § 1983 action, the statute of limitations for recovery of damages in
personal injury cases). In many actions under § 1983 the statute of limitations
would be more generous than AEDPA’s one-year filing deadline. See id. at 280
(applying New Mexico’s three-year statute of limitations governing actions “for
an injury to the person or reputation of any person”); see also Owens v. Okure,
488 U.S. 235, 238–39 (1989) (applying “New York’s 3-year residual statute of
limitations for claims of personal injury” rather than the one-year statute of
limitations urged by the State).
315. As a general rule, new constitutional rules announced by the Supreme
Court that do not “place certain kinds of primary individual conduct beyond
power of States to proscribe” and that are not “‘watershed’ rules of criminal
procedure,” do not apply retroactively to cases that are already final. Danforth v.
Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 266 (2008) (citing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288
(1989)). If, however, the challenge is brought as an injunctive action under
§ 1983, the limitations imposed by Teague ought not apply. See Teague, 489 U.S.
at 308–10 (describing exceptions where a decision will apply retroactively,
including when the decision requires adherence to procedures that are “implicit
in the concept or ordered” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Palko v.
Conn., 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937))). Accordingly, a prisoner could theoretically
challenge a state procedure as insufficiently full and fair and obtain an
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Skinner rule allows prisoners to “undercut[] the restrictions
Congress and this Court have placed on federal review of state
convictions,” including the “significant deference” afforded to
state courts under (d)(1). 316 This means that the severe
limitations on relief dictated by decisions like Richter do not
apply to prisoners challenging the adequacy of the state process
under § 1983. To the extent that the challenges to state
procedures prove ineffectual under § 2254(d)(2) or the new claim
approach, discussed above, a § 1983 challenge to the process
provides a viable alternative that is unencumbered by the
exhaustion and deference provisions of AEDPA. 317

injunction ordering the state court to comply with the new procedural rule. Of
course, the § 1983 challenge’s ultimate goal must be the undermining of the
state review procedures and not the overturning of the prisoner’s conviction. See
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994) (stating that if a § 1983 judgment
in favor of a plaintiff necessarily implies the invalidity of his conviction, the
complaint must be dismissed absent proof of the conviction’s prior invalidation).
On the other hand, one could reasonably argue that many new rules of state
post-conviction procedure could be announced on federal habeas review—that is
to say, the Court has never addressed whether Teague’s retroactivity rule
applies to new rules of post-conviction procedure, and there is good reason to
believe that Teague does not bar the announcement of new rules of procedure on
habeas review when the new rule implicates the state post-conviction
procedures rather than the trial procedures. Cf. Martinez v. Schriro, 623 F.3d
731 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 2960 (U.S. June 6, 2011) (No. 101001).
316. Skinner, 131 S. Ct. at 1303 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
317. Although the fact that § 1983 litigation is not subject to the limitations
contained in § 2254 is obvious, I do not mean to overstate the advantages of
litigating under § 1983 in this regard. It must be acknowledged, for example,
that I do not think that a claim of procedural unfairness in the state process
raised under § 2254(d)(2) would be constrained by the limits in (d)(1) either. In
other words, to the extent that a petitioner is able to challenge the unfairness of
a state proceeding through federal habeas proceedings, it seems unlikely that
(d)(1) would apply to this determination. Moreover, it must be acknowledged
that a prisoner challenging a state’s procedures under § 1983 would, at the very
least, be required to state a claim under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, a task that is increasingly difficult in the wake of cases like Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1952 (2009), which held that Iqbal failed to state a
claim because he did not allege sufficient facts “to plausibly suggest petitioners’
discriminatory state of mind.” Cf. Steinman, supra note 272, at 1294 (“If a
plaintiff seeking judicial redress is unable to provide an adequate ‘statement of
the claim’ at the pleadings phase, then that claim is effectively stillborn.”).
Nonetheless, it still appears safe to assume that developing a well-pleaded civil
complaint is easier than satisfying the strictures of § 2254(d)(1).
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Equally important, where a prisoner litigates an issue
outside of the shadow of § 2254(d)(1), Pinholster’s newly
announced limitations on factual development would not apply.
Pinholster holds that new evidence presented for the first time in
federal court may not be considered and that instead, review
“under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the
state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” 318 An action
under § 1983 is, of course, unconstrained by § 2254(d)(1), and
consequently, federal review of the state procedures is not limited
to facts raised in the state court. In fact, the general federal
discovery rules have been applied to civil rights actions, as
opposed to habeas cases, so as to facilitate “broad discovery.” 319
Despite the fact that the Court has “long recognized the need
to impose sharp limits on state prisoners’ efforts to bypass state
courts with their discovery requests,” and although litigation
under § 1983 challenging state procedures “implicate[s] precisely
the same federalism and comity concerns,” a challenge to the
state collateral proceedings litigated under § 1983 is permitted to
proceed unencumbered by the discovery and deference provisions
applicable to federal habeas review. 320

318. Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011).
319. See, e.g., Inmates of Unit 14 v. Rebideau, 102 F.R.D. 122, 128 (N.D.N.Y.
1984) (“Federal policy favors broad discovery in civil rights actions.”). For a
useful example of the sort of evidence that might be available through federal
discovery in order to demonstrate the unfairness of a judicial process, see
Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214, 217 (1988) (“[W]hile petitioner was pursuing his
direct appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court, an independent civil action in
federal court brought to light a scheme by the District Attorney and the Jury
Commissioners of Putnam County to underrepresent black people and women
on the master jury lists. . . .”). While evidence relating to the exclusion of jurors
on the basis of race or gender might undermine the verdict and prove
impermissible as a basis for a collateral civil rights proceeding, similar evidence
regarding the unfairness of the state post-conviction process—racial
discrimination, funding shortages, judicial bias, etc.—might be discoverable
through a civil rights action and ultimately serve as evidence of an unfair state
process.
320. See Dist. Attorney’s Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct.
2308, 2325 (2009) (Alito, J., concurring) (“It is no answer to say, as respondent
does, that he simply wants to use § 1983 as a discovery tool to lay the foundation
for a future state postconviction application . . . .”).
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3. Class Actions and Attorney Fees
In the past, habeas corpus was associated with correcting
systemic failures as well as protecting individual rights.
Recalcitrant states that were either unable or unwilling to
enforce federal rights were forced into compliance through habeas
corpus actions. 321 And the inability of the AEDPA model of
habeas review to efficiently redress systemic failures of the
justice system is one of the major motivations for recent
reformers to suggest that federal habeas review, as we currently
know it, should be abandoned. 322 To be sure, class action
litigation is a powerful method of spurring reform, 323 and review
under § 2254 is currently not amenable to such litigation.
However, rather than scrapping § 2254 litigation, in the wake of
Skinner, in some cases it may make sense to supplement it with
§ 1983 litigation, which does permit class actions.
At least from the 1960s through the early 1990s, a wide
range of systemic failures in state justice systems could be
efficiently consolidated for litigation in federal habeas class
actions. 324 The efficiency and structural benefits of aggregated
litigation in this context are easily appreciated when one
considers that this form of litigation allowed prisoners to
collectively challenge, for example, the validity of a jurisdiction’s
death penalty, 325 or limited access to counsel or legal materials,
321. See Primus, supra note 170, at 14 (“[F]ederal habeas review of state
court criminal convictions was not only about emancipating wrongly convicted
individuals; it was also about coercing reluctant states to enforce federal
rights.”).
322. King and Hoffmann regard habeas as a protection against systemic
failures and note that the modern writ, as applied in review of criminal
convictions, is substantially incapable of curing these defects. KING &
HOFFMANN, supra note 8, at 87–108.
323. There is a robust literature documenting the important role that class
actions, generally speaking, have in prompting social reform. See, e.g., Kevin R.
Johnson, International Human Rights Class Actions: New Frontiers for Group
Litigation, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 643, 645 (providing examples of class actions
brought in hopes of spurring social change).
324. See Brandon L. Garrett, Aggregation in Criminal Law, 95 CAL. L. REV.
383, 404 (2007) (“[T]o remedy systemic criminal procedure violations, courts did
for a time certify class actions in federal habeas corpus . . . .”).
325. See Knapp v. Cardwell, 513 F. Supp. 4, 8 (D. Ariz. 1980) (describing a
challenge to Arizona’s death penalty procedures as proceeding as a class action
pursuant to Rules 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).

178

69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 85 (2012)

or the question of whether a jurisdiction had complied with
federal procedures so as to “opt-in” under a special provision of
AEDPA that provides for, among other things, an accelerated
statute of limitations for capital prisoners. 326 Collective
challenges or habeas class actions reduced the strain on the
courts of litigating the claims individually and allowed prisoners,
who lack a right to counsel in post-conviction, to prioritize their
shared or aggregate interests such that a single lawyer could
represent many prisoners in a single case. 327 Class actions in this
context promote the efficient use of scarce resources, draw
judicial attention to common systemic problems, and even protect
the innocent by facilitating aggregate claims brought by persons
who were unable to afford counsel or competently prepare a pro
se pleading. 328
In 1998, the Supreme Court effectively rendered the practice
of litigating a habeas class action impossible by holding that the
systemic challenges raised by prisoners could not be addressed
until each petitioner has properly and completely exhausted the
claim, on his own, through state court proceedings. 329 As has
happened repeatedly in the realm of modern habeas review,
questions of constitutional substance were delayed, side-stepped,
or permanently evaded by shifting attention to a procedural rule.
In this instance, the efficiencies and advantages of collective
litigation were bypassed in favor of a requirement that trial
courts ensure that each prisoner had fully exhausted the claims
326. See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 324, at 405 (compiling cases).
327. Professor Primus has recognized that class actions “would preserve
judicial time, energy, and resources and would ensure that habeas petitioners
had counsel to raise their common claims.” Primus, supra note 170, at 52.
328. As Professor Garrett points out, the story of Earl Washington, Jr.
illustrates that, at least in one circumstance, the use of class-action habeas
litigation saved an innocent man from execution. Garrett, supra note 324, at
407. Garrett discusses a lawsuit in which a “jailhouse lawyer” brought a pro se
class action arguing for a right to counsel in post-conviction “largely because of
his concern for a fellow inmate, Earl Washington Jr., who could not bring a case
himself because he had ‘an IQ of 69, an execution date three weeks away, and no
lawyer.’” Id. The case eventually resulted in a stay, and “we now know, Earl
Washington was actually innocent.” Id.
329. See Calderon v. Ashmus, 523 U.S. 740, 748 (1998) (“[I]f
respondent . . . is allowed to maintain the present action, he would obtain a
declaration as to the applicable statute of limitations in a federal habeas action
without ever having shown that he has exhausted state remedies.”).
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at issue before any of the claims could be joined together. Given
the one-year statute of limitations for habeas cases and the fact
that it is very rare for two prisoners to be at the same stage of
exhaustion so as to be able to collectively bring such a challenge,
for all practical purposes, the Court’s decision in this regard
“meant the end of the habeas corpus class action.” 330 Moreover, if
any vestiges of the class-action model of habeas review survived
this exhaustion rule, they have certainly been eviscerated by
AEDPA’s strict limits on second or successive habeas petitions. 331
Notably, however, collective challenges to systemic or
common procedural failings through class action litigation is
permitted in litigation under § 1983. 332 Professor Primus has
recognized the advantages of cumulative or collective litigation in
spurring systemic reforms of procedure; however, she ultimately
concludes that the “procedural obstacle course and the deferential
merits review . . . prevent habeas [class actions] from deterring
systemic state violations.” 333 Even accepting the questionable
assumption that challenges to state processes would be governed
by AEDPA deference in a habeas action, as discussed above, the
exhaustion and deference provisions of § 2254 do not apply to
litigation under § 1983. Accordingly, § 1983 class actions provide
a viable vehicle for systemic challenges to state processes insofar
as neither AEDPA deference nor the Court’s exhaustion rules
apply to such actions. 334
330. Garrett, supra note 324, at 406.
331. Id. As Garrett points out, the bar on successive habeas petitions
codified in AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. § 2244, provide an even “harsher procedural
barrier to habeas corpus class actions.” Id. at 409. No prisoner can afford to
participate in a class action as to some shared systemic issue if the filing of that
petition will bar him from litigating his own individual claims in a separate and
subsequent petition.
332. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a); see also Angelo N. Ancheta, Comment, Defendant
Class Actions and Federal Civil Rights Litigation, 33 UCLA L. REV. 283, 284
(1985) (“[T]he defendant class action is a powerful, albeit uncommon, procedure
for vindicating constitutional and statutory civil rights.”).
333. Primus, supra note 170, at 53.
334. The recent challenges to lethal injection procedures and methods serve
as a useful analogue. In Pennsylvania, for example, death-row inmates brought
a class action under § 1983 challenging the state’s lethal injection procedures.
See Chester v. Beard, 657 F. Supp. 2d 534, 536 (M.D. Pa. 2009) (describing the
class action claim that lethal injection subjects prisoners to the risk of
“excruciating pain and suffering” in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments); Jackson v. Danberg, 601 F. Supp. 2d 589, 591 (D. Del. 2009)
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Whereas the availability of class action litigation
considerably assists the plight of indigent prisoners who have no
right to habeas counsel by allowing the work of a single pro bono
attorney to directly benefit an entire class of prisoners, another
feature of § 1983 litigation makes access to counsel for procedural
challenges even more likely. Section 1983 litigation improves the
chances that indigent defendants seeking to challenge a state
post-conviction system will be able to obtain the assistance of
counsel for either an individual or systemic challenge insofar as
there is statutory authority for attorneys’ fees for prevailing
parties. 335 Whereas habeas petitioners in non-capital cases will
frequently be appearing pro se or relying on overworked pro bono
counsel, under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 a prevailing party may be
entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees. 336 Moreover, although
awards for attorneys’ fees and costs to a prevailing party are a
matter of trial court discretion, the Supreme Court has implied
that § 1988(b) awards should not be parsimoniously granted. In
rejecting an individual’s argument that it would be too difficult to
find an attorney to bring § 1983 actions for technical Fourth
Amendment violations, Justice Scalia, writing for the Court,
explained that “42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) answers this objection.” 337 In
other words, the Court assumes that fee awards will be
generously awarded to deserving prevailing parties, even where,
as may be the case with a procedural challenge to the state postconviction process, damages might be nominal unless or until the
prisoner’s conviction is ultimately reversed.
(same). Even where these challenges have failed on the merits, they provided
prisoners a forum to litigate these challenges as a consolidated unit,
independent of the normal procedural abyss that accompanies habeas litigation.
335. The Civil Rights Attorneys’ Fees Awards Act of 1976 allows attorneys’
fees for prevailing plaintiffs in § 1983 actions, a benefit that is not available to
prisoners seeking to challenge the fairness of the state process through habeas
corpus actions. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2006) (permitting a court to award, in
its discretion, reasonable attorneys’ fees to a prevailing party in a § 1983 action).
Significantly, under § 1988, fees may also be awarded for experts retained by
the prevailing party. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(c).
336. “Section 1983’s no-exhaustion rule and statutory fee authority are the
two major distinctions between the two remedies and generally render section
1983 more desirable than federal habeas corpus to state prisoners.” Schwartz,
supra note 63, at 106.
337. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 597 (2006).
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****
In short, litigation challenging state collateral proceedings is
permitted under § 1983, and challenges in this posture avoid
many of the most cumbersome procedural hurdles presented by
AEDPA. The opportunity to engage in collective litigation of
systemic problems, the possibility of attorneys’ fees awards, the
absence of exhaustion requirements, and the inapplicability of
§ 2254(d)(1)’s discovery and substantive limitations create
substantial incentives to challenge state processes through nonhabeas litigation.
C. The Defects and Disadvantages of § 1983 Challenges to Process
The notion that a litigant might prefer § 1983 challenges over
AEDPA-based review has not been overlooked by Justices
Thomas, Alito, and Kennedy, who have voiced concern that
allowing § 1983 challenges to state collateral proceedings
threatens to undermine the restrictions imposed by AEDPA. 338 In
separate opinions in both Osborne and Skinner, this trio has
lamented what they regard as a readymade path or “roadmap”
around AEDPA for those wise enough to “artful[ly] plead” their
claims under § 1983 rather than § 2254. 339 Observing that the
federalism and comity issues are no less forceful in challenges to
process, 340 these Justices have complained that the Skinner rule
allows a prisoner to challenge state “collateral review procedures
under § 1983 [and thereby] impeach the result of collateral
review without complying with any of the restrictions for relief in
federal habeas.” 341
To be sure, Skinner-based challenges to procedure provide a
novel vehicle for prisoners to “impeach” the state post-conviction
338. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2324 (Alito, J., concurring); Skinner, 131 S. Ct. at
1303 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
339. “The rules set forth in our cases and codified in AEDPA would mean
very little if state prisoners could simply evade them through artful pleading.”
Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2325.
340. Some have suggested that “injunctive relief associated with section
1983” might create greater “federalism concerns” than the sort of outright
release relief available on habeas. Primus, supra note 170, at 49.
341. Skinner, 131 S. Ct. at 1303.
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processes that is, at least initially, unencumbered by AEDPA.
However, while it is premature to attempt to catalogue all of the
difficulties or shortcomings of Skinner-based challenges to
process, it is clear that the predictions of AEDPA’s untimely
death are, at least for now, substantially overstated and
misdirected. This section identifies a few of the key limitations on
relief under the Skinner approach to litigation, paying particular
attention to difficulties that may arise as to the proper remedy
and the timing for filing such actions.
First, given that Skinner arose on a motion to dismiss, it
remains to be seen what sort of circumstances will warrant a
merits-based determination that due process has been violated.
Skinner holds that a state’s collateral proceedings are subject to
federal review under § 1983, 342 but the Court did not decide
whether Skinner will “ultimately prevail on his procedural due
process claim.” 343 Thus, the question of what exactly constitutes a
sufficient transgression of fundamental fairness so as to violate
due process remains to be developed in specific cases. It is clear
that due process does not require state proceedings to take a
particular form or to provide the most comprehensive set of
protections imaginable, but it seems equally clear that a state
post-conviction process that is largely a sham or entirely
ineffectual for purposes of developing and litigating fact-intensive
claims will run afoul of due process. 344 Until additional cases are
decided on this issue, it is impossible to predict just how broad or
narrow the due process right is in the context of challenges to
state collateral review, but there is no reason to believe that such
342. Id. at 1298 (majority opinion).
343. Id. at 1296 (internal quotation marks omitted).
344. The Court did address a process-based challenge to the Alaska law
governing procedures for DNA testing and concluded that the procedures did not
violate due process. See Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2319 (acknowledging that a statecreated post-conviction system, while not constitutionally required, can “beget
yet other rights to procedures essential to the realization of the parent right”
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat,
452 U.S. 458, 463 (1981))). And while it denied Osborne relief, the Court
recognized that federal intervention is necessary if the state post-conviction
process is “fundamentally inadequate to vindicate the substantive rights
provided.” See id. at 2320 (recognizing that the state has some “flexibility in
deciding what procedures are needed in the context of postconviction relief” and
that “due process does not ‘dictat[e] the exact form such assistance must
assume’” (quoting Pennsylvania. v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 559 (1987))).
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review will be less hospitable to prisoners than AEDPA-based
review; indeed, the very novelty of such a claim is likely to
produce some favorable judicial outcomes that might not have
been achieved through pure habeas litigation alone.
A second limitation on the viability of Skinner-based
challenges to state processes concerns the relationship between
§ 1983 and habeas actions. More precisely, a second limitation on
the scope of challenges to state post-conviction proceedings under
Skinner relates to the appropriate remedy resulting from such
litigation. It is well settled that § 1983 challenges, even if
successful, must not “‘necessarily imply’ the invalidity of [the]
conviction” 345 because only habeas corpus actions are permitted
as a basis for challenging the validity of one’s conviction or
sentence. Consequently, damage or injunctive actions premised
on the invalidity of one’s conviction generally are not permitted
under § 1983. 346 Indeed, any action that will “necessarily spell
speedier release” must be brought under § 2254. 347 This
recognition that claims relating directly or necessarily to the
345. Skinner, 131 S. Ct. at 1298 (citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,
487 (1994)).
346. Similarly, challenges to a search or seizure that, if successful, would
necessarily imply the invalidity of the conviction are also not permitted under
§ 1983 unless the conviction has already been set aside on appeal or through
habeas proceedings. See, e.g., Wiley v. City of Chicago, 361 F.3d 994, 997 (7th
Cir. 2004) (“If, as alleged, Wiley was arrested and prosecuted solely on the basis
of drugs planted by the arresting officers, then any attack on the arrest would
necessarily challenge the legality of a prosecution premised on the planted
drugs.”). By contrast, when evidence is not suppressed because of an exception
to the exclusionary rule, a § 1983 challenge based on the illegality of the officer
conduct is generally permitted. Cf. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 597
(2006) (rationalizing a refusal to exclude evidence obtained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment by virtue of the prisoner’s ability to bring a civil action
under § 1983). There is thus a distinction between civil actions that undermine
the validity of one’s conviction, which are not cognizable until the conviction has
been overturned, and challenges that do not necessarily undermine the validity
of the conviction. But in many instances, even where the illegal government
conduct could theoretically be challenged through a § 1983 action insofar as it
does not undermine the conviction, a plaintiff is not entitled to any
compensatory damages if his conviction has not been reversed.
347. Skinner, 131 S. Ct. at 1299 n.13 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 82 (2005)). A claim under Brady v.
Maryland, for example, cannot be brought under § 1983 because a Brady claim,
if successful, necessarily undermines one’s conviction and thus lies at the “core
of habeas corpus.” Id.

184

69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 85 (2012)

validity of one’s conviction lie at the “core of habeas corpus” and
outside of the reach of § 1983 actions, though a significant
limitation on the form of remedy available from such actions,
does not undermine the purpose of a Skinner challenge to one’s
post-conviction proceedings. In fact, the analysis regarding
Skinner’s challenge to the post-conviction procedures for DNA
access in Texas demonstrates the viability of such challenges
against a state’s post-conviction system more generally:
Skinner has properly invoked § 1983. Success in his suit for
DNA testing would not “necessarily imply” the invalidity of his
conviction. While test results might prove exculpatory, that
outcome is hardly inevitable; [the] results might prove
inconclusive or they might further incriminate Skinner. 348

The same can be said for a state prisoner’s challenge to the
procedural unfairness of a state post-conviction proceeding. A
federal court’s holding that the process was flawed would not
necessarily imply the invalidity of one’s conviction. In order to
overturn a conviction, one must demonstrate, per § 2254(a), that
his conviction was unconstitutional. Standing alone, a finding of
unfairness as to the state post-conviction process will require
corrective procedural actions by either the state or federal
system, but it does not imply the invalidity of the underlying
conviction. 349 At most, such a finding would result in an
injunction ordering a new state process or a federal habeas
proceeding unencumbered by the state review, either of which
might result in a definitive determination that the conviction
does not rest on a constitutional violation. 350 Simply stated, a
348. Id. at 1298.
349. Skinner reverses the Fifth Circuit’s holding that such challenges are
not cognizable under § 1983, but it does not prescribe a remedy should such an
action ultimately succeed. Id. at 1293. One option would be to simply allow the
prisoner to proceed to federal habeas for a review of his constitutional claims
unencumbered by AEDPA. A remedy that is more consistent with the federalism
concerns that arise in this area of the law would be to remand the case to the
state for a post-conviction review process that comports with due process.
Assuming that the tolling of AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations would be
available for the remand proceedings, this latter remedy seems to better fulfill
the deterrence role I envision federal oversight playing in this arena.
350. To be sure, a challenge to state post-conviction procedures does, as
Justice Thomas observed, “concern the validity of the conviction.” Id. at 1302–03
(Thomas, J., dissenting). But it only does so indirectly. A victory by the plaintiff
does not “necessarily imply” that his conviction is invalid any more than the
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prisoner who is ultimately successful in challenging a state’s
procedures as fundamentally unfair is not entitled to release. The
prisoner who obtains a judgment of procedural inadequacy would
certainly prefer a grant of conditional release rather than
damages or a procedural “redo” in the state court. The paradox of
Skinner, however, is that the more robust the remedy provided by
federal courts for procedural violations, the less viable the
Skinner procedure remains as a metric for testing the fairness of
state procedures.
A state prisoner is permitted to proceed under § 1983
precisely because such a victory would not, without more,
undermine his conviction or entitle him to relief. 351 In practical
terms, this means that a state prisoner wishing to take
advantage of Skinner must proceed through two tiers of federal
litigation—§ 1983 and habeas review—and it means that at least
some of AEDPA’s restrictions on relief likely continue to govern
the habeas portion of the litigation through which the prisoner
seeks to directly challenge the validity of the conviction or
sentence. Stated another way, the injunctive relief, or perhaps
declaratory relief, 352 available through § 1983 challenges to the
state collateral processes does not directly lead to a prisoner’s
conviction being set aside. But it certainly has promise as a
means of augmenting challenges to state processes in the federal
courts.
The caveats about the nature of the § 1983 remedy do not
displace the previously discussed advantages to litigating
right to test DNA evidence does; instead, the prevailing party simply wins the
right to a process through which he might eventually test the ultimate validity
of his conviction.
351. For this reason alone, the concerns expressed by the dissenters in
Skinner, that AEDPA’s restrictions are effectively bypassed through “artful
pleading,” is considerably overstated. See id. at 1303 (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(“Allowing Skinner to artfully plead an attack on state habeas procedures
instead of an attack on state habeas results undercuts [AEDPA].”).
352. Declaratory judgments are likely not available as to matters collateral
to the ultimate dispute: the constitutionality of the conviction. See Calderon v.
Ashmus, 523 U.S. 740, 745 (1998) (noting that federal courts may issue
declaratory judgments only in limited situations). Although the language in
Calderon suggesting that any bypass of the exhaustion rule applicable to habeas
proceedings is impermissible, id. at 748, is overruled in light of Skinner, the
Court’s limitations on declaratory judgments likely remains applicable in this
context.
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procedural unfairness through § 1983 actions. To be sure, a twotier litigation track is cumbersome, but for many prisoners,
particularly non-capital prisoners who lack counsel for federal
habeas review, the benefits will sometimes outweigh the costs. As
previously noted, the independent value of § 1983 challenges
includes the ability of the proceedings to facilitate the discovery
of the facts necessary for a habeas claim without the
entanglements of AEDPA. I concede that, as to specific
procedural challenges, a prisoner will only be able to get
discovery if he states a claim in the manner required by the Rules
of Civil Procedure—that is, § 1983 litigation does not promise
unhinged and limitless discovery opportunities. However, it
seems reasonable to conclude that many prisoners will be able to
provide “a short and plain statement” 353 describing the
procedural unfairness of the state post-conviction system in their
particular cases, and the resulting access to discovery, among
other procedures, will likely be more favorable for a § 1983
plaintiff than it would be for a habeas petitioner. For one thing, a
federal court ordering discovery and ultimately relief on a § 1983
action is at liberty to merely remand the case for additional state
proceedings, a remedial step that avoids some of the stickiest
federalism concerns that plague decisions to grant relief in the
habeas context. Scholars have observed that, when it comes to
constitutional adjudication, context matters, 354 and when the
context involves setting aside a final state conviction, the
resulting judicial decisions may tend to be less favorable to the
prisoner than an action under § 1983. 355 Moreover, although the
concurrence in Osborne concluded that “[i]t is no answer to say,
as respondent does, that he simply wants to use § 1983 as a
discovery tool to lay the foundation for a future,” 356 in Skinner the
Court implicitly approved the notion that a § 1983 claim is an
entirely permissible vehicle for facilitating discovery that might
353. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
354. For an insightful account of how context matters for the constitutional
adjudication of the Fourth Amendment, see Nancy Leong, Making Rights, 91
B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1719774.
355. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 63, at 179 (suggesting that courts might
be less disposed to grant relief in the habeas context).
356. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2325 (Alito, J., concurring).
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ultimately be useful during habeas litigation. 357 Consequently,
litigation under § 1983 designed to compel discovery in aid of a
federal habeas petition may become critical after cases like
Pinholster—if “new” evidence cannot be considered after a federal
habeas petition has been filed, 358 then discovery through an
independent § 1983 action so as to obtain critical new details
prior to the filing of the federal habeas petition may justify the
cumbersome nature of this two-track litigation.
To reiterate this important point, Skinner-type actions
present a unique remedial problem insofar as they do not promise
relief from the underlying conviction or sentence. However, the
availability of an injunctive form of relief through which state
courts would conduct a post-conviction redo ultimately reflects a
proper remedy. 359 Indeed, if, as many commentators assert,
collateral review in several states is disastrously unfair and
incomplete, then a federal court decision ordering the state to
redo a particular prisoner’s review, perhaps after providing
discovery on the issue, has the triple benefit of leaving the first
357. A pre-AEDPA circuit court case is generally illustrative on this point
regarding how § 1983 actions might facilitate discovery for federal habeas
review. In Qualls v. Shaw, 535 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1976), a Texas prisoner whose
requests for information from the state had been repeatedly ignored obtained a
discovery order based on a § 1983 challenge. Id. at 319. The federal court
deemed the information necessary to the prisoner’s ability to fully plead his
federal habeas case, and because the state would not willingly provide the
information, § 1983 provided a useful workaround. Id.
358. Recall the majority’s concession in Pinholster that “new evidence [in
support of a claim] . . . may well present a new claim.” Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at
1401 n.10. If new evidence can convert an old claim (bound by (d)(1)) into a new
claim (unencumbered by (d)(1)), then § 1983 discovery practices may prove
valuable in litigation prior to the filing of a federal habeas petition.
359. The Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, should not bar such action
by a federal court. The text of the Act reads: “A court of the United States may
not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly
authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to
protect or effectuate its judgments.” 28 U.S.C. § 2283. By its plain text, the Act
only applies to stays and not to injunctions forcing proceedings to occur.
Moreover, it is accepted wisdom that “§ 1983 is an exception to the antiinjunction statute.” 1 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 2.15(f)(iv) (4th ed.) (compiling citations including HENRY
M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 1249 (2d ed. 1973)); see also Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 243 (1972)
(concluding that actions under § 1983 are exempt from the limitations contained
in the anti-injunction statute).
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and primary review in the control of the state, 360 while
facilitating both structural reforms and case-specific relief. As
Justice Scalia has recognized in a related context, the “precepts of
fundamental fairness inherent in ‘due process’ suggest that a
forum to litigate [constitutional] challenges like petitioner’s must
be made available somewhere,” and principles of comity and
federalism would suggest that the state, as the “rendering
jurisdiction,” should be given an opportunity to correct the
error. 361 In short, § 1983 offers a viable litigation forum for
spurring systemic reform in state systems, and it could do so
while leaving substantial discretion and responsibility for federal
constitutional adjudication in the hands of the states—it is a
federalism-respecting form of federal intervention.
The final and perhaps most pressing potential problem with
§ 1983 challenges to state post-conviction procedures is the issue
of the proper timing for filing such challenges—that is, when
should a Skinner challenge be filed? Both § 1983 and § 2254
impose limitations on when an action may be filed—in certain
circumstances, both prohibit filings that are too late as well as
filings that are too early. Although § 1983 actions must be filed
within the time allotted by the applicable state statute of
limitations for personal injury actions, the ultimate application of
a prudential abstention doctrine may be determinative as to
when Skinner-type challenges should be litigated. Specifically,
the appropriate time for filing may require considering the
interaction between the Younger abstention limits on § 1983
actions, 362 AEDPA’s statute of limitations, and the
complementary limits on subsequent or successive federal habeas
petitions. Based on these considerations, if Younger abstention
applies to these challenges, then, as discussed below, the Skinner
challenge cannot be made until after the state post-conviction
360. See, e.g., Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S. 374, 386 (2001) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part) (“Fundamental fairness could be achieved . . . by holding
that the rendering jurisdiction must provide a means for challenge . . . .”);
Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, Bell v. Kelly, 555 U.S. 55 (2008) (No. 07-1223)
(providing Justice Scalia’s suggestion that the appropriate course in cases of
state unfairness might be to return the matter to the state for additional
proceedings).
361. Daniels, 532 U.S. at 386.
362. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46 (1971) (citing a “fundamental
policy” of abstention by federal courts from interfering with state prosecutions).
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proceedings are complete, thus presenting challenging issues
regarding the AEDPA statute of limitations. By contrast, if
Younger does not apply, then perhaps such a challenge can be
made simultaneously with the completion of state post-conviction
litigation. The details of this doctrinal interaction are set forth
below.
“absent
exceptional
Under
Younger
v.
Harris, 363
circumstances creating a threat of irreparable injury both great
and immediate, a federal court must not intervene by way of
either injunctive or declaratory relief in a pending state lawenforcement proceeding.” 364 Moreover, an action is deemed
pending for purposes of Younger until all state appellate remedies
have been exhausted. 365 In a typical case of Younger abstention,
this means that a defendant wishing to enjoin his prosecution
under a criminal statute may not have his claim heard in federal
court until all of his state appeals are complete. Although postconviction proceedings are nominally civil rather than criminal
proceedings, and although I could not locate any cases applying
Younger to bar a challenge to state post-conviction proceedings, I
predict that it is nonetheless very unlikely that a federal court
would, barring extraordinary circumstances, intervene and hear
a challenge to a state process that is not yet complete. 366 In this
way, it is arguable that Younger would impose a quasi-exhaustion
procedure on prisoners such that it is unlikely that a federal
court would intervene and declare a state system fundamentally
unfair if the prisoner has not attempted to secure relief through
that system in his own case. 367 In this way, even a § 1983 action
363. Id. at 37.
364. See FEDERAL PROCEDURE, LAWYERS EDITION § 1:617 (2011) (explaining
the rule from Younger).
365. See, e.g., Brown v. Day, 477 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1113 (2007) (“For
purposes of the first Younger element, a proceeding is ‘pending’ if—as of the
filing of the federal complaint—not all state appellate remedies have been
exhausted.”).
366. It is likely that Younger would apply such that a prisoner seeking to
make an individualized or as-applied challenge to the state procedures must
have attempted to use the state procedures himself. The abstention principle, to
the extent it has any application in this context, may have less force when the
prisoner is bringing a more generalized, systemic challenge to the state
system—that is, perhaps a facial challenge could be made to state procedures
even where the prisoner has not utilized the flawed state process.
367. Cf. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2321 (“His attempt to sidestep state process
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challenging state procedures faces something akin to an
exhaustion requirement, but unlike a habeas petitioner who must
exhaust each claim in question, a potential § 1983 plaintiff would
simply need to let the state process he seeks to challenge run its
course.
Even assuming that such a quasi-exhaustion requirement
exists because of abstention principles, standing alone, the
requirement that a prisoner utilize the state review process
before challenging the process as fundamentally unfair does not
present a material barrier to litigation for most prisoners serving
substantial sentences. However, considered in conjunction with
AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations and the limitations on
second or successive habeas petitions, this limitation on Skinner
could prove substantial. It is unlikely that a federal challenge to a
state’s post-conviction proceedings under § 1983 could be
researched, filed, litigated, and any appeals conclusively resolved
all before the one-year limitation for filing a federal habeas
petition expires. This means that if Younger requires the prisoner
to use the available state procedures before challenging them as
unfair, in many cases a prisoner will have to file a federal
petition, which is due within one year of the completion of state
proceedings, without the benefit of being able to complete
litigation of his § 1983 challenge and without any discovery,
injunctions, or other benefits that such Skinner litigation might
yield. The three-way interaction of Younger’s limits on § 1983
actions, AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations on filing federal
habeas actions, and the AEDPA bar on second or successive
habeas petitions, then, presents a bit of a conundrum for Skinner
litigation.
The limits on filing a successive habeas petition are set out in
28 U.S.C. § 2244. Under this provision, raising the same claim in
through a new federal lawsuit puts Osborne in a very awkward position . . . . It
is difficult to criticize the State’s procedures when Osborne has not invoked
them.”); Schwartz, supra note 63, at 161 (“[T]hese claims will normally be
denied under Younger abstention principles.”). Alternatively, a § 1983 action
might be a viable platform for challenging an unreasonable delay by the state
court in adjudicating an appeal. Cf. Vasquez v. Parrott, 318 F.3d 387, 389 (2d
Cir. 2003) (considering whether a claim challenging unreasonable delay in
adjudicating an appeal is properly considered on § 2254 review and thus
whether a subsequent filing is a successive petition).
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a new habeas petition is categorically prohibited. 368 Accordingly,
if § 1983 litigation (either directly or through a state court
remand) yields additional useful, factual evidence relevant to a
federal habeas claim that was already exhausted, then filing a
new petition with the same claim bolstered by the new evidence
is absolutely prohibited. 369 Moreover, even if the § 1983 action (or
related state remand procedures) yields evidence sufficient to
give rise to a new claim, the presentation of a new claim in a
second or subsequent habeas petition is barred unless the claim
relies on a new rule of law made retroactive by the Supreme
Court, or the claim rests on a newly discovered factual predicate
that substantially demonstrates the petitioner’s innocence. 370 In
short, the circumstances in which a new petition may contain a
claim discovered or developed for the first time after the filing of
a habeas petition are extremely limited. 371 Likewise, the
circumstances in which a petitioner can amend a pending federal
petition to add a new claim, or perhaps even substantially better
develop the claim, are similarly limited. 372
Stated more directly, although Justices Thomas, Alito, and
Kennedy have lamented the impact that Skinner will have on
federal habeas actions, it is important to realize that the
avoidance of the classic AEDPA burdens—deference, discovery,
and exhaustion—are of truly limited and indeed symbolic value if
368. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) (2006) (stating that such claims shall be
dismissed).
369. Likewise, under Pinholster, using the new evidence developed through
§ 1983 litigation to support the same claim that was adjudicated in state court is
prohibited. See Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1401 (2011) (discussing the
restrictions on new evidence).
370. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) (2006) (clarifying under what circumstances
such a claim shall not be dismissed).
371. Notably, there are no circumstances in which a successive petition can
be filed to present for a second time the “same” claim that was previously
presented, perhaps with new support or stronger legal arguments. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(b)(1) (2006).
372. See Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 650 (2005) (“An amended habeas
petition, we hold, does not relate back (and thereby escape AEDPA’s one-year
time limit) when it asserts a new ground for relief supported by facts that differ
in both time and type from those the original pleading set forth.”); see also
MEANS, supra note 22, § 9A:149 (“If the claims in the original petition are
conclusory, however, they will not provide the requisite notice for relation back
purposes.”). On the other hand, “relation-back is permitted if the amended claim
only serves to add facts and specificity to the original claim.” Id. § 9A:150.
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the court rules or practices do not permit, at the very least, some
form of equitable staying of the habeas petition so as to avoid the
limitations on second or successive petitions. Fortunately for
prisoners, however, some of the stepping stones necessary to
facilitate the use of the fruits of successful Skinner challenges in
federal habeas litigation already exist, and it is reasonable to
conclude that a common-law principle of equity will emerge in
these circumstances such that prisoners will be permitted to file
federal habeas petitions within the statute of limitations and
have them stayed pending completion of the § 1983 litigation in
appropriate circumstances.
In Rhines v. Weber, 373 the Court confronted a similar trap-oftiming by sanctioning the use of a stay and abeyance
procedure. 374 Specifically, in a pre-AEDPA case, Rose v. Lundy, 375
the Court held that exhaustion by a state prisoner requires total
exhaustion—that is, a district court must dismiss entirely any
habeas petitions that are a mix of claims that were exhausted
and unexhausted in state court. 376 Initially, Rose presented
relatively few problems for state prisoners because the dismissal
was without prejudice and would simply permit them an
opportunity to complete the exhaustion process and return to
federal court. 377 However, in Rhines, the Court recognized that
AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations “dramatically altered the
landscape.” 378 The combination of a rule requiring dismissal of
habeas petitions containing any unexhausted claims and a oneyear statute of limitations meant that the many petitioners who
file a petition for federal habeas relief close to the one-year filing
deadline will be completely deprived of federal habeas review. For
example, “[i]f a petitioner files a timely but mixed petition in
federal district court, and the district court dismisses it under

373. Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005).
374. See id. at 278 (discussing the appropriate use of stay and abeyance
procedure).
375. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982).
376. See id. at 520 (mandating that “before you bring any claims to federal
court, be sure that you first have taken each one to state court”).
377. A procedural dismissal of a habeas petition does not trigger the second
or successive filing limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2244.
378. Rhines, 544 U.S. at 274.
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Lundy after the limitations period has expired, this will likely
mean the termination of any federal review.” 379
Recognizing the “gravity of this problem” of timing born out
of the interaction of Rose’s complete exhaustion requirement and
the AEDPA statute of limitations, in Rhines, the Court approved
a stay and abeyance procedure under which a federal district
court will, for good cause, stay a mixed petition and hold it in
abeyance so as to provide the petitioner an opportunity to return
to state court and exhaust the unexhausted claims without
forfeiting his federal habeas petition. 380 In essence, the harshness
of the interplay between the statute of limitations and the
exhaustion requirement prompted the Court to recognize that
federal courts must occasionally stay a federal proceeding to
permit full state court exhaustion. 381 The rigid application of
habeas rules was softened to comport with basic principles of
equity.
Notably, a similarly harsh result arises when a petitioner
attempts to fully utilize a state procedure so as to avoid potential
379. Id. at 275. Moreover, the Court recognized that this problem is not
limited to persons who file close to the AEDPA deadline because even “a
petitioner who files early will have no way of controlling when the district court
will resolve the question of exhaustion.” Id. Cf. McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S.
849, 857–58 (1994) (holding that a mere request for counsel initiates a habeas
corpus proceeding, thereby conveying power to a federal judge to stay a state
execution); O’Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677, 687 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he
district courts are entitled to discretion in managing cases within the federal
system . . . .”).
380. As one Circuit has summarized the law, “Rhines declared that ‘in
limited circumstances,’ federal district courts have the authority to stay a mixed
habeas petition and hold the entire petition—exhausted and unexhausted
claims alike—in abeyance while the petitioner returns to state court to exhaust
his remedies there.” King v. Ryan, 564 F.3d 1133, 1135–36 (9th Cir. 2009). It
must, therefore, be conceded that even under a stay and abeyance procedure,
the ultimate claims litigated typically must relate back to the claims raised in
the first federal habeas petition prior to the stay. See, e.g., id. at 1142 (holding
that amendments to a claim following a stay and abeyance must relate back to
the claims pending during the stay).
381. In Rhines, the Court recognizes that “[d]istrict courts do ordinarily
have authority to issue stays . . . where such a stay would be a proper exercise of
discretion, [and] AEDPA does not deprive district courts of that authority.”
Rhines, 544 U.S. at 276 (citations omitted); see also CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL
PROCEDURE § 86:140 (2011) (“[A] stay and abeyance of a federal habeas
proceeding is appropriate only when the district court determines there was
good cause . . . .”).
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abstention problems only to have insufficient time to complete a
§ 1983 challenge to the state court process before his federal
habeas petition becomes untimely. Just as the Rose complete
exhaustion rule might leave state prisoners without a federal
habeas remedy, an attempt to obtain full and fair review through
an unsound state process may deprive a prisoner of adequate
time to challenge the state procedures and benefit from the
discovery or the injunctive relief that flows from such a § 1983
action. To this end, federal habeas courts should exercise their
discretion and grant a stay and abeyance to prisoners who have a
pending § 1983 action challenging state procedures and a likely
chance of obtaining injunctive relief or discovery through the
federal civil rights action. When good cause exists for a stay,
federal habeas courts are authorized, indeed required, to grant
the stay.
Where, for example, a § 1983 challenge has yielded an order
enjoining a state court to conduct additional post-conviction
proceedings, it would seemingly amount to an abuse of discretion
under Rhines for a federal court to refuse to stay the federal
habeas petition. Likewise, where a colorable procedural challenge
has been advanced under § 1983 and diligently pursued by the
prisoner, a practice in favor of staying the habeas proceedings
pending the resolution of the § 1983 challenge is appropriate. 382
In short, district courts retain considerable discretion to grant a
stay and abeyance even under AEDPA, and a pending challenge
to state processes under Skinner, like mixed habeas petitions,
will occasionally provide good cause for such stays. Given the due
process concerns underlying the need for a fair state collateral
review process, a pending, colorable § 1983 challenge to the state
post-conviction process should be understood to be among the
“limited circumstances” in which a stay and abeyance of a habeas
petition is justified. 383 If courts take seriously the authority under
382. As with a mixed petition, a stay ought to be available only if the
petitioner’s pending § 1983 action is not obviously without merit. CYCLOPEDIA OF
FEDERAL PROCEDURE § 86:140 (2011) (“[A] court should not grant a habeas
petitioner a stay and abeyance in a proceeding involving a mixed petition of
exhausted and unexhausted claims when the petitioner’s unexhausted claims
are plainly meritless.”). Likewise, if the § 1983 claim is filed for purposes of
delay or as abusive litigation tactic, a stay would not be available.
383. See Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277 (2005) (noting the reasons
limiting action by the district courts).
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Rhines to stay habeas proceedings, and if petitioners construe
their claims broadly such that facts newly discovered through the
§ 1983 action are merely supporting the pre-existing claims, 384
then Skinner promises to be a valuable way of augmenting
habeas litigation without the burdens of AEDPA. By gathering
new facts in support of claims, either through federal discovery or
new state procedures (rather than arguing that the new facts give
rise to new claims), Skinner may yet prove substantially useful to
state prisoners.
However, § 1983 challenges, supplemented with reasonable
stay and abeyance procedures, will not solve every problem
induced by unfair state procedures. To be sure, merely staying
the proceedings does not solve the problems that will arise if a
§ 1983 action or a related remand procedure in state court
ultimately result in the discovery of an entirely new claim.
Current habeas procedures only permit amendments to the
federal petition if the amendments relate back to the claims
contained in the original petition. 385 A claim is said to relate back
only insofar as it derives from the same “common ‘core of
operative facts’ uniting the original and newly asserted
claims.” 386 Perhaps courts faced with instances of unfair state
procedures will simply exercise their equitable authority over
habeas cases so as to permit amendments even when truly new
claims are developed. 387 Or more likely, on the rare occasion
when a § 1983 action (or resulting state remand) produces
evidence of a truly new claim that was not contained in the
384. Amendments to habeas petitions are permitted where the amendment
is not “factually and legally unrelated to the claims in the original petition.” See
United States v. Henry, 37 F. App’x 343, 345 (10th Cir. 2002); see also LARRY W.
YACKLE, POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES § 8:2 (2010) (discussing the standard for
permitting amendment).
385. See Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 656 (2005) (discussing the rationale
for the rule).
386. Id. at 659.
387. The Court has recognized that the statutorily enacted one-year
deadline for filing federal habeas petitions may be excused based on equitable
considerations. See Holland v. Florida., 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2564 (2010)
(acknowledging that equitable tolling may be applied in extraordinary
situations). If the statute of limitations, which is expressly codified in AEDPA,
can be excused for equitable considerations, the right circumstances ought to
justify an equitable exception to the rigid, court-created rules regarding
amendments to federal habeas petitions.
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initially filed federal habeas petition, perhaps the petitioner will
have to raise the issue in an original habeas petition to the
Supreme Court. 388 While a full recounting of the original writ’s
function is beyond the scope of this Article, the critical point is
that scholars have recognized that successive habeas petition
restrictions do not “apply in original habeas proceedings.” 389 It is
an imperfect solution insofar as original habeas actions are filed
directly in the Supreme Court, 390 granting review in such cases
requires five votes rather than four, 391 and the Court’s rules
specify that review is limited to truly “exceptional
circumstances.” 392 However, the combination of bars on
successive habeas petitions and a showing that state procedural
unfairness caused a claim to go undiscovered could well satisfy
the criteria. When no viable alternatives exist for federal review
of a claim of unconstitutional detention, circumstances are said to
be sufficiently exceptional so as to warrant the Court’s original
habeas review. 393 Original habeas review may prove an
important, if infrequently necessary, corollary to the sort of
§ 1983 challenges authorized in Skinner. 394
388. For a thorough and impressive history and explanation of the original
writ, see generally Lee Kovarsky, Original Habeas Redux, 97 VA. L. REV. 61
(2011).
389. See id. at 115 (noting that this conclusion is supported by the Troy
Davis case).
390. Id. at 62–63.
391. See id. at 77 (noting that a 4–4 vote effectively denies relief).
392. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4) (noting district courts might decline
jurisdiction when compelling reasons arise).
393. See Kovarsky, supra note 388, at 112 (“[T]here is a strong case that the
exceptional circumstances requirement does not obstruct review in the same
way it would if the Court could grant certiorari.”).
394. Consider the following illustrative hypothetical: Prisoner (P) is
convicted of murder and sentenced to death. P attempts to litigate a Brady
claim during state post-conviction procedures, but the prosecution refuses to
cooperate with discovery, and the state courts, despite a colorable argument,
refuse an evidentiary hearing and discovery. When P files his federal habeas
petition, he has two options, but neither are favorable: (1) he could just omit the
Brady claim, recognizing that he lacks the facts to substantiate it; or (2) he
could raise the claim but realize that, under Pinholster, the federal review is
limited to the record before the state and that he will not be able to garner
factual support for his claim through a federal hearing. By contrast, if P files a
§ 1983 action, he has two potentially favorable alternatives: (1) he could include
the bare-bones Brady claim in his federal petition, seek a stay and abeyance to
complete § 1983 litigation relief in the form of a remand for additional discovery
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In sum, a § 1983 challenge to state procedures bypasses the
pitfalls of AEDPA litigation and may serve as a meaningful check
on state collateral processes, but in many instances, this will
require federal courts to exercise their authority and duty to stay
pending habeas petitions pending the resolution of colorable civil
rights challenges. At first blush, the utility of bifurcating the
federal proceedings into civil rights challenges and habeas
petitions may seem cumbersome and unnecessary. But the
advantages ultimately outweigh the costs. Skinner litigation
allows federal courts, by issuing stays in the habeas proceedings,
to further principles of comity and federalism by respecting the
autonomy of the states to address the challenges of prisoners in
any manner they choose, so long as it comports with due process.
That is to say, the federal oversight is aimed only at ensuring a
minimum floor of fair process, but much more discretion and
responsibility—fact-finding and conclusions of law—will rest with
the state courts than would be the case when a federal court
simply grants a hearing, makes findings, and issues a conditional
release for a state prisoner. In this way, § 1983 provides a vehicle
for systemic reform of state processes, where necessary to
comport with due process, in a way that is more deferential to
state sovereignty than traditional models of habeas relief. In
addition, § 1983 litigation in this arena may ultimately prove
more efficient. As habeas lawyers and federal judges know, a
substantial portion of federal habeas litigation relates to the
deference owed to state findings and the fairness of the state
process. If the fairness of the state process is litigated under
§ 1983 in advance of a federal habeas decision and afforded res
and litigation in the state court, and ultimately attempt to amend his petition;
or (2) if the facts uncovered through the § 1983 litigation rendered the claim too
novel such that amending the petition was not permitted, then in order to
overcome the bar on successive petitions, he could file an original habeas action
in the Supreme Court based on the unfairness of the state procedures and the
strength of the newly discovered constitutional claim. Cf. Cullen v. Pinholster,
131 S. Ct. 1388, 1401 n.10 (2011) (recognizing that new evidence may, if it is
particularly powerful, render a claim “new,” but apparently assuming that the
new evidence would be discovered prior to filing the federal petition and
included in the petition); id. at 1398 (holding that “review under § 2254(d)(1) is
limited to the record that was before the state court”). There will be instances
where, absent a change in the current practices of federal habeas courts in
reviewing procedural challenges, Skinner-type litigation will offer decided, if
limited, benefits to the state prisoner.
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judicata effect, then far fewer issues of procedure will remain
unresolved at the time of the habeas action. 395 Obviously, there
remain considerable questions about the proper workings of
Skinner litigation, and the ultimate desirability of this form of
litigation will depend on how the questions raised in this Article
and others that will arise are resolved, but the potential import of
§ 1983 challenges in this field is presently untested, and in view
of the diminished force of § 2254 review, deserving of judicial
attention and resources.
VII. Conclusion
In 2005, one of the leading habeas scholars, John Blume,
concluded that AEDPA had turned out to be “more hype than
bite”—that is, the access to federal habeas relief had not been
substantially diminished under AEDPA. 396 As demonstrated in
this Article, both as a doctrinal and an empirical matter, over the
last six years AEDPA’s bite has matured and taken hold. AEDPA
deference has emerged as a suffocating force in most cases, and,
as a result, state post-conviction review will typically represent
the only viable forum for the constitutional review of issues
regarding the legality of one’s sentence or conviction.
Acknowledging the diminution of the federal courts’ power to
review the merits of state decisions and accepting the profoundly
important role that state courts now play in adjudicating
constitutional criminal procedure rights, some scholars have
suggested substantially abandoning federal oversight of state
convictions. This Article rejects this conclusion and seeks instead
to reorient federal oversight so that it serves, at the very least,
395. There remains, of course, the question of whether an unfair state
process can be afforded AEDPA deference, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), without
offending due process. I have detailed my research on this question in a previous
article. See Marceau, supra note 13, at 45–49 (exploring the tension between
AEDPA deference and due process). If federal courts defer to the sovereignty of
state courts by providing the remand remedy advocated in this Article, then this
issue is avoided. That is to say, if litigants pursue the Skinner-based challenges
to the state system, then federal courts, upon finding an unfair state process,
ought to simply enjoin the state to provide a more adequate state post-conviction
process, and thus the (d)(1) deference applies only to proceedings that are full
and fair.
396. Blume, supra note 4, at 297 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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the critical function of ensuring the fairness of the state process.
Because federal oversight of the merits of state review is
substantially diminished, it is increasingly important that there
be some minimal federal review of state procedures. It is time to
take seriously the need for challenges of process rather than only
challenges of result, and this Article takes the first steps toward
identifying frameworks for such challenges.

200

69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 85 (2012)
Appendix

NAME
Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985)
Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985)
Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985)
Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985)
Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606 (1985)
Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716 (1985)
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985)
Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104 (1985)
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985)
Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986)
Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284
(1986)
Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376 (1986)
Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986)
Morris v. Mathews, 475 U.S. 237 (1986)
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986)
Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560 (1986)
Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986)
Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986)
Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986)
Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986)
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986)
Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986)
Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986)
Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986)
Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255 (1986)
Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570 (1986)
Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129 (1987)
Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987)
Hithcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987)
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987)
Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770 (1987)
Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66 (1987)
Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1 (1987)
Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756 (1987)
Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776 (1987)

AEDPA
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO

WINNER
P
G
P
P
G
G
G
P
G
P
P
P
G
G
G
G
P
G
G
P
P
G
G
G
G
G
P
G
P
G
G
P
G
G
G

CHALLENGING THE HABEAS PROCESS
NAME
Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231 (1988)
Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214 (1988)
Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988)
Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164 (1988)
Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988)
Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33 (1988)
Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272 (1989)
Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255 (1989)
Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401 (1989)
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989)
Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346 (1989)
Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488 (1989)
Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376 (1989)
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989)
Duckworth v. Eagen, 492 U.S. 195 (1989)
Terrell v. Morris, 493 U.S. 1 (1989)
Selvage v. Collins, 494 U.S. 108 (1990)
Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407 (1990)
Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (1990)
Delo v. Stokes, 495 U.S. 320 (1990)*
Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227 (1990)
Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764 (1990)
Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308 (1991)
Lozada v. Deeds, 498 U.S. 430 (1991)
Burden v. Zant, 498 U.S. 433 (1991)
McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991)
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991)
Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797 (1991)
Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991)
Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222 (1992)
Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992)
Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 227 (1992)
Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992)*
Richmond v. Lewis, 506 U.S. 40 (1992)
Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20 (1992)
Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364 (1993)
Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993)
Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461 (1993)

AEDPA
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO

201
WINNER
G
P
P
G
P
G
G
P
G
G
G
P
G
P
G
P
P
G
G
G
G
G
P
P
P
G
G
G
G
P
G
G
G
P
G
G
G
G

202

69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 85 (2012)

NAME
Negonscott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99 (1993)*
Delo v. Lashley, 507 U.S. 272 (1993)
Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463 (1993)
Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680 (1993)
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993)
Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333 (1993)
Dobbs v. Zant, 506 U.S. 357 (1993)
Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993)
Burden v. Zant, 510 U.S. 132 (1994)
Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222 (1994)
Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383 (1994)
Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339 (1994)
McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849 (1994)
Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995)
Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364 (1995)
O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432 (1995)
Goeke v. Branch, 514 U.S. 115 (1995)
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995)
California Department of Corrections v.
Morales, 514 U.S. 499 (1995)*
Garlotte v. Fordice, 515 U.S. 39 (1995)
Wood v. Bartholomew, 516 U.S. 1 (1995)
Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99 (1995)*
Tuggle v. Netherland, 516 U.S. 10 (1995)
Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314 (1996)
Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152 (1996)
California v. Roy, 519 U.S. 2 (1996)
Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433 (1997)*
Young v. Harper, 117 S. Ct. 1148 (1997)
Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518 (1997)
Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899 (1997)
O'Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151 (1997)
Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997)
Trest v. Cain, 522 U.S. 87 (1997)
Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269 (1998)
Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1 (1998)
Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998)
Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538 (1998)

AEDPA
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO

WINNER
G
G
G
P
G
G
P
G
P
G
G
G
P
P
G
P
G
P

NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
YES
NO
NO
NO
YES
YES (2244)

G
P
G
P
P
P
G
G
P
P
G
P
G
P
P
G
G
G
G

203

CHALLENGING THE HABEAS PROCESS
NAME
Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637
(1998)
Hopkins v. Reeves, 524 U.S. 88 (1998)
Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141 (1998)
Stewart v. LaGrand, 526 U.S. 115 (1999)*
O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (1999)
Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999)
Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259 (2000)
Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225 (2000)
Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000)*
Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61 (2000)
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000)
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420 (2000)
Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446 (2000)
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000)
Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156 (2000)
Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4 (2000)
Fiore v. White, 531 U.S. 225 (2001)*
Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230 (2001)*
Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250 (2001)*
Lackawanna County District Attorney v.
Coss, 532 U.S. 394 (2001)
Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001)
Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (2001)
Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656 (2001)
Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362 (2002)
Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162 (2002)
Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685 (2002)
Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002)
Horn v. Banks, 536 U.S. 266 (2002)
Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856 (2002)
Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3 (2002)
Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19 (2003)
Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003)
Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003)
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003)
Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202 (2003)
Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634 (2003)

AEDPA

WINNER

YES (2244)
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
YES
NO
NO
YES
YES
NO
YES
YES
YES
NO
NO
NO

P
G
G
G
G
G
G
G
G
G
P
P
G
P
G
P
P
G
G

NO
YES
YES (2244)
YES
NO
YES
YES
YES
YES
NO
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES

G
P
G
G
P
G
G
G
G
G
G
G
P
G
P
G
G

204

69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 85 (2012)

NAME
Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1 (2003)
Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12 (2003)
Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (2004)
Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27 (2004)
Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386 (2004)
Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433 (2004)
Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652 (2004)
Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225 (2004)
Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004)
Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274 (2004)
Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406 (2004)
Holland v. Jackson, 542 U.S. 649 (2004)
Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S. 447 (2005)
Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133 (2005)
Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005)
Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005)
Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175 (2005)
Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005)
Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005)
Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005)
Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644 (2005)
Bell v. Thompson, 545 U.S. 794 (2005)*
Dye v. Hofbauer, 546 U.S. 1 (2005)*
Schriro v. Smith, 546 U.S. 6 (2005)
Kane v. Espitia, 546 U.S. 9 (2005)
Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74 (2005)
Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189 (2006)
Brown v. Sanders, 546 U.S. 212 (2006)
Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333 (2006)
Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198 (2006)
House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518 (2006)
Ayers v. Belmontes, 549 U.S. 7 (2006)
Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70 (2006)
Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147 (2007)
Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233
(2007)
Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327 (2007)
Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406 (2007)

AEDPA
YES
YES
NO
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
NO
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES (2244)
YES (2244)
NO
YES
YES
YES (2244)
YES (2244)
YES
NO
NO
YES
YES
YES (2244)
YES
YES
YES (2244)
NO
YES
YES
YES (2244)

WINNER
G
G
P
G
P
G
G
G
G
P
G
G
G
G
P
G
G
P
P
G
G
G
P
G
G
G
G
G
G
G
P
G
G
G

YES
YES (2244)
YES

P
G
G

205

CHALLENGING THE HABEAS PROCESS
NAME
Brewer v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 286 (2007)
Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465 (2007)
Uttecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. 1 (2007)
Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112 (2007)
Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007)
Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007)
Allen v. Siebert, 552 U.S. 3 (2007)
Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120 (2008)
Hedgpeth v. Pulido, 555 U.S. 57 (2008)
Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113 (2009)
Waddington v. Sarausad, 555 U.S. 179 (2009)
Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111 (2009)
Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449 (2009)
Bobby v. Bies, 556 U.S. 825 (2009)
Corcoran v. Levenhagen, 130 S. Ct. 8 (2009)
Bobby v. Van Hook, 130 S. Ct. 13 (2009)
Wong v. Belmontes, 130 S. Ct. 383 (2009)
Porter v. McCollum, 130 S. Ct. 447 (2009)
Webster v. Cooper, 130 S. Ct. 456 (2009)
Beard v. Kindler, 130 S. Ct. 612 (2009)
McDaniel v. Brown, 130 S. Ct. 665 (2010)
Smith v. Spisak, 130 S. Ct. 676 (2010)
Wood v. Allen, 130 S. Ct. 841 (2010)
Thaler v. Haynes, 130 S. Ct. 1171 (2010)
Berghuis v. Smith, 130 S. Ct. 1382 (2010)
Renico v. Lett, 130 S. Ct. 1855 (2010)
Jefferson v. Upton, 130 S. Ct. 2217 (2010)
Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250
(2010)
Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549 (2010)
Magwood v. Patterson, 130 S. Ct. 2788 (2010)
Wilson v. Corcoran, 131 S. Ct. 13 (2010)
Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770 (2010)
Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733 (2011)
Swarthout v. Cooke, 131 S. Ct. 859 (2011)
Walker v. Martin, 131 S. Ct. 1120 (2011)
Wall v. Kholi, 131 S. Ct. 1278 (2011)
Felkner v. Jackson, 131 S. Ct. 1305 (2011)

AEDPA
YES
YES
YES
YES
NO
YES
YES
YES
NO
YES
YES
YES
YES
NO
YES
NO
NO
YES
YES
NO
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
NO
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES

WINNER
P
G
G
G
G
P
G
G
G
P
G
G
P
G
P
G
G
P
P
G
G
G
G
G
G
G
P
G
P
P
G
G
G
G
G
P
G

206

69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 85 (2012)

NAME
Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011)
Bobby v. Mitts, 131 S. Ct. 1762 (2011)
Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S. Ct. 2 (2011)
Greene v. Fisher, 132 S. Ct. 38 (2011)
Bobby v. Dixon, 132 S. Ct. 26 (2011)
Hardy v. Cross, 132 S. Ct. 490 (2011)

AEDPA
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES

WINNER
G
G
G
G
G
G

